By Noor Huda Ismail

The fall of Damascus to Syrian rebels has sparked a ripple effect in Southeast Asia, with figures like Indonesia’s Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid using apocalyptic prophecies to fuel extremism. However, the region's diverse Islamic practices, shaped by unique historical and socio-political contexts, show that a universal eschatological (end of the world) narrative does not resonate everywhere. Religious scholars can counter extremist ideologies and reclaim prophetic teachings for peace in Southeast Asia’s pluralistic society by offering inclusive interpretations of prophecy and addressing local grievances.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2024. 4p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan

Using a large, national survey of online Australians, we measured unintentional and intentional exposure to fringe or radical content and groups online.

Two in five respondents (40.6%) reported being exposed to material they described as fringe, unorthodox or radical. One-quarter of these respondents (23.2%) accessed the content intentionally. One-third (29.9%) said the content they had seen depicted violence.

Fringe or radical content was often accessed through messages, discussions and posts online. Mainstream social media and messaging platforms were the platforms most frequently used to share fringe or radical content. Being a member of a group promoting fringe or radical content was associated with increased sharing of that content with other internet users.

Efforts to restrict access to radical content and groups online, especially on mainstream platforms, may help reduce intentional and unintentional exposure to and sharing of that content.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 17p.

By David Bruce

Mapping gun crimes can ensure that police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce violent offences.

Firearm crime is rife in South Africa. Mapping it can help ensure police resources are used in a targeted way to reduce firearm-related offences. This policy brief illustrates how firearm crime can be mapped by using police data. It focuses on Gauteng province, which has high levels of gun use by criminals.

Key findings Firearms make a major contribution to crime-related death, injury and fear in South Africa. In areas with high firearm crime levels, there are seven main gun-related crime categories: murder, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, carjacking, residential robbery, nonresidential robbery and illegal possession of guns and ammunition. South Africa’s highest gun-related crime levels are in the following provinces: Gauteng, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and parts of the Eastern Cape. Recommendations The SAPS should develop a focused strategy to reduce levels of firearm crime and violence. The SAPS should use crime data to identify the areas where firearm crime is most concentrated. This will support the targeted use of resources to reduce firearm crime. Targeted evidence-based strategies are more likely to have a measurable impact on levels of violent crimes associated with firearm use. As an initial step, the SAPS should use available information on ‘instruments’ used in crime from the Crime Administration System (CAS), or docket analysis, to assess levels of firearm crime in each police station area. The results will show the provinces, metropolitan In these provinces, police station areas with the highest levels of crime in the seven main gun-related crime categories are also high firearm-use areas. South African Police Service (SAPS) data on Gauteng police stations with high levels of these seven crimes highlights 41 high firearm crime police stations. Although data collection standards differ between stations, SAPS Crime Administration System data generally includes details on weapons used and can be used to map gun crime more precisely. areas and districts, and stations where firearm crime is most concentrated. Docket quality, data collection, recording, mapping and analysis on all crimes related to firearms and ammunition should be improved. Dedicated firearm crime reduction units with adequate intelligence support should be established. Their key performance measure must be a reduction in murders, attempted murders and robberies involving firearms. Police measures to reduce firearm crime must be aligned with efforts to lessen the overall problem of firearm proliferation in South Africa.

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 16p.

By Brittni Lambing, Ron Frandsen, Jennifer Karberg, and Joseph Durso

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) requires a background check on an applicant for a firearm purchase from a dealer who is a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL). During the permanent Brady Act period, from 1999 through 2018, background checks were conducted on over 237 million applicants for firearm transfers or permits. During this period, nearly 3.5 million applications for firearm transfers or permits were denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or by state and local agencies. This report summarizes the number of applications for firearm transfers and permits, denials that resulted from background checks, reasons for denial, rates of denial, appeals of denials, and arrests of denied persons during the permanent Brady Act period. Statistics are presented at the FBI, state, and local levels. The report also provides a summary of significant changes in federal and state laws and regulations related to firearm sales. Statistical highlights are presented in the body of the report, and complete details are included in an appendix.

Washington, DC: Regional Justice Information Service; 2024. 29p

By Alexandra Punishill

Nowhere is the discussion surrounding gun violence more prominent than in the United States, with the impacts of our gun-friendly culture being felt around the world. This thesis analyzes the dynamics of gun trafficking from the United States to Mexico and sheds light on its role in fueling the epidemic of gun violence south of the border. It is argued that the particular system of federalism adopted by the United States has led to a variety of state-level gun regulations that have shaped domestic gun policy and have had an international impact. Despite Mexico’s persistent efforts to combat the gun violence orchestrated by powerful organized crime networks, success remains elusive. Central to this discourse is Mexico’s legal action against U.S. gun companies, signaling a significant shift in its approach to addressing the root causes of the crisis. However, it is argued that without substantive changes to gun laws in the United States, gun violence in Mexico will continue to have a devastating impact on both sides of the border.

Claremont McKenna College, CMC Senior Theses. 3577. 2024. 66p.

By Camden Carmichael, Brooke Buxton, Seamus Hughes, and Clara Braun

Despite a rapid increase in domestic terrorism investigations in the United States, the threat that domestic terrorism poses to the homeland remains unclear. This is due to a lack of a comprehensive domestic terrorism legal framework that fully encompasses the variety of ideological groups present in the US. Using a sample of twenty-six QAnon and eighteen incel cases that have been federally prosecuted, our team examined how the US prosecutorial system utilises non-terrorism-related charges in addressing domestic violent extremism (DVE) cases. We propose a more inclusive DVE legal framework that expands the categorisation of VE ideologies, identifies specific DVE charges, and requires the engagement of the prosecutorial and probationary offices. By recognising Misogyny Motivated Violent Extremists (MMVEs) and Conspiracy Theory Motivated Violent Extremists (CTMVEs) as their own threat categories, it would allow researchers and practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of how pervasive the threat posed by these ideologies is.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2024. 21p.

By Danny Klinenberg

Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper from Danny Klinenberg, an IGCC nonresident fellow, examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. Klinenberg studies how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, he finds that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but is more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.

La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, WORKING PAPER NO. 10, 2024. 42p.

By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

By The Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024, 209 pages

By Gabriele Bernardini, Elena Cantatore, Fabio Fatiguso, and Enrico Quagliarini

This open access book outlines the latest results in analysing, assessing, and managing terrorist risk in the urban outdoor built environment. In detail, contents refer to the outdoor Open Areas (such as streets, squares, urban parks and other public spaces in our cities) exposed to such violent events considering the physical elements and properties of the built environment and users. PThe built environment features, including layout, use and management, are combined with terrorist threats issues and user behaviours in emergency conditions, to determine a set of complementary tools for the reduction of risk and increase of urban resilience. The contents hence provide different levels of tool analysis, for risk scenario definition, risk assessment, mitigation strategies design and effectiveness evaluation, considering traditional approaches about the issue along with simulation-based approaches relying on understanding and representing user behaviors. This “behavioural design” approach offers the opportunity to manage the level of risk for specific real urban cases overcoming the normative limitations in Europe that are only referred to a few countries and sometimes deal with the prevention of violent acts by intelligence activities as the exclusive way to face this issue. In addition, the focus on the characters of cultural and historic places and their resilience is increasing by means of introduction of mitigation and compatible solutions providing a complementary chapter for the design of resilient cities in all of their peculiarities (peripheries, consolidated, and historical). In this sense, it is one of the first organized attempts to analyse the main limitations of current solutions in these outdoor Open Areas and, at the same time, to clearly introduce the importance of human behaviours and the various choices in emergency evacuation conditions, thanks to the proposed behavioural-based simulation approach. The attention is focused on a critical aspect for historic spaces, where morphological conditions are fixed values. Thus, this book represents a sort of guidelines about these user-related issues during such violent events and is useful to both professionals and researchers in the areas of security and urban administration.

Singapore: Springer Nature, 2025. 135p.

By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Henry Ziemer, and Azucena Duarte

Although only 8 percent of the world lives in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the region accounts for a third of all homicides worldwide. LAC cities consistently top international rankings as some of the most violent locales outside of active conflict zones. Behind this insecurity are powerful and deeply entrenched transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking drugs and other illegal commodities, who in turn rely on a seemingly endless flow of illicit firearms to carry out their campaigns of violence and intimidation on the Western Hemisphere’s inhabitants. Arms trafficking goes well beyond a law enforcement challenge; the proliferation of semi- and fully automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and various high-caliber weapons are increasingly used by TCOs to hold at risk the very sovereignty of LAC governments. Stories from Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, and beyond all underscore how the scourge of illicit weapons, and the groups who wield them, can plunge communities, and even whole countries, into violence.

Leveraging new data sources, this report examines the prevalence and patterns of arms trafficking within and between each of the four subregions. Recognizing the nature of the threat arms trafficking presents to the Western Hemisphere at large, the report seeks to define the contours of a new strategy to combat illegal guns, concluding with recommendations for the United States, Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean to pursue.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2024.

By Piotr Bąkowski  

In 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). One of them, a proposal on the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing, became Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, adopted on 31 May 2024. Its detailed, directly applicable provisions will replace the minimum rules of the existing EU AML directives. Most provisions will apply from 10 July 2029. The package was adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to enhance the EU's AML/CFT regulatory framework. The aim is for the framework to become more coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining in line with international standards in the area. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs were jointly responsible for the file. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024, 10p.  

By Rachel Rein

This Note explores human trafficking in the United States through Disability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit). First, the Note offers background on trafficking and applicable federal law. The Note shows that not only does trafficking disable people, but that people with preexisting disabilities are especially at risk for trafficking. Next, the Note indicates that trafficking law follows a Law-and-Order framework that retraumatizes marginalized survivors. Then, the Note introduces DisCrit and justifies its use for anti-trafficking advocacy. Finally, the Note applies DisCrit. By looking at trafficking law through DisCrit, it becomes clear that trafficking law must work with—not against—survivors to end human suffering.

42 Colum. J. Gender & L. 183 (2022).

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio 

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes in matched individuals living in non-proximal and not-affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics  2024. 45p.

By: Erika Harrell, Jennifer L. Truman, Katherine A. Fowler, Kristin Holland, Thomas R. Simon, and Steven A. Sumner

This report examines trends and patterns in firearm violence from 1993 to 2023 using a combination of data sources to provide a broad perspective on fatal and nonfatal firearm violence in the Unites States that could not be achieved through any single source of information. It includes data on firearm type; incident location; victim and offender demographic characteristics and relationship; injury and treatment type; police notification; and victims’ self-protective behaviors.

Estimates in this report are based primarily on data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System death certificate data queried through the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System. Additional estimates come from the CDC’s National Violent Death Reporting System, National Syndromic Surveillance Program, and Youth Risk Behavior Survey. The report is organized to present findings from each data source in separate sections.

Highlights

• The rate of nonfatal firearm violence for persons age 12 or older declined 72% from 1993 to 2023, dropping from 7.3 to 2.0 victimizations per 1,000 persons, and varied from 1.2 to 2.3 per 1,000 during 2019 to 2023.

• About 64% of nonfatal firearm violence was reported to police during 2018–2022.

• The firearm homicide rate among persons age 12 or older fluctuated between 1993 and 2023, with a decline from 1993 to 2014 (from 8.4 to 4.0 homicides per 100,000 persons age 12 or older) before rising to 7.3 per 100,000 in 2021.

• From 2018 to 2022, on average, 80% of homicides were committed with a firearm

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2024. 41p.

By JASON BLAZAKIS & MEGAN RENNEBAUM

This paper seeks to examine the array of terrorist designations undertaken by “Five-Eye” (FVEY) countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against violent far-right terrorists, often also referred as racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) actors. While not a focus of the papers, non-FVEY countries, most notably Germany, have also implemented measures to restrict the activities of violent far-right actors. Thus, this paper will evaluate whether non-FVEY measures can help inform broader policy determinations related to violent far-right terrorism designations. What lessons learned, if any, can the FVEY countries draw from other national experiences? Furthermore, are there multilateral regimes, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 counterterrorism sanctions regime (henceforth, 1267 regime), that can inform FVEY policies within the field of terrorist designations?

Issue Brief, New York: Soufan Center, 2022. 22p.

By Michele Ubaldi Matteo Picchio

We study the effect of mass shooting exposure on individuals’ mental health by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-randomness of mass shootings in a staggered difference-in-differences design. We compare changes in mental health outcomes of individuals living in affected cities with changes of matched individuals living in non-proximal and not affected cities. We find that mass shootings have a substantial adverse impact on mental health, which persists for up to six years. This impact is not statistically significant for Black individuals, whereas it is slightly more pronounced among women and older cohorts

Bonn, Garmany: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics 2024. 45p.