By Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Transformation of War: The book discusses how Al Qaeda represents ashift in the nature of warfare, moving from traditional state-basedconflicts to transnational, non-state actors engaging in asymmetricwarfare.

Historical Context: It explores the historical and political contextbehind Al Qaeda's actions, emphasizing the importance ofunderstanding their motivations and grievances.

Misconceptions: The author addresses common misconceptions aboutAl Qaeda, arguing that their actions are politically motivated rather thanpurelyideological or irrational.

Way Forward: The book suggests potential ways to resolve the conflict, including the possibility of negotiations and reassessment of currents trategies.

Pluto Press, 2007, 136 pages

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

DREXEL, BILL; WITHERS, CALEB

From the document: "Since ChatGPT [Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer] was launched in November 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have captured public imagination across the globe. ChatGPT's record-breaking speed of adoption--logging 100 million users in just two months--gave an unprecedented number of individuals direct, tangible experience with the capabilities of today's state-of-the-art AI systems. More than any other AI system to date, ChatGPT and subsequent competitor large language models (LLMs) have awakened societies to the promise of AI technologies to revolutionize industries, cultures, and political life. [...] This report aims to help policymakers understand catastrophic AI risks and their relevance to national security in three ways. First, it attempts to further clarify AI's catastrophic risks and distinguish them from other threats such as existential risks that have featured prominently in public discourse. Second, the report explains why catastrophic risks associated with AI development merit close attention from U.S. national security practitioners in the years ahead. Finally, it presents a framework of AI safety dimensions that contribute to catastrophic risks."

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY. UN, 2024. 42p.

By Simon Greipl, Julian Hohner, Heidi Schulze, Patrick Schwabl, Diana Rieger

Social media messages can elicit emotional reactions and mobilize users. Strategic utilization of emotionally charged messages, particularly those inducing fear, potentially nurtures a climate of threat and hostility online. Coined fear speech (FS), such communication deliberately portrays certain entities as imminently harmful and drives the perception of a threat, especially when the topic is already crisis-laden. Despite the notion that FS and the resulting climate of threat can serve as a justification for radical attitudes and behavior toward outgroups, research on the prevalence, nature, and context of FS is still scarce. The current paper aims to close this gap and provides a definition of FS, its theoretical foundations, and a starting point for (automatically) detecting FS on social media. The paper presents the results of a manual as well as an automated content analysis of three broadly categorized actor types within a larger radical German Telegram messaging sphere (2.9 million posts). With a rather conservative classification approach, we analyzed the prevalence and distribution of FS for more than five years in relation to six crisis-specific topics. A substantial proportion between 21% and 34% within the observed communication of radical/extremist actors was classified as FS. Additionally, the relative amount of FS was found to increase with the overall posting frequency. This underscores FS's potential as an indicator for radicalization dynamics and crisis escalation.

Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media. Vol. 4, 2024.

RISIUS, MARTEN; NAMVAR, MORTEZA; AKHLAGHPOUR, SAEED; XIE, HETIAO (SLIM)

The following excerpt from the document contains multiple links embedded in the original text: "'Content Warning: This insight contains antisemitic, racist, and hateful imagery.' [...] Extremists exploit social media platforms to spread hate against minority groups based on protected attributes such as gender, religion, and ethnicity. Platforms and researchers have been actively developing AI tools to detect and remove such hate speech. However, extremists employ various forms of implicit hate speech (IHS) to evade AI detection systems. IHS spreads hateful messages using subtle expressions and complex contextual semantic relationships instead of explicit abusive words, bringing challenges to automatic detection algorithms. Common forms of IHS include dog whistles, coded language, humorous hate speech, and implicit dehumanisation. Moreover, the forms and expressions of IHS evolve rapidly with societal controversies (e.g., regional wars). Identifying and tracking such changes in IHS is crucial for platforms trying to counter them. In this Insight, we report and analyse 'Substitution' as a new form of IHS. Recently, we observed extremists using 'Substitution' by propagating hateful rhetoric against a target group (e.g., Jews) while explicitly referencing another label group (e.g., Chinese). We show that Substitution not only effectively spreads hate but also exacerbates engagement and obscures detection."

GLOBAL NETWORK ON EXTREMISM AND TECHNOLOGY (GNET). 24 JUN, 2024. 8p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

From the document: "The United States is an Arctic nation, and the region is critical to the defense of our homeland, the protection of U.S. national sovereignty, and our defense treaty commitments. I am issuing this 2024 Arctic Strategy to guide the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in a concerted approach to preserve the Arctic as a stable region in which the U.S. homeland remains secure and vital national interests are safeguarded. Major geopolitical changes are driving the need for this new strategic approach to the Arctic, including Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO Alliance, increasing collaboration between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, and the accelerating impacts of climate change. This increasingly accessible region is becoming a venue for strategic competition, and the United States must stand ready to meet the challenge alongside Allies and partners. This new DoD strategy directs the Department to enhance its Arctic capabilities, deepen engagement with Allies and partners, and exercise our forces to build readiness for operations at high latitudes. The document supports the 2022 National Security Strategy as well as the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and its lines of effort implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy direction to adopt a 'monitor-and-respond' approach to preserving stability in the Arctic. This strategy represents prudent and measured efforts to protect U.S. interests in the face of new challenges and an evolving security environment."

Washington DC. UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 21 JUN, 2024. 28p.

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

From the document: "Fulcrum represents the Department's ambitious Information Technology (IT) advancement strategy designed to leverage the power of technology to drive transformative change and serves as a tipping point for catalyzing digital modernization for the warfighter. To propel the Department forward, we must ensure continued success and relevance in the digital age. Fulcrum will enable achievement of the DoD mission and strategic objectives with unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness. [...] The DoD Chief Information Officer's (DoD CIO) mission is to 'connect', 'protect', and 'perform'. Fulcrum outlines a vision guided by four lines of effort (LOEs) representing a strategic shift that embraces technology as a mission enabler. [...] Fulcrum features the DoD CIO's IT goals and objectives for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2025-2029 that provide essential support to the priorities in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the supporting DoD Strategic Management Plan (SMP)."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 6 JUN, 2024

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By Michael A. Jensen and Elena Akers

Recent mass casualty attacks in the United States have renewed a long-standing debate over the need for novel legislation to effectively prosecute domestic terrorism. Those who advocate for a new terrorism law argue that deficiencies in the US legal code present challenges to prosecuting domestic extremists, leading to unwarranted sentencing disparities in international and domestic terrorism cases. Critics of the proposal for a domestic terrorism law counter that the US legal code is sufficiently flexible for the courts to punish domestic extremists to the same extent as their international counterparts. Neither side, however, has produced an empirical assessment to support their claims. In this article, we address this research gap by analysing data on 344 US federal terrorism cases that were initiated between 2014 and 2019. We find that significant disparities are endemic to US federal terrorism prosecutions for three types of sentencing outcomes: length of incarceration; time spent on supervision upon release from prison; and the use of restrictive monitoring conditions. International terrorism defendants are more likely than domestic extremists to receive severe penalties for all three sentencing decisions even when controlling for criminal severity. Sentencing disparities in US federal terrorism cases are especially large when domestic extremists are prosecuted using common criminal charges, like weapons violations. We conclude with a discussion of what these findings mean for promoting judicial fairness in US terrorism prosecutions.

Perspectives on Terrorism Volume XVIII, Issue 1 March 2024

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in north-eastern Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). In the course of 2023, JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad, which ISWAP had controlled. 

Why did it happen? Conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from differences in governance and treatment of civilians. JAS kills and steals from everyone; the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants. Many JAS members surrendered to authorities or continued fighting instead of joining ISWAP after the death of JAS’s

leader in 2021. 

  Why does it matter? In the last two years, JAS and ISWAP may have visited more damage upon each other than the Lake Chad states have inflicted on the jihadists. Still, the splinters pose a significant threat. ISWAP is regrouping, while the revamped JAS is set to target civilians around the lake. What should be done? The Lake Chad governments will need to do more to prevail over the jihadists. They should mitigate risks to civilians by maintaining humanitarian assistance; expanding efforts to support defectors; improving airstrike precision; and reinvigorating regional security cooperation.    

Edited by Jeff Breinholt

Initially enacted in 1992, the Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §2333, provides a legal remedy for American victims killed or injured by reason of international terrorism by creating a private cause of action, with treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Since then, some 150 lawsuits have been brought under the statute against such terrorist organizations as Hamas, Hizballah, and FARC, as well as the banks and companies alleged to have assisted them. These lawsuits have generated some 600 opinions.

Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 91pg

Edited By James Cuno and Thomas G. Weiss

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage has a long history. Contemporary examples include the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, mosques in Xinjiang, China, mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, and Greco-Roman remains in Syria. Cultural heritage destruction invariably accompanies assaults on civilians, making heritage attacks impossible to disentangle from the mass atrocities of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Both seek to eliminate people and the heritage with which they identify. Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities assembles thirty-eight experts from the heritage, social science, humanitarian, legal, and military communities. Focusing on immovable cultural heritage vulnerable to attack, the volume’s guiding framework is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a United Nations resolution adopted unanimously in 2005 to permit international intervention against crimes of war or genocide. Based on the three pillars of prevent, react, and rebuild, R2P offers today’s policymakers a set of existing laws and international norms that can and—as this book argues—must be extended to the protection of cultural heritage. Essays consider the global value of cultural heritage and document recent attacks on people and sites in China, Guatemala, Iraq, Mali, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Comprehensive sections on vulnerable populations as well as the role of international law and the military offer readers critical insights and point toward research, policy, and action agendas to protect both people and cultural heritage. The table of contents along with a concise abstract of each chapter is offered online in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish to facilitate robust, global dissemination of the strategies and tactics offered in this pathbreaking call to action.

Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 2022. 649p.

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

Edited by Petra Terhoeven

How does terrorism affect our picture of the history of terrorism then, if the victims are moved centre stage? If the focus is put on their suffering? The contributions to this edition of the European History Yearbook will examine such questions in a broad range of historical case studies and methods, including visual history.

Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. 172p.

By Bashir Bello and Mustapaha Muhammad Abdullahi

The study examined farmers–herdsmen conflict, cattle rustling, and banditry in Anka and Maradun local government area of Zamfara State, Nigeria. The study examined the influence of farmers–herdsmen conflicts on cattle rustling and banditry, and vice versa. Exploratory research was employed; focus group discussion (FGD) and key informant interview (KII)were used to collect primary data from the respondents. The data generated were transcribed and recorded verbatim (word-for-word account of verbal interview) and they were converted into written form. Data were enumerated and thematic analysis and categorization were provided. Secondary data were sourced from internet and relevant books. This study adopted the environmental resources scarcity and frustration-aggression theory. The findings of the study revealed that farmers–herdsmen conflict precipitates the acts of cattle rustling and banditry. It also revealed that conversely cattle rustling and banditry contributed to the farmers–herdsmen conflict in the local government area of Zamfara State. The study discovered that the synthesis of farmers–herdsmen conflicts, cattle rustling, and banditry pose serious threat to the safety and security of the people. The researchers recommended that there should be an introduction of grazing reserves equipped with adequate social amenities and that there should be policies capable of enhancing herders’ transformation from traditional to the modern method of animal husbandry. They also suggested that various factors responsible for farmers–herdsmen conflict, cattle rustling, and banditry should be properly managed by traditional and religious leaders. The findings corroborate the gaps which the researchers intended to fill

Sage Open, 11(4). 2021.

By Nsirimovu Okwuwada

There have been several agitations in Nigeria, but none have degenerated into the current barbaric, horrendous, heinous, and despicable dimensions of carnage, massacres, and bloodletting orchestrated by terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, and other organized violent crime syndicates. This study takes a holistic approach using secondary data sources to examine the root causes of the modern-day prevalence of kidnapping, banditry, terrorist attacks, and other organized criminal activities in Nigeria. The study finds that unemployment, excess supply of young people, neglect of certain regions in the distribution of national wealth, lack of government visibility, lack of equal economic opportunity for all, uncontrolled influx of firearms, poverty, and religious fanaticism contributes to the increasing rate of violent crime in Nigeria. The article finds that the nature of banditry, kidnapping, and terrorist attacks are similar, and the modes of attacks on civilian and government installations are also related. The government should thus become proactively visible throughout the nation via its security agencies and economic development agenda. Additionally, the government should educate local officials and traditional councils on contemporary methods for reporting and addressing violent groups in their communities.

MPRA Paper No. 117671, Munich: MPRA, 2023. 46p.

By Cyril O. Ugwuoke, Benjamin Okorie Ajah, Linus Akor, Sunday Ojonugwa Ameh, Cletus A. Lanshima, Elias C. Ngwu, Ugomma Ann Eze, and Michael Nwokedi

This paper examined the vulnerability of travelers to kidnapping, abduction and armed robbery attacks and in some extreme cases, death along Nigeria's highways. Insecurity on the nation's highways became a contemporary criminological discourse following the emergence of new strands of criminality like militancy, terrorism, kidnapping, herdsmen-farmers violence, communal conflicts and banditry. Nigerian highways have become the major operational hotspots for criminals who harass, terrorize, and traumatize travelers at will. With the ever-rising insecurity on Nigerian highways, the military and paramilitary offensives deployed by the Federal Government have not yielded the desired results culminating in the description of government's inertia as a form of state slumber. Data for this study were sourced from a content analysis of reported violent highway crimes by credible mainstream Nigerian newspapers, spanning a period of one year, from July 2020 to July 2021. Adopting the Social Disorganization Theory, the study indicated that the worrisome nature of insecurity on Nigeria's highways resulting in the high rate of abduction and murder of people of diverse military, professional, socioeconomic and political backgrounds has engendered a sense of helplessness, trauma and vulnerability among Nigerian road travelers. The paper recommends the de-centralization of Nigeria Police Force structure to create State Police that will encourage and electrify effective and better people oriented patrolling and management of insecurities on the Nigerian highways.

Heliyon v.9(10); 2023 Oct PMC10551549