By John P. Sullivan

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a ‘criminal insurgency’ against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors.

Paris: Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme , 2011. 21p.

By LaVerle Berry. et al.

This report assesses conditions that contribute to or are potentially hospitable to transnational criminal activity and terrorist activity in selected regions of the world during the period 1999-2002. Although the focus of the report is on transnational activity, domestic criminal activity is recognized as a key foundation for transnational crime, especially as the forces of globalization intensify. The report has been arranged geographically into the following major headings: Africa, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. Within the geographical headings, the report addresses individual countries with particularly salient conditions. Cases such as the Triborder Area (TBA) of South America and East and West Africa, where conditions largely overlap national borders, have been treated as regions rather than by imposing an artificial delineation by country. The bibliography has been divided into the same geographical headings as the text. The major sources for this report are recent periodical reports from Western and regional sources, Internet sites offering credible recent information, selected recent monographs, and personal communications with regional experts. Treatment of individual countries varies according to the extent and seriousness of conditions under study. Thus some countries in a region are not discussed, and others are discussed only from the perspective of one or two pertinent activities or conditions. Because they border the United States, Canada and Mexico have received especially extensive treatment.

Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003. 260p.

By Tomas Williams, Pablo Slutzky, and Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas

We explore how anti-money laundering (AML) policies affect banks and credit provision to firms. For identification we exploit the enactment of a financial regulation in Colombia. Aimed at controlling the flow of money from drug trafficking into the financial system, we find that after implementation bank deposits in municipalities with high drug trafficking decline. This negative liquidity shock has consequences for credit in other municipalities. Banks sourcing their deposits from areas with high drug trafficking cut lending relative to other banks. Using a proprietary database containing data on bank-firm credit relationships, we show that small firms that rely on credit from affected banks experience a negative shock to sales, investment, and profitability. Furthermore, we use night-lights data to show that these results are not due to a reallocation of activity across firms nor between the formal and informal sectors. Our evidence uncovers a hidden to be considered when implementing AML policies.

Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2020. 62p.

By Pacelli, Joseph, Janet Gao, Jan Schneemeier, and Yufeng Wu.

Bank employees face discretion in investigating and reporting money laundering activities via suspicious activity reports (SARs), a primary tool to combat financial crimes. We investigate the incentives banks face to initiate SARs and the implications for criminal activity. Our theoretical and empirical analyses document that banks with more profit-seeking pressure adopt lax reporting policies to attract criminal customers, ultimately leading to more suspicious activity reports. A structural estimation approach helps us uncover the relation between bank profitability, reporting stringency, and the demand from criminal customers. Our results also suggest an assortative matching between lax banks and criminal clientele.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 61p.,

By Gaurav Khanna, Carlos Medina, Anant Nyshadham, Christian Posso, Jorge Tamayo

We investigate the effects of job displacement, as a result of mass-layoffs, on criminal arrests using a matched employer-employee-crime dataset from Medellín, Colombia. Job displacement leads to immediate and persistent earnings losses, and higher probability of arrest for both the displaced worker and family members. Leveraging a banking policy-reform, we find that greater access to credit attenuates the criminal response to job loss. Impacts on arrests are pronounced for property crimes and among younger men for whom opportunities in criminal enterprises are prevalent. Taken together, our results are consistent with economic incentives contributing to criminal participation decisions after job losses.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2020. 35p.

By Gaurav Khanna, Carlos Medina, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo

Canonical models of criminal behavior highlight the importance of economic incentives and employment opportunities in determining participation in crime (Becker, 1968). Yet, deriving causal corroborating evidence from individual-level variation in employment incentives has proven challenging. We link rich administrative micro-data on socioeconomic measures of individuals with the universe of criminal arrests in Medellin over a decade. We test whether increasing the relative costs to formal-sector employment led to more crime. We exploit exogenous variation in formal employment around a socioeconomic score cutoff, below which individuals receive generous health benefits if not formally employed. Our regression discontinuity estimates show that this popular policy induced a fall in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime. This relationship is stronger in neighborhoods with more opportunities for organized crime. There are no effects on less economically motivated crimes.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2019. 57p.

By Zoe B. Cullen, Will S. Dobbie, and Mitchell Hoffman

State and local policies increasingly restrict employers’ access to criminal records, but without addressing the underlying reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. Employers may thus still want to ask about a job applicant’s criminal record later in the hiring process or make inaccurate judgments based on an applicant’s demographic characteristics. In this paper, we use a field experiment conducted in partnership with a nationwide staffing platform to test policies that more directly address the reasons that employers may conduct criminal background checks. The experiment asked hiring managers at nearly a thousand U.S. businesses to make incentive-compatible decisions under different randomized conditions. We find that 39% of businesses in our sample are willing to work with individuals with a criminal record at baseline, which rises to over 50% when businesses are offered crime and safety insurance, a single performance review, or a limited background check covering just the past year. Wage subsidies can achieve similar increases but at substantially higher cost. Based on our findings, the staffing platform relaxed the criminal background check requirement and offered crime and safety insurance to interested businesses.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022. 42p.

By Sophus A. Reinert

The Milanese Marquis Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) dedicated his life first to theorizing a more just and equal society grounded in individual rights, anchored in secular political economy rather than in religious dogma, then to realizing this bold vision through decades of administrative and regulatory work for the Milanese state. His project was not merely to reform the criminal system of the Old Regime but to challenge the very inequalities—legal, economic, educational, and so on—which drove crime to begin with.2 During his lifetime, however, his fame as a “friend of humanity” derived mostly from his impassioned pleas against torture and capital punishment, though on the basis of his temperament and his ideas it would also be easy to count him as part of what, for the later eighteenth century, the late Yves Bénot dubbed the “internationale abolitionniste.”3 This is, in large parts, also how he is remembered, but not only. It is of course a truism that ideas can have ironic, even sarcastic afterlives, but there is nonetheless something slightly perverse about Beccaria’s treatment in parts of American historiography.4 I have previously highlighted how his paternity has been claimed for both libertarian atheism and Catholic social democracy, but his name now appears ever more frequently in contemporary debates over “gun rights,” the “carceral state” and the rise of “racial capitalism.”5 We often hear of the “centrality of penal slavery” in Beccaria’s thought, for example, to the point where he repeatedly has been given the rather unenviable title of “father of prison slavery” and “father of penal servitude.”6 Some of these commentators are generous enough to admit that Beccaria can “be credited with voicing some humanitarian concerns,”

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 49p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency

EIA’s latest report, The Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants, delves into how Tanzania’s elephants are once more being slaughtered in vast numbers to feed a resurgent ivory trade in China in an illegal trade driven by Chinese criminal syndicates and Tanzanian corruption. Vanishing Point reveals how some politicians from Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and well-connected businesspeople use their influence to protect ivory traffickers. The video below provides an overview, complemented by firsthand accounts, of the corruption in Tanzania and the Chinese market providing an outlet for illegal poaching.

London; Washington, DC: EIA, 2015. 36p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency

Since 2018, Mali has suffered two military coups, while the country has become one of the largest suppliers of rosewood to China, through the export of Pterocarpus erinaceus – commonly identified as “kosso,” “keno,” or “bois de vêne,” a species the trade of which is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), since January 2017.

The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)’s findings indicate that China has imported the equivalent of half a million kosso trees from Mali – worth approximately US$220 million, between January 2017 and January 2022, a large portion of it being the product of illegal harvesting or illegal export. The relentless timber poaching in the Southern forests of Mali has resulted in a significant decline of the species.

Washington, DC: : EIA, 2022. 27p.

By Environmental Investigation Agency

Lost at Sea, calls on governments, industry, retailers, and consumers to help end the appalling damage that plastic waste inflicts on marine environments.

The report details how global plastics production has grown from five million tons per year in the 1960s to 299 million tons in 2013. It is found in our clothes, computers, and cars and has now found its way to our oceans, leaving no area uncontaminated. Plastics are ingested by seabirds and other marine life, concentrated in Arctic Sea ice, and are accumulating in deep sea sediments where microplastics are now more numerous than in surface waters. An estimated 80 percent of marine litterl originates from terrestrial waste sources, but can vary depending on geographical area.

This report outlines some of the impacts on marine creatures, with recommended actions to reduce the rising tide of plastic waste entering the oceans.

London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2015. 12 p.

By Verité

In-depth research carried out by Verité has found that Latin American countries export reputational risks for major companies with gold in their supply chains. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, with which Verité has been closely collaborating, recently released an in-depth report thoroughly documenting the close link between illegal gold mining and organized crime, which fuels violence, environmental damage, corruption, money Verité publications include a research report focusing on illegal gold mining in Colombia and a white paper with detailed recommendations for companies and other stakeholders to ensure that illegally mined gold does not enter into company supply chains and the vaults of central banks. research carried out by Verité in Peru in 2012-2013 and in Colombia in 2015, and desk research carried out across the Latin American region.

Amherst, MA: Verité , 2016. 17p.

By Paul D. Kenny, Rashesh Shrestha, and Edward Aspinall

This paper examines the relationships between agrarian commodity booms and the incidence of group conflict and criminality in the context of Indonesia’s expanding oil palm sector. It theorizes that commodity boom violence takes two main forms: low level but organized criminal violence involved in the extortion of “rents” produced by a given commodity extraction and production process (extortion); and violent competition among a range of groups, including “mafias”, youth gangs, landholders, and commercial producers for control of these rents (competition). Extortion and competition violence are associated with distinct temporal distributions consistent with our theory. Criminality–especially theft–is higher in villages with established and productive oil palm plantations (extortion), whereas villages undergoing planation expansion have a higher incidence of group conflict (competition). Dynamic analyses utilizing panel data at the sub-district level support our causal interpretation, as the relationship between the area under oil palm cultivation and resource conflict (competition) changes over time and with prevailing commodity prices. Our results are robust to the use of instrumental variable analysis to account for the potential endogeneity of plantation expansion. Our theorized mechanism is given further support by a targeted primary survey of 1,920 respondents in oil palm producing and non-producing villages, which shows that villages experience different rates of extortion and competition violence depending both on if, and when, oil palm production commenced.

Canberra: Australian National University, 2020. 77p.

By Mähler, Annegret

This paper studies the oil‐violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into con‐ sideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource‐specific and non‐resource‐specific causal factors. With re‐ gard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political‐institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the “oil era.” Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, sec‐ ondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the per‐ petuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity.

Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) , 2010. 39p.

By Ian M. Ralby

On January 13, 2017, the Atlantic Council launched a major study on downstream oil theft at its inaugural Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The present analysis draws on that launch event to examine the implications of the Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies report findings, and to suggest tangible next steps in both further investigating this global scourge and beginning to confront it effectively. The panel, moderated by Ambassador Richard Morningstar, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s chairman, included the lead author of the report, Dr. Ian Ralby, a nonresident senior fellow of the center and chief executive officer (CEO) of I.R. Consilium; Éric Besson, former minister of industry, energy, and digital economy for the Republic of France; Dr. John Gannon, former Central Intelligence Agency deputy director for intelligence and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council; and Kola Karim, CEO of Shoreline Energy, an oil company in Nigeria. Though the panelists’ comments form a starting point for this analysis, they do not constitute the sole basis for this report. The implications of the study are extensive and point to a wide range of challenges, but six areas stand out as encompassing the most significant consequences of illicit downstream hydrocarbons activity: 1. The Energy Industry 2. Security, Terrorism, and Law Enforcement 3. The Environment 4. Finance and Economics 5. Politics and Policy 6. International Relations The present analysis focuses on the implications of the study for these six areas

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017. 15p.

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By Etienne Romson

This second of two papers on global oil theft discusses ways to reduce oil theft, misappropriation, and fraud. At US$133 billion per year, oil is the largest stolen natural resource globally, while fuel is the most smuggled natural resource. Oil theft equates to 5–7 per cent of the global market for crude oil and petroleum fuels. It is so engrained in the energy supply chain that thefts are priced in by traders and tolerated by many shipping companies as petty theft. Oil theft and related insecurity have substantial negative economic effects on developing countries, whether they produce oil or not. In 2012, non-oil-producing Benin saw a 28 per cent drop in taxable income after a spate of oil tanker hijacking incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011. In Nigeria, the oil capacity shut-in and amount of oil deferred is more than twice the amount estimated as stolen, with a US$20 billion annual loss in petroleum profit tax—63 per cent of total government tax revenue in 2019. Organized oil crime syndicates are often transnational and conduct theft and fraud professionally, exploiting gaps in jurisdiction and adapting their practices when law enforcement becomes more effective. They evolve from ship piracy to stealing tanker cargoes to kidnapping tanker crews; from physical ransom of assets to digital hijacking via ransomware. The proceeds of oil theft often finance other organized crime, and it triggers violence against the community and in crime-on-crime activities. Twelve commonalities in oil theft and fraud have been identified that can direct international solutions, in three target areas: stolen oil volumes, stolen oil transport, and stolen oil money. Prosecution for acts of bribery offers opportunities for action: transport of or payment for illegal oil could constitute a bribe under the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act if government officials were involved in the transaction or shipment. Bribe charges could be raised for paid ‘services’ that facilitate oil theft (through action or non-action).

Helsinki: UNU-WIDER , 2022. 65p.

By Ian M. Ralby.

This report is the first comprehensive study of the theft of refined oil products around the globe. It provides insight into the modalities and trends in oil theft, the culprits responsible, the stakeholders affected by illicit activities, and recommendations that could change the dynamics.

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017. 117p.

By Julian Rademeyer.

Much has been written about state-sponsored North Korean criminal activity in Asia and Europe. But relatively little attention has been devoted to North Korea’s illicit activities in Africa, which run the gamut from trafficking of rhino horn and ivory to gold and tobacco. This report – which draws on hundreds of pages of documents, academic research, press reports and interviews with government officials, diplomats and defectors in Southern Africa and South Korea – presents an overview of evidence implicating North Korea in criminal activity ranging from smuggling and drug trafficking to the manufacturing of counterfeit money and black market cigarettes. It examines North Korea’s current involvement in Africa, the complex history of African-North Korean relations and allegations that the country’s embassies in several African states are intimately connected to a complex web of illicit activity aimed at bolstering the Kim Jong-un regime and enriching cash-strapped diplomats. An analysis of press reports and other publicly available information conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime shows that North Korean diplomatic passport holders have been implicated in at least 18 cases of rhino horn and ivory smuggling in Africa since 1986. Despite North Korea’s waning influence on the continent, incriminating evidence linking its diplomats to ivory and rhino horn smuggling continues to emerge. The report includes interviews with a number of high-level North Korean defectors about their knowledge of, and stated involvement in, a range of criminal activities. They claim that smuggling by North Korean diplomats is widespread, with couriers traveling regularly to Pyongyang and Beijing in China with diplomatic bags stuffed with contraband. “[D]iplomats…would come from Africa carrying rhino horn, ivory and gold nuggets,” explained one defector who ran a North Korean front company in Beijing. “Every embassy [in Africa] was coming two or three times every year.” The persistent abuse of diplomatic immunity by North Korean diplomats and agents poses a particularly vexing problem for law enforcement. Increasing economic sanctions and isolationist policies designed to cripple North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities are likely to fuel the expansion of the regime’s illicit activities and statesponsored criminal networks.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 40p.

By Julian Rademeyer

The rhino population is nearing the ‘tipping point’ where the numbers of rhino deaths could outnumber births, critically reducing the ability of the population to sustain itself. In the first part of this two-part series, “Tipping Point: Transnational crime and the ‘war’ on poaching,” the Global Initiative brought together evidence that the impact of rampant poaching and deeply entrenched transnational criminal networks active in Southern Africa over the past decade has been severe. Driven by seemingly insatiable demand in Southeast Asia and China, rhino horn has become a black market commodity rivalling gold and platinum in value. Six thousand rhinos have fallen to poachers’ bullets in Africa over the past decade.1 Dozens more have been shot in so-called “pseudo-hunts” in South Africa. Today there are estimated to be about 25,000 rhino left in Africa, a fraction of the tens of thousands that existed just half-a-century ago. Numbers of white rhinos (Ceratotherium simum) have begun to stagnate and decline, with 2015 population figures estimated at between 19,666 and 21,085. While the numbers of more critically endangered black rhino (Diceros bicornis) - estimated to number between 5,040 and 5,458 – have increased, population growth rates have fallen.2 Since 2008, incidents of rhino poaching have increased at a staggering rate. In 2015, 1,342 rhinos were killed for their horns across seven African range states, compared to just 262 in the early stages of the current crisis in 2008. While the vast majority of poaching incidents occurred in South Africa, home to about 79% of the continent’s last remaining rhinos, dramatic spikes in poaching in Namibia and Zimbabwe, two key black rhino range states, have counteracted the growing efforts of conservationists and the South African government to protect their remaining herd. Namibia, which had experienced little to no poaching from 2006 to 2012 saw incidents increase from four in 2013 to 30 in 2014 and 90 in 20153 . In Zimbabwe, 51 rhinos were killed, up from twenty in 2014. It was the country’s worst year on record since 2008, when 164 rhinos were lost to poachers.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2016. 44p.

By Mark Galeotti and Anna Arutunyan.

Globally, connections between crime, war and insurrection are inescapable, and the undeclared struggle over the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, before Russia’s open invasion in February 2022, was no exception to the rule. Since Russia first encouraged, facilitated, armed and bankrolled the rising of the rebellious pseudo-states of south-eastern Donbas in 2014, there had been a pervasive connection between crime, war and insurrection. Despite continued sporadic skirmishes, by 2015, it seemed that the conflict had largely stabilized. A violent and confused hybrid of insurrection and foreign invasion, had led to the creation of the self-proclaimed pseudo-states of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR, respectively). Together, they controlled roughly 30% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and had a combined population of approximately 2 to 2.3 million people. This was a status quo that not only encouraged criminalization, but was based on it. Industrial-scale smuggling of everything from coal to narcotics helped sustain the internationally unrecognized pseudo-states of Donbas; gangsters became militiamen; and money-laundering networks meanwhile bypassed sanctions

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 56p.