By Lev Topor

Arguments made by white supremacists to explain, promote, and gain support for their ideology fall into five categories: religious arguments, biological arguments, cultural arguments, arguments based on “protectionism,” and arguments relating to freedom of speech. Furthermore, while nationalism can lead to differences and conflicts between nations, global support for white supremacy can act as a common glue, uniting even historical adversaries, such as Americans and Russians. To explain and exemplify these phenomena, the pseudo-philosophical and pseudoscientific arguments in support of white supremacy are examined in the light of historical, social, and political trends, which all develop the concept of global white supremacy. Thus, while religious arguments in support of white supremacy date back thousands of years, “protectionist” arguments have become more prominent in the wake of terror events in the twenty-first century. They have also entered the mainstream as populists argue that “self-defense” is the only rational response to such threats. Ironically, it is the main idea behind each one of these arguments that ultimately serves to nullify it.

ISGAP’s Occasional Paper Series ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

Oxford ◆ Cambridge ◆ New York.◆ Jerusalem ◆ Toronto.◆ Rome;

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy

ISCAP, 2022. 33p.

By John P. Sullivan

Crime wars and criminal Insurgencies challenge states as they emerge at the intersection of crime and war. In many nations these conflicts involve protracted gang and drug wars. These situations of insecurity range in the level of intensity and complexity. At times the lower levels of violence result in local consequences: violence and insecurity. In others the criminal organizations challenge the state and establish alternative of parallel power structures. This short paper will discuss these issues by briefly summarizing the situation in Mexico and Colombia. This summary will then identify the need for further research and development of legal and policy approaches in these states, as well as others facing similar challenges such as Brazil and Central America.

REVISTA DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO MILITAR, 2021.

By John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

Transnational Organized Crime exploits the complex relationships of local and global networks comprised of a range of criminal cartels, mafias, gangs, and corrupt state actors. This article will look at the links among these criminal enterprises and state actors, at municipal, sub-state, and state levels in Latin America to frame the contours of this segment of the global illicit political economy. The networks of alliances and co-operation among criminal cartels, transnational gangs, mafias, and state actors will be assessed. This includes criminal alliances of cartels and gangs with global mafias, the presence of criminal governance, transnational (and third generation) gangs, and links with hybrid threats and influence operations involving state actors. Examples will be drawn from Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, and Brazil. These examples will look at global links between cartels and gangs with transnational mafia such as the ‘Ndrangheta, as well as the use of strategic crime and corruption by states such as Russia, China, and Iran. Methods include a mix of quantitative methods, such as social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative cases studies. International Journal on Criminology • Volume 11, Number 2 • Summer/Fall 2024

By Daniel Byman and Riley McCabe

In the wake of Israel’s blistering military response against Hezbollah, the group is facing a cash shortfall at a time when it has lost key leaders, fighters, weapons, stockpiles of cash and gold, communication systems, and infrastructure. On top of that, it has to contend with a new Lebanese government that is beginning to do its part to implement the November 2024 ceasefire. As Hezbollah seeks to recover, it is certain to look to criminal enterprises—including laundering drug money—to fill the gap, as it has in the past after less severe financial crises. Nor is the risk limited to terrorist financing alone.

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2025. 17p.

By Peer Schouten & James Barnett

Conflict maps often depict who controls what territory, with the Sahel frequently shown as divided among jihadists, bandits and militias. Yet such maps obscure how armed groups actually operate. We propose a more nuanced model that distinguishes core areas of presence, areas of tribute extraction, and raiding frontiers – capturing how these actors interact with communities in varied and shifting ways. Why maps matter Conflict maps of Nigeria show a worrying picture: virtually the whole national territory is under control of some non-state armed actor. Boko Haram controls the northeast, jihadists and bandits the northwest, and they are divided from the separatists in the south by a belt that is under the sway of farmer and herder militias.1 The rest of the Sahel doesn’t fare much better, with vast swathes of territory typically marked as under the control of armed groups.

While perhaps useful to raise the alarm on the often-dire humanitarian situation in these areas, such maps convey a treacherously wrong impression of how armed actors interact with communities across space.3 The Sahel is a huge, often sparsely settled space, in most of which it makes no sense for armed groups (or states for that matter) to try and establish a permanent presence – particularly given the oftenmodest capacities most groups dispose of.4 This dissonance is important, because policy is made and public opinions are shaped based on maps.motorbikes, typically just before planting and around harvest time, to extract their due. Because farmers are mostly left alone the rest of the year, this is hardly captured by the permanent and exclusive territorial control suggested by conventional maps.

Current conflict maps exaggerate the extent of armed group control by equating sporadic violence with territorial control. This misrepresentation risks distorting threat assessments and misguiding humanitarian and security interventions. The proposed radial model offers a more precise tool for policy and programming. By distinguishing between areas of direct control, tribute extraction and episodic raiding, it helps target interventions to where communities are most vulnerable or most governed by non-state actors. This spatial framework is relevant to conflicts across the Sahel, Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Redrawing the maps of these conflicts, based on how armed groups actually interact with populations, can enable more context-sensitive strategies, be they for peacebuilding, civilian protection or engagement with local actors.

Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 2025. 5p.

By Newton D. Baker, Edited by Ciolin Heston

Newton Diehl Baker’s Why We Went to War, published in 1921, is one of the most important contemporary American explanations of the nation’s entry into the First World War. Baker, who served as Secretary of War from 1916 to 1921 under President Woodrow Wilson, occupied a unique position at the very center of America’s wartime transformation. Once known as a progressive mayor of Cleveland and a disciple of Wilsonian reform, Baker became, almost overnight, the chief administrator responsible for raising, training, and mobilizing an army that grew from a modest peacetime force into one of the most formidable fighting powers of the modern age. His book represents both a justification and a reflection—part political defense, part historical testimony—on why the United States took the fateful step of joining a conflict from which it had long sought to remain apart.

For modern readers, Why We Went to War should be approached both as a primary document and as an act of persuasion. Baker was not an impartial historian; he was a participant and advocate, a defender of Wilsonian ideals at a moment when those ideals were under attack. His words reveal not only the official reasoning of the Wilson administration but also the mindset of a generation of progressives who believed that the United States, through sacrifice and leadership, could help reorder the world toward democracy and peace.

In the end, Baker’s book is as much about America’s identity as about the Great War. It reflects a moment when the nation stood at the crossroads between its traditional reluctance to become entangled in European affairs and its emerging role as a world power. To understand why the United States entered World War I is to understand not only the international provocations of the time but also the ideals, anxieties, and ambitions of a nation coming of age on the world stage.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p. 165.

By Kodili Henry Chukwuma

Offers a critical examination of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism policy as a political activity of identity construction

• Draws upon archival material to offer a discursive analysis of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy

• Considers the construction of terrorist threat and identity considering specific colonial and post-colonial histories, realities and agency

• Explores the official discourse on counter-terrorism as produced by Nigeria’s federal executive

• Examines the productivity and effects of the official discourse

  This book critically engages with Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy as a means of identity construction. Drawing on a wealth of archival materials, Kodili Chukwuma analyses how the federal government articulates and justifies its counter-terrorism policy against specific ‘terrorist’ groups such as Boko Haram in order to construct Nigeria's identity. He argues that the designation of particular terrorist threats as a new form of terrorism in Nigeria – and beyond – enables state counter-terrorism interventions. Revealing the complexities of Nigeria's counter-terrorist strategy, this book sheds new light on critical terrorism and critical security studies in a key postcolonial context.

  Edinburgh University Press, 2025. 216p.

By Drevon, Jerome

The Syrian regime unleashed unprecedented violence to suppress large-scale non-violent protests amid the Arab uprisings. Hundreds of armed groups formed throughout the country to defend the protesters and fight back. However, in contrast to other conflicts previously dominated by al-Qaeda and Islamic State, the two largest Syrian Jihadi groups, Ahrar al-Sham and then Jabhat al-Nusra, rejected global jihad and began to cultivate new ties with the population, other armed opposition groups, and even foreign states. This strategic shift is a response to the Jihadi paradox--a realization that while Jihadis excel at leading insurgencies, they fail to achieve political victories. In From Jihad to Politics, Jerome Drevon offers an examination of the Syrian armed opposition, tracing the emergence of Jihadi groups in the conflict, their dominance, and their political transformation. Drawing upon field research and interviews with Syrian insurgents in northwestern Syria and Turkey, Drevon demonstrates how the context of a local conflict can shape armed groups' behavior in unexpected ways. Further, he marshals unique evidence from the Arab world's most intense conflict to explain why the trajectory of the transnational Jihadi movement has altered course in recent years.

New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 

By Sardelić, Julija

This open-access book presents a socio-legal analysis of immediate responses to large-scale refugee displacement in Europe after the 1951 Refugee Convention came into force, focusing on the countries to which refugees initially fled or through which they passed (namely Austria and, initially, Yugoslavia, followed by several of the former Yugoslav countries). First, it investigates the immediate responses to refugee movements following the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution by Soviet troops. Second, it examines the responses to individuals seeking asylum after being displaced during the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Third, it analyses the responses of the same countries to refugees fleeing Global South countries (predominantly Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) in 2015 and 2016. Finally, it explores how these countries responded to the mass displacement of refugees from Ukraine. The book argues that these countries have positioned themselves as “transit” or temporary protection countries in order to avoid assuming long-term responsibility for a larger number of refugees. As a consequence, they granted various forms of temporary legal status to refugees that differed from the refugee status defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. These legal statuses were hierarchical (in terms of the rights attached to them) and racialized, with the fewest rights granted to refugees from the Global South and other negatively racialized groups. The book traces the usage of self-serving politics of diversity and selective memory to legitimise why refugees could not be protected long-term in these countries, and also why there were such differences in treatment of refugees.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2025.

By Amy Cooter

A dominant analytical frame has emerged in extremism studies that attributes nearly all right wing, far right, or nostalgic group ideology1 and action to white supremacy. Some versions of this narrative further posit that these extremist groups intentionally and consciously effect white supremacy through a “cohesive social network based on commonly held beliefs,” a “white power movement.”2 However, these conceptions sometimes lack definitions of social movements, white supremacy, and other key concepts that are central to their arguments.3 This has led to over-generalizations about nostalgic group actors’ motives and goals in a way that downplays both the power of white supremacy as a hegemonic system and the specific harms caused by overtly supremacist actors. This paper clarifies a social science understanding of the key, but sometimes taken-for-granted, terms necessary for understanding these dynamics and demonstrates how faulty or unclear usage of this terminology leads to both analytical problems and the perpetuation of power structures that the field of extremism studies hopes to address. Specifically, I argue that improper conceptualization of white supremacy and related terms creates risks falling into three categories: analytic accuracy and predictive capacity, preventing near-term harm, and perpetuating white supremacy’s power structure and radicalization.

Monterey, CA: Center on Terrorism, Extremism and Counterterrorism, Middlebury Institute of International Studies. 2024. 29p.

By Noor Huda Ismail and Putri Kusuma Amanda

The rise of JAD Nusantara, an ISIS-linked online network drawing in large numbers of minors, exposes serious gaps in Indonesia’s child protection systems. Vulnerable adolescents, often grappling with bullying, isolation, or absent parents, are being recruited without showing clear outward signs of radicalisation. In line with UN child rights standards, Indonesia must adopt an approach that prioritises rehabilitative, child-centred responses, safeguarding children’s rights while tackling the vulnerabilities and special needs that extremists exploit.

COMMENTARY
The case of a 12-year-old boy in Pemalang, Central Java, who joined the terrorist group JAD Nusantara, underscores a worrisome trend: radicalisation is increasingly happening entirely online, beyond parental or authority awareness. 

Social media platforms and messaging apps serve as conduits, enabling extremist content to reach vulnerable youth undetected. Research analyses show that extremism thrives on platforms that offer anonymity, rapid dissemination, and emotional appeal – qualities that make virtual spaces ideal for radical recruitment. 

Detecting online-driven radicalisation through traditional community surveillance is extremely difficult. Therefore, child protection systems need to adopt digital literacy and monitoring capabilities so that educators and social workers, not just security personnel, can recognize warning signs and intervene early.

A comprehensive society-wide strategy is needed – one that identifies young people at risk and engages them through pastoral, not punitive, channels.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Robin O'Luanaigh, Hannah Ritchey and Frances Breidenstein

One image shows two young women sparring with each other, donning boxing gloves and athletic wear. A second image shows a young woman wrapping her hands and wrists, presumably preparing for a fight. On her arm is a tattoo of an Othala rune, a symbol common in neo-Nazi and white supremacist communities. 

These images, identified in online Active Club spaces, diverge from more traditional portrayals of women in right-wing extremist movements and communities. Instead of quaint cottagecore aesthetics and traditional ‘tradwives’ tending to the family and home, these images present women as activists, ideologues and warriors. While the Active Club network’s portrayals of women still promote traditional gender roles–especially within romantic relationships–the invocation of ‘warrior women’ tropes opens the door to a more palatable form of right-wing extremist activism – one that is less overtly misogynistic and ostensibly more ‘gender equal’. 

This Insight serves as a first look into the hypermasculine extremist spaces and communities of the Active Club network and how they co-opt and utilise images of women in their propaganda. We first introduce the Active Club network before reviewing existing literature on representations of women in right-wing extremist content. Next, we identify and discuss distinctly gendered tropes regarding the representation of women and couples in Active Club content. We conclude with a cautionary analysis of how such content can make Active Clubs and similar organisations palatable to women who may view these groups as gender-equal or empowering. 

Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 

By Middlebury Institute of International Studies

Active Clubs make up a decentralized network of individually-formed organizations that are centered around the premise of a white supremacist fraternal brotherhood. First introduced in December of 2020 by Robert Rundo, the leader of the white supremacist Rise Above Movement (R.A.M), Active Clubs are intended to preserve and defend the white population and traditional European culture from a perceived global genocide by non-white ethnic and racial groups. 

Rundo was inspired to create the Active Club network—something he referred to as “white nationalism 3.0”—in response to the numerous arrests of R.A.M. members made in 2018. He wanted to create an organization that would be less perceptible to law enforcement, and thus less susceptible to disruption or destruction. From this, Active Clubs were born—small, decentralized organizations that would focus recruitment efforts on localized areas and thus garner less attention than traditional white nationalist organizations. This structure would also ensure that Active Clubs were not reliant on a particular physical entity or leadership figure for survival.

Active Clubs provide like-minded white men with physical spaces where they can train in mixed martial arts in preparation for war against their perceived enemies. Ideologically, Active Clubs adhere to neofascist and accelerationist principles, with the promotion of violence comprising a key theme in Active Club communication and propaganda. Located across the United States and in several countries transnationally, the Active Club network ensures that groups of men devoted to training for battle are available for mobilization in multiple locations across Western countries. 

Monterey, CA: Middlebury Institute of International Studies and Center on terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, 2024.

 By Amy Cooter

There has been increasing attention to how military service members and veterans may be recruited or exploited by extremists, yet there is little research on precisely how this may happen or on how such ties may, in turn, influence military cohesion. It is important to emphasize that the vast majority of service members are not extremist, but a growing number of domestic extremists have military connections who may then have an outsized ability to enact harm, including by training others in military techniques. Given the potential for veterans’ knowledge and experiences to be exploited by extremist groups, understanding these connections is pressing. This paper shares findings from an in-depth interview study with 42 veterans from all military branches who collectively shed light on how extremism influences various aspects of military life from recruitment to readiness and who offer concrete steps the military could pursue at every stage of service to limit extremists’ exploitation of the institution and those who serve.

Monterey, CA: Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism (CTEC) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies 2025. 31p.

By Ciarán O’Connor, Laurie Wood, Katherine Keneally and Kevin D. Reyes

The number of Active Clubs in the United States, Canada and Europe is increasing, posing a threat to public safety. Active Clubs (“ACs”) are white nationalist extremist groups that emphasize physical fitness and hand-to-hand combat skills and have a history of violence. Though each “club” is autonomous, the groups frequently engage in coordinated activities offline, such as mixed martial arts (MMA) tournaments, protests and physical training. In recent years, these clubs have used their social media profiles to encourage likeminded individuals to establish their own clubs in their respective locations. ISD’s research shows this strategy has been highly effective throughout the US.

This report identifies and analyzes the network of Active Clubs operating within the US along three themes: ideology, tactics and targets. The research predominately focuses on the use of the messaging platform Telegram by ACs, and includes detailed data analysis exploring how this network uses Telegram to produce and promote white nationalist propaganda, expand the network of clubs, and facilitate on- and offline collaboration between members and groups.

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2023. 17p.

By  Michael Miller Yoder,  David West Brown &  Kathleen M. Carley 

Much research has focused on the role of the alt-right in pushing far-right narratives into mainstream discourse. In this work, we focus on the alt-right’s effects on extremist narratives themselves. From 2012 to 2017, we find a rise in alt-right, 4chan-like discourse styles across multiple communication platforms known for white supremacist extremism, such as Stormfront. This discourse style incorporates inflammatory insults, irreverent comments, and talk about memes and online “chan” culture itself. A network analysis of one far-right extremist platform suggests that central users adopt and spread this alt-right style. This analysis has implications for understanding influence and change in online white supremacist extremism, as well as the role of style in white supremacist communications. Warning: This paper contains examples of hateful and offensive language.

Comput Math Organ Theory Volume 31, pages 222–235, (2025)

By Amy C. Gaudion

In his 2022 book, Ward Farnsworth crafts a metaphor from the lead-pipe theory for the fall of Rome to consider how rage and misinformation traveling through today’s technology-enabled pipes are poisoning our civic engagement and threatening our governmental structures: “We have built networks for the delivery of information––the internet, and especially social media. These networks too, are a marvel. But they also carry a kind of poison with them. The mind fed from those sources learns to subsist happily on quick reactions, easy certainties, one-liners, and rage.” This Article carries the metaphor into a new context and considers what should be done when the poison being transported through the digital pipes is directed at members of the U.S. military. While extremism in the U.S. military is not a new threat, the events of January 6, 2021, brought the threat into much sharper focus. It exposed three preexisting trends, each sitting in plain sight but not yet woven together. These trends include a growing acceptance of extremist views and ideologies in U.S. military and veteran communities, an increase in violent extremist acts committed by individuals with military backgrounds, and the enhanced use of digital platforms by extremist groups to target their messaging to and strengthen their recruitment of individuals with military experience. To return to the metaphor, the extremist poison is teeming through the pipes at an alarming rate, and the number of pipes has increased to include social media platforms, encrypted chat tools, gaming platforms, podcasts, and music streaming apps, including YouTube, Discord, Gab, Telegram, and WhatsApp, among many others. In offering these observations, the author is mindful of not overstating the threat and takes seriously warnings as to the adverse consequences that follow from hyperbole and exaggeration. Indeed, a fundamental difficulty is the lack of understanding as to scope and scale of the extremism threat in the U.S. military. This Article attempts to draw the contours of that threat, exposes the structural and legal obstacles that make countering extremism in the military such a fraught exercise, and identifies actors, tools, and mechanisms—beyond the conventional options––able to overcome these long-standing structural and institutional obstacles.

Indiana Law Journal | Vol. 100:1743 | 2025, Penn State Dickinson Law Research Paper 10-2025

By Iftekharul Bashar

The recent arrests in Malaysia confirm that radicalisation within the Bangladeshi diaspora is a significant and evolving threat. This problem stems from socioeconomic factors, homeland instability, and online recruitment. A transparent, collaborative, and multi-faceted P/CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) approach is essential to mitigate the risk.

COMMENTARY

Malaysian authorities recently arrested 36 Bangladeshi citizens in Selangor and Johor for their involvement in a radical militant movement promoting Islamic State (IS) ideology. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail reported that these individuals were forming recruitment cells, fundraising for terrorism, and plotting to overthrow the Bangladesh government.

Notably, the network, as detailed by police, raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets, directing money to the IS group in Syria and Bangladesh. This method highlights a growing trend in terrorist financing, leveraging the speed, lower costs, and often less stringent oversight of digital platforms and cross-border money movement to facilitate illicit financial flows globally.

Of those arrested, five have been charged with terrorism-related offences, 15 face deportation, and 16 remain under investigation, with the police anticipating further arrests. Malaysian authorities estimate that 100 to 150 individuals are suspected to be involved in this network, demonstrating the scale of the threat they are actively dismantling.

These arrests are a stark reminder that the threat of extremism continues to cast a long shadow, not just within Bangladesh’s national borders but also across diaspora communities. The arrest of the 36 nationals is not an isolated incident. There have been previous cases of radicalisation of Bangladeshis in Malaysia.

In May 2019, a 28-year-old Bangladeshi mechanic was arrested in Kuala Kedah; he had possessed the necessary chemicals and expertise to produce improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Earlier in January 2017, two Bangladeshi salesmen, aged 27 and 28, were arrested in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly for having ties with suspected IS militants in Bangladesh and for planning to join a terror cell in the southern Philippines.

Singapore, among other nations, has also experienced similar cases in the past, notably in 2015, 2016, and 2020, highlighting a recurring pattern of Bangladeshi diaspora members being targeted and recruited by terrorist networks, including the Islamic State.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

By Johanna Kleffmann, Swetha Ramachandran, Noah Cohen, Siobhan O'Neil, Mohammed Bukar, Francesca Batault, Kato Van Broeckhoven,

Key Findings • The labelling of banditry as “organized crime,” “unknown gunmen,” or, more lately, “terrorists” has distorted this multi-faceted and still poorly understood phenomenon. Likewise, some of the frames that have been applied to banditry – particularly the farmer/herder conflict or Hausa/Fulani tensions – do not appear to fully align with local communities’ understandings of today’s evolution of banditry. Simplistic categorization and narrow lenses for understanding banditry may contribute to inappropriate or insufficient policy and programmatic responses. MEAC’s survey unearths some of the lived experiences with bandits and sheds light on the nuances of the phenomenon and its profound impact on communities. • Community perceptions of bandit groups corroborate earlier research depicting them as comprised of largely distinct, organized groups, albeit with shifting configurations and subject to fragmentation. Bandit groups operate in highly mobile, armed, and largely forestbased units that use quick-strike attacks on motorbikes against communities. Their motivations are primarily perceived as economic/financial by victims, including the notable subsection of the sample of Fulanis who have been victimized by bandits. • For the surveyed communities, weapons are the most recognizable feature of bandit groups. This bears critical implications for the potential for escalation of violence, further proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition including in the neighbouring regions, community violence reduction efforts and future DDR programming. • Victimisation experiences differ considerably with gender, age, and location in the North West. While physical violence and killings disproportionately affect adult men, sexual violence appears to especially affect women and girls (although it likely remains underreported). Variations of victimization across states indicate the volatile and dynamic nature of overall banditry presence and violence. • Banditry violence has profound and pervasive effects on the physical safety, access to income-generating activities, education, and mobility of residents in the northwestern communities surveyed. The perceived intensity and frequency of attacks are on the rise, with one in three respondents reporting experiencing weekly attacks in recent years. Close to two-thirds of respondents have family members who have been attacked by bandits.

Findings Report 36,

Geneva, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ., UNIDIR, 2024,43p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) has emerged as a major international security threat, orchestrating or inspiring attacks abroad following a Taliban clampdown on its home turf. Although its strikes have fallen in number in 2025, its offensive could resurge. Why does it matter? Despite the recent lull, IS-KP might reactivate commanders willing to carry out attacks abroad or coordinate with other ISIS branches to launch them. Even a small number of highprofile operations – such as the March 2024 mass shooting and arson in Moscow – can cause numerous deaths and have major international repercussions. What should be done? Coordination among security services has improved, particularly in intelligence sharing and rendition. There are strong reasons not to resort to military action, but more could be done in terms of collaborating with the Taliban and Syrian governments, redefining the global anti-ISIS coalition’s law enforcement role, and supporting Central Asian countries.

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°183

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 28p.