By James Black, Mattias Eken, Jacob Parakilas, Stuart Dee, Conlan Ellis, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Ryan J. Bain, Harper Fine, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Melusine Lebret, et al.

Artificial intelligence (AI) holds the potential to usher in transformative changes across all aspects of society, economy and policy, including in the realm of defence and security. The United Kingdom (UK) aspires to be a leading player in the rollout of AI for civil and commercial applications, and in the responsible development of defence AI. This necessitates a clear and nuanced understanding of the emerging risks and opportunities associated with the military use of AI, as well as how the UK can best work with others to mitigate or exploit these risks and opportunities.

In March 2024, the Defence AI & Autonomy Unit (DAU) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) jointly commissioned a short scoping study from RAND Europe. The goal was to provide an initial exploration of ways in which military use of AI might generate risks and opportunities at the strategic level – conscious that much of the research to date has focused on the tactical level or on non-military topics (e.g. AI safety). Follow-on work will then explore these issues in more detail to inform the UK strategy for international engagement on these issues.

This technical report aims to set a baseline of understanding of strategic risks and opportunities emerging from military use of AI. The summary report focuses on high-level findings for decision makers.

Key Findings

One of the most important findings of this study is deep uncertainty around AI impacts; an initial prioritisation is possible, but this should be iterated as evidence improves.

The RAND team identified priority issues demanding urgent action. Whether these manifest as risks or opportunities will depend on how quickly and effectively states adapt to intensifying competition over and through AI.

RAND - Sep 6, 2024

By Peter M. Swartz

COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS: LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Recent events off the Horn of Africa have once again involved the US Navy in counter-piracy operations. The Navy has been involved in operations against piracy since the 18th century. We quickly reviewed these operations and found several relevant lessons for today’s operations.

PIRACY ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE CENTURIES

We identified three distinct eras relating to piracy: the era of privateering, the era of Western imperialism, and the era of terrorism.

THE ERA OF PRIVATEERING: 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES

Privateers were civilians licensed by their sovereigns to seize upon the high seas vessels, cargoes, and crews of other nations against whom their own nation was at war. Pirates also operated for their own financial benefit on the high seas, but with no government authorization, and against the ships, cargoes, and crews of any nation. The Law of Nations allowed the forces of any nation to capture, try, and hang them. In the 18th and 19th centuries, however, it was often difficult to differentiate legal privateering from illegal piracy. During this period the American merchant marine became second only to that of Great Britain in size. As one of the world’s leading shipping powers, the United States had a vital interest in the safety of American ships, crews, cargoes, and profits. This was the principal mission set of the Navy through most of this period. This was the era of the Barbary pirates and the Caribbean anti-piracy campaign.

THE ERA OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM: 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

The nineteenth century saw an explosion of European and American global commerce, and a concomitant increase in attacks on that commerce worldwide. Some of these attacks were sponsored by political entities: decaying empires, petty states, local warlords, and insurgent groups. Others were clearly conducted by independent bands of true pirates. Western naval operations to suppress piracy usually involved landings and assaults ashore. These anti-piracy   CNA Historical Paper Series (2006) ii operations were sometimes hard to distinguish—especially in the minds of local rulers—from the various other forms of European colonial land-grabs then underway throughout the world.

Arlington VA: CNA, 2006. (published 2021) 21p.

By Alicia Schmidt

This report outlines a conceptual model of the social and economic impacts of money laundering and terrorism financing. Drawing on a comprehensive literature review and stakeholder interviews, it identifies possible economic, societal and sectoral impacts. Economic impacts are those that affect the economy at a macro level and include reductions in economic growth and foreign direct investment and the distortion of exchange and interest rates. Societal impacts include changes in crime levels—predicate offences which generate illicit proceeds that are then laundered, crimes financed using laundered funds and crimes attracted to areas where money laundering occurs—and the associated costs to the community. They also include the consequences of terrorism enabled by terrorism financing, including the costs of terrorist attacks and the impact on national reputation. Sectoral impacts include damage to the reputation of the financial sector and other regulated entities, the crowding out of legitimate competitors, artificial increases in prices (eg real estate prices), and lost tax revenue. Importantly, not all impacts are harmful; potential benefits of money laundering include the recovery of proceeds of crime from the enforcement of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime, the profitability of certain sectors that facilitate or enable money laundering, and the growth of the AML/CTF industry. Having identified these impacts, this report assesses their significance in the Australian context and sets out a path towards quantifying the impacts identified as both relevant and measurable.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 117p.

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

By Kristian Alexander

The September 11, 2001, attacks highlighted significant US vulnerabilities and led to major counterterrorism reforms. Post-9/11, the US government implemented institutional changes, enhanced international cooperation, and expanded its use of technology and drone warfare. However, public fatigue from prolonged wars and shifting US focus towards geopolitical rivalries and domestic issues has reduced the centrality of counterterrorism in US policy over the last two decades. COMMENTARY The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, remain one of the most devastating strategic surprises in modern history. Despite being the world’s preeminent superpower with an extensive intelligence apparatus, the United States failed to anticipate and prevent the hijacking and subsequent crashing of four commercial airliners, killing almost 3,000 people.

Singapore: The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) , 2024. 4p.

By Global Witness

This report and our campaign are dedicated to all those individuals, communities and organisations bravely taking a stand to defend human rights, their land, and our environment. Last year, 196 people were murdered for doing this work. We also acknowledge that the names of many defenders who were killed last year may be missing, and we may never know how many more gave their lives to protect our planet. We honour their work too

This report shows that in every region of the world, people who speak out and call attention to the harm caused by extractive industries – like deforestation, pollution and land grabbing – face violence, discrimination and threats. We are land and environmental defenders. And when we speak up many of us are attacked for doing so.

More than 2,100 land and environmental defenders killed globally between 2012 and 2023

• An estimated 196 land and environmental defenders were killed in 2023 around the world, according to a new Global Witness report published today

• The new figures take the total number of defenders killed between 2012 to 2023 to 2,106

• For the second year running, Colombia had the highest number of killings worldwide – with a record 79 defenders killed last year, followed by Brazil (25), Mexico (18) and Honduras (18)

• Once again, Latin America had the highest number of recorded killings worldwide, with 166 killings overall – 54 killings across Mexico and Central America and 112 in South America

• Environmental defenders are also being increasingly subject to range of tactics for silencing those who speak out for the planet across Asia, the UK, EU and US

London: Global Witness, 2024. 66p.

By Ahmet Gule and Mustafa Demir

This study examined the effectiveness of post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies in preventing terror attacks and reducing casualties against American targets within and outside the United States. Monthly data on terrorism incidents from July 1981 through December 2020 were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (N = 462). The results of monthly interrupted time-series analyses showed that within the United States, after the 9/11 attacks, the number of attacks, the number of successful attacks, and the successful attack rate statistically significantly decreased in the first month following 9/11; then, no significant increase was observed in the trend of those outcomes. Outside the United States, after the 9/11 attacks, the trend of the number of successful attacks, the number of victims, the number of nonfatal victims, and the victim rate statistically significantly decreased. The results suggest that post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies are effective both domestically and internationally. These findings and their policy implications are discussed.

Criminal Justice Policy Review OnlineFirst, Sept. 2024

May Contain Markup

Edited by A. Dirk Moses

Scope of Genocide Studies: The book explores genocide in various historical contexts, emphasizing that genocides are not limited to the 20th century but have occurred throughout history.

Colonialism and Genocide: It examines the intrinsic link between colonialism and genocide, suggesting that many genocides have rootsin colonial and imperial conquests.

Case Studies: The document includes numerous case studies from different regions and periods, such as the Armenian Genocide, genocides in Tasmania, and colonial rule in German Southwest Africa.

Intellectual Contributions: The book features contributions from various scholars, providing diverse perspectives on the relationship between empire, colony, and genocide.

Berghahn Books, 2008, 491 pages

May Contain Markup

Edited by René Lemarchand

Forgotten Genocides: The book explores lesser-known genocides, such as those in Burundi, Tibet, and among the Herero and TasmanianAborigines.

Denial and Memory: It discusses how many genocides are denied or forgotten, often manipulated by perpetrators and overlooked by the global community.

Historical Context: Each genocide is examined within its uniquehistorical and political context, highlighting the diversity of circumstances leading to mass violence.

Comparative Analysis: The book provides a comparative study of different genocides, emphasizing the importance of remembering and understanding these tragedies to prevent future occurrences.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011, 190 pages

May Contain Markup

Edited by Helen Fein

Definitions of Genocide: The book explores various definitions of genocide, highlighting the limitations of the U.N. Genocide Conventionand proposing broader sociological definitions.

Recognition and Denial: It discusses the challenges in recognizing and labeling genocides, including the role of media and state motives in denial and misinformation.

Prevention and Punishment: The book examines approaches to preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable, includingreflections on historical cases and legal frameworks.

Role of Refugees: Refugees are highlighted as contemporary witnesses to genocide, with their testimonies providing crucial evidence andinsights into ongoing atrocities.

SAGE Publications, 1993, 204 pages

By Guri Nordtorp Mølmena and Jacob Aasland Ravndal

How does the internet affect the radicalisation of extreme-right lone actor terrorists? In the absence of an established theoretical model, this article identifies six mechanisms seen as particularly relevant for explaining online radicalisation. Having first reviewed a larger set of relevant lone actor terrorists, the study traces the mechanisms in three selected cases where the internet was reportedly used extensively during radicalisation. The findingsshow that the internet primarily facilitated radicalisation through information provision, as well as amplifying group polarisation and legitimising extreme ideology and violence through echoing.In all three cases, radicalisation was also affected considerably byoffline push-factors that through their presence made extreme online messages more impactful. The results challenge the view that offline interaction is necessary for radicalisation to occur but also the view that online influence itself is sufficient

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL AGGRESSION 2023, VOL. 15, NO. 4, 463–487

By Raul Zepeda Gil

One of the main inquiry topics within crime and conflict studies is how inequalities or poverty fosters or deters participation in organized violence. Since the late 1990s, the increase in violence in Latin America has boosted the use of Global North criminology and conflict studies to explain this phenomenon. Although helpful, the question about the link between inequality and violence remains elusive. Instead, this research uses occupational mobility and life course approaches to analyze the latest Mexican inmate survey data. With this data, we can understand the factors behind youth recruitment into violent criminal organizations during the current drug war. The main findings point to youth transitions from school and low-skilled manual employment towards criminal violent activities as an option out of work precariousness. This research proposes researching transitions to organized violence as an occupational choice in market economies and post-conflict settlements as a possible causal mechanism that explains inequalities and violence.

   Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 1–15, 2024

By Eva Veldhuizen Ochodničanová, Alicia Heys

Despite the link between conflict and human trafficking having been globally recognized, academic inquiry investigating how the two interact continues to be limited. Given the recency of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, this lack of literature is even more pronounced in understanding how the risks of trafficking are developing in the current context. This paper examines extant academic literature to explore what is already known about the relationship between conflict and human trafficking, situating this within the theoretical framework of routine activity theory (RAT). It analyses governmental and non-governmental organization reports emerging from Ukraine to contextualize the risk that is specific to those affected by the war. The paper identifies four key drivers of risk facing those in, or fleeing, Ukraine, which can heighten their vulnerability to human trafficking, before offering a novel and innovative typology of the ways that human trafficking can manifest as a result of conflict. The typology considers the direct and indirect links between conflict and trafficking, the geographical spaces in which trafficking can occur, and the specific forms that exploitation can take. By situating the paper within RAT and contextualizing it with evidence from the war in Ukraine, the findings of this paper provide both theoretical and empirical insights that help to expand existing knowledge on how conflict situations can increase the risk of THB.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 26–41.2024 

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

By André Duffles, Teixeira Araneg and Ariel Faccioli Fernandes

Grounded on an extensive literature review derived from evidence-based studies (e.g., scientific articles, institutional and technical reports, journalistic evidence, academic books, and book chapters), our article develops a qualitative analysis to address the following question: to what extent do the strategic motivations of states and organized crime groups converge/diverge in the context of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict? This article is divided into three parts. The initial section delves into the interconnections between illicit markets and armed conflicts. Secondly, after acknowledging the background of organized crime in both countries and the emergence of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it highlights the implications of this conflict on the dynamics of illicit markets. Finally, it analyzes the strategic motivations of states and organized crime within this setting, as well as its points of convergence and divergence. This research potentially explores the frequently wicked ties of (inter)national politics and criminal adaptation during (post-)war times in Eastern Europe and within the international system.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 48–60. 2024.

By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.

ByMaura Conway, Ashley A. Mattheis, Sean McCafferty, and Miraji H. Mohamed.

The report describes and discusses developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) in the 12-month period from 1 January to 31 December 2023. It accomplishes this by surveying, synopsizing, and integrating the findings of relevant articles and reports produced by academics, think tanks, civil society, and governmental organizations; high-quality press reports; and the first-hand online experience and primary research of the authors.

Dublin: Vox Pol, 2023. 43p.