By Anna Sergi

This paper will investigate narratives, traits, and expectations of Italian-American mafias in North America. The specific case study is the area of Niagara, at the border between New York State, USA and Ontario, Canada. In this context, the artricle will mainly explore narratives and traits of so-called “mafia” families in the city of Hamilton, and their apparent connections with other “mafia” groups on the other side of the borderland, in Buffalo and in Toronto. Through qualitative design adapted from grounded theory methodology with mixed data, including news stories, investigative files and interviews, this article shows how mafias in the borderland of Niagara are conceptualised as hybrid groups, employing different identity “flags”. Mafias appear isomorphic since they imitate each other's structures and (try to) obey traditional mafia rules, to adapt and survive. In line with GT methodology, this paper finally explores an emerging theoretical category, that of the mafia borderland. As a space and identity, mafia borderland helps to sketch traits and expectations of mafia groups in border areas.

Journal of Borderlands Studies, 1-23. 2022

By Anna Sergi

This article presents findings from a qualitative research project into organized crime, policing and security across five major seaports (‘Portvilles’): Genoa (Italy); Melbourne (Australia); Montreal (Canada); New York (USA); and Liverpool (UK). Through content analysis of confidential judicial files, the article will construct the offenders’ scenarios and options for importing drugs in Portville. Through also interviews with law enforcement agencies, police forces and security staff in these seaports, the article presents the policing and security struggles to disrupt importations. The main finding is that importation roles and security techniques change constantly and quickly, as in a game of Pac-Man. Security and policing in seaports lead to the dilution and fragmentation of drug importation, and only distribution tends to remain organized in Portville. In this chaotic environment, it is the rules of trade that affect the success of drug importations the most, rather than the failures of effective security and policing.

European Journal of Criminology. 19 (4), 674-691, 2022.

By Max Gallien

Africa has become a growth market for the tobacco industry, as people in the global North have started to smoke much less. The prevalence of smoking in Europe since the 1990s has dropped by one-third, and even further in the Americas (44%). Over the same period, smoking levels in Africa have increased by over 50% (Reitsma et al. 2017).1 Africa’s youth, in particular, is overrepresented among new smokers (N. Ramanandraibe and A.E. Ouma 2011; Blecher and Ross 2013). This is part of a wider shift in tobacco consumption from richer to poorer countries – it has been projected that 6.8 million of a global total of 8.3 million tobacco-related deaths will occur in low- and middle-income countries by 2030 (Mathers and Loncar 2006). Africa is not only facing rising health care costs connected to tobacco consumption, but also the loss of lives, particularly men, as a consequence of smoking-related diseases.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, Summary Brief Number 22, 2020. 8p.

By Max Gallien , Giovanni Occhiali

Objective: To evaluate the common industry claim that higher tobacco taxation leads to higher levels of smuggling, particularly in a limited state capacity setting. Design:This paper evaluates the effects of a tobacco tax increase in Sierra Leone on smuggling by using gap analyses. Its models are based on multiple rounds of the Demographic and Health Survey and customs data as well as newly collected data on cigarette prices. Results: The paper shows that despite a substantial increase in cigarette taxation, and despite the absence of other formal tobacco control policies, smuggling has not increased in Sierra Leone. Its primary model shows a decrease in cigarette smuggling by 16.74% following the tax increase, alongside a decrease in cigarette consumption more widely and an increase in tax revenue. Conclusions: By presenting a low income and lower enforcement capacity case study, this paper provides novel and critical evidence to the debate on the tax smuggling link. Furthermore, it points to new questions on how states in these contexts can limit cigarette smuggling.

Published Online First: Tobacco Control, 02 June 2022, DOI:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2021-057163

By Max Gallien and Florian Weigand

Although  smuggling is  commonly  assumed to happen  in remote and difficult-to-access borderlands, in reality, smuggling is most prevalent in areas that states tightly control, including formal border crossings. To understand this puzzle, this article explores the relationship between states and smugglers at international borders. Based on extensive empirical research in various borderlands in North Africa and Southeast Asia, it argues that different kinds of smugglers prefer different types of relationships with the state. The article outlines six ideal types of such relationships. It contends that these types of relationships are the dominant factor in how different smuggling networks choose routes along a border. The findings have implications for our understanding of smuggling and policies that aim at addressing smuggling, especially regarding the effects of border fortifications and corruption prevention. bordFor over 400 kilometers, the border between Tunisia and Libya stretches across deserts, lakes, and mountains. The border provides a source of income for one of the largest smuggling economies in North Africa, with trading in everything from gasoline, fabrics, and electronics to cigarettes and narcotics. Its length and terrain make the border difficult to control for both Tunisian and Libyan security forces, and offer plenty of opportunities for the thousands of smugglers who cross the border everyday to stay undetected or leverage their superior knowledge of the terrain in high-speed car chases with soldiers and customs officers. And yet, most of these smugglers have chosen two particular points in the border to conduct their business: the formal border crossings as Ras Jedir and Dhiba. In fact, differ-ent smuggling networks prefer different routes: while those trading in mobile phones, bananas, or alcohol have typically preferred to play cat and Mouse.

SECURITY STUDIES, 2021, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 79–106

By OECD/  EUIPO

Illicit trade in fake goods is a significant and growing threat in a globalised and innovation-driven economy, undermining good governance, the rule of law and citizens’ trust in government. It not only has a negative impact on the sales and profits of affected firms and on the economy in general, but also poses major health and safety threats to consumers. To provide policy makers with solid empirical evidence about this threat, the OECD and the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) joined forces to carry out a series of analytical studies that deepen our understanding of the scale and magnitude of the problem. The results have been published in a set of reports starting with Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact (2016), and including the most recent ones Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (2019), and Illicit Trade in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals (2020). The results are worrying. Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to up to 3.3 % of world trade in 2016; when considering only imports into the EU, fake goods amounted to up to 6.8 % of imports. Counterfeiters operate swiftly in the globalised economy, misusing modern logistical solutions and legitimate trade facilitation mechanisms and thrive in economies lacking good governance standards. Evidence shows that, while criminals continue to use all available modes of transport for illicit trade, seizures from commercial maritime container shipping continue to dominate in terms of volume and value of goods seized. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the problem: criminal networks have reacted very quickly to the crisis and adapted their strategies to take advantage of the shifting landscape. This study provides a detailed analysis of economy- and industry-specific patterns in the misuse of containerised maritime transport by counterfeiters. Such information is crucially needed, not only for better understanding this threat, but also for developing effective governance responses to support post-COVID recovery. This study was carried out under the auspices of the OECD’s Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade, which focuses on evidence-based research and advanced analytics to assist policy makers in mapping and understanding the vulnerabilities exploited and created by illicit trade  

Paris: OECD, 2021. 81p.

By Anna Sergi

Abstract In large commercial seaports policing and security efforts to counter the drug trade, especially cocaine, do not appear to be effective beyond a mere displacement effect. In the port of Piraeus, Greece, (perceived) rising quantities of cocaine have led to calls for further securitisation of the port to curb illicit trafficking. This article will present the current trends of countering and disrupting cocaine at the port of Piraeus and question how these efforts, together with the growth of the port, are affecting the overall territory of and around the port. This article will first argue that the (perceived) increase in cocaine trade towards/in the port of Piraeus has activated a ‘utopia of security’ in the policing and security responses at the port. This utopia of security leads to paradoxes when it comes to being effective against organised crime in the port. The article will conclude by discussing the possibility of a different approach, one of displacement of countering efforts rather than of cocaine flows. This different approach can also rebalance the focus of policing and security authorities on the relationship between the port and its territory. 

European Journal of Criminology 1–21 © The Author(s) 2023 

by Stephanie Brewer and Ana Lucia Verduzco

Mexico’s federal government is increasingly militarizing civilian tasks within and outside the realm of public security. Previous presidents presented militarization as a temporary measure that would allow time to strengthen civilian institutions—though in practice, military deployment became the permanent model, largely at the expense of prioritizing other security and justice strategies and institutions. The current government, however, promotes a broad militarization of civilian tasks in the long term, including through the militarization of the National Guard. The power and roles of the armed forces are growing without effective civilian controls over their actions. While the levels of serious human rights violations attributed to the military have fallen following the end of former president Felipe Calderón’s term, such violations continue to occur. More broadly, Mexico continues to experience historic levels of violence, and the vast majority of crimes go unpunished. Without minimizing positive reforms and steps forward, access to justice remains a fundamental challenge. In this context, it is crucial to improve criminal investigations and strengthen the capacities and accountability of the country’s police institutions. The military’s growing list of civilian tasks is a trend that will not be easily reversed, but demilitarizing public security and consolidating civilian institutions is the necessary route to strengthen the rule of law. In the meantime, the government must install effective civilian controls over the armed forces.

Mexico: WOLA- Adovcacy for Human Rights in Mexico, 2023, 61p.

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin 

  A growing share of drug distribution takes place through cryptomarkets—illicit online drug markets which supply the lower levels of the drug trade. Though the economy at large is well understood and the motivations and demographics of buyers as well, the population of drug sellers has received less scrutiny. In this study we address this research gap through the largest qualitative study of cryptomarket vendors to date. We find that sellers begin their careers in varying ways, some moving their business online, others moving into cryptomarket distribution from buying, reselling or supplying friends or from other cybercrimes. We further observe that economic and non-economic motivations frequently overlap, and that strategies for managing risk vary extensively. We conclude with a discussion of our findings from a policy perspective, focusing on the implications for policing drug markets and health policies.  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2020. 44p.

By Richard L. Harries, Caitlyn Norman, Robert Reid, Niamh Nic Daeid, Lorna A. Nisbet

The administration of new psychoactive substances (NPS), in particular synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs), via e-cigarettes, within prison settings has been well publicized. This study provides an overview of five e-cigarette case samples seized from Scottish prisons between May 2022 and July 2023 where the anabolic-androgenic steroids (AASs) mestanolone and oxandrolone were identified following gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) analyses. These e-cigarette samples represented 2.9% of all samples containing e-cigarette cartridges (n = 170) and 9.4% of all samples found to contain AASs (n = 53) seized during the same time period. The AASs were detected in combination with other drugs, including cocaine, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC), SCRAs and nicotine. This represents a new and novel route of administration for AASs.

Forensic Science International, (2024)

By  Felipe Botero Escobar

For years, Ecuador enjoyed a relative degree of peace, as its neighbors, Colombia and Peru, were wrangling with internal conflicts as chief protagonists in the international supply of cocaine. However, things have changed dramatically in recent times. On 9 January 2024, the recently elected president, Daniel Noboa, said that the country was in a state of ‘internal armed conflict’ against 22 criminal groups that he described as ‘narco-terrorists’.

One of the most visible incidents of Ecuador’s growing problem with violence occurred in August 2023 when presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated at a campaign rally in Quito just weeks before the elections. Since Villavicencio’s murder, several incidents have occurred, including the arrest of the Colombian hitmen involved in his death and their subsequent murders in a prison, which has deprived the authorities of crucial evidence in the investigation.6 The year 2023 ended as the most violent recorded in the history of Ecuador.

The situation in Ecuador is complex, and more research into the political-economic factors behind how this once stable country descended into violent, crime-driven chaos needs to be undertaken if we are to fully comprehend the situation. Nevertheless, there are some key features of Ecuador’s criminal landscape that we do understand, and which can at least partly explain how the country has arrived at this critical juncture.

The existence of at least three intertwined criminal markets, the presence of transnational organized crime groups as well as local criminal networks, and the country’s poor resilience capacity to respond to and mitigate the effects of organized crime are all pivotal to understanding the complex criminal ecosystem that has emerged in force in recent years. In the last edition of the Global Organized Crime Index, published in September 2023, scores for Ecuador’s criminal markets and criminal actors are revealed.

This analysis provides but an initial understanding of the background. A more comprehensive assessment of how intersecting criminal markets, like arms trafficking and extortion, operate in the country will be essential in formulating sustainable, practicable responses to the crisis.

By Ryan C. Berg

Key Points

• Much of Brazil’s deadly urban violence is the direct result of territorial battles involving the country’s powerful transnational organized crime groups, many of which trace their origins to the country’s dangerous and overcrowded prisons.

• The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or First Capital Command, took shape in São Paulo during the early 1990s, as inmates organized against poor prison conditions to impose order and preserve lives. Eventually, the PCC developed an ability to project its influence and control well beyond prison walls and into Brazil’s sprawling urban slums.

• The PCC has vanquished many of its domestic rivals, enjoys a footprint in every state in Brazil, runs operations in almost every country of South America, and is now more globally minded than ever before, recruiting guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Venezuelan refugees and partnering with European mafia groups and Lebanese Hezbollah.

• Law-and-order strategies that “stuff” Brazil’s crowded prisons with new inmates may actually exacerbate the problem, given that the PCC has effectively converted the country’s prisons into logistical hubs and training centers of illicit activity. To fight the PCC, the US should designate it as a transnational organized crime group to confer the benefits of multiple pieces of legislation and seek extradition of key PCC leaders.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 36p.

By Thomas Hofmarcher, Anne Leppänen, Anna Månsdotter, Joakim Strandberg, Anders Håkansson

Background: Illegal drug use is a public health concern with far-reaching consequences for people who use them and for society. In Sweden, the reported use of illegal drugs has been growing and the number of drug-induced deaths is among the highest in Europe. The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date estimation of the societal costs of illegal drug use in Sweden, relying as much as possible on registry and administrative data. Methods: A prevalence-based cost-of-illness study of illegal drug use in Sweden in 2020 was conducted. A societal approach was chosen and included direct costs (such as costs of health care, social services, and the criminal justice system), indirect costs (such as lost productivity due to unemployment and drug-induced death), and intangible costs (such as reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and their family members). Costs were estimated by combining registry, administrative, and survey data with unit cost data. Results: The estimated societal costs of illegal drug use were 3.7 billion euros in 2020. This corresponded to 355 euros per capita and 0.78 % of the gross domestic product. The direct and intangible costs were of similar sizes, each contributing to approximately 40 % of total costs, whereas indirect costs contributed to approximately 20 %. The largest individual cost components were reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and costs of the criminal justice system. Conclusion: Illegal drug use has a negative impact on the societal aim to create good and equitable health in Sweden. The findings call for evidence-based prevention of drug use and treatment for those addicted. It is important to address the co-morbidity of mental ill-health and drug dependence, to develop low-threshold services and measures for early prevention among children and young adults, as well as to evaluate laws and regulations connected to illegal drug use.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 104259

By Letizia Paoli, Luke Thomas Joseph Cox

Background: Like many other goods and services, performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs), and particularly androgenic anabolic steroids (AAS), are increasingly discussed and promoted by social media influencers. Little, however, is known about the influencers specialized in PIEDs and which drugs and services they promote and sell. Aims: Against this background, the study has been intended to identify prominent influencers specialized in PIEDs, examine the market activities they engage in, and assess the latter’s legality. Methods: We first searched the clean internet to identify prominent PIED influencers. Second, we conducted a sixmonth-long, non-reactive digital ethnography of the social media accounts of 20 influencers and, via a content analysis, identified the market activities they engage in. Third, we assessed the latter’s legality, primarily using the EU legislation as a benchmark. Findings: The selected influencers are all current or former bodybuilders, predominantly male and from the United States. Many of them have developed a considerable number of followers, in three cases exceeding one million. They engage in various market activities that span the whole spectrum of legality, from legal to illegal, with many activities having an uncertain, but often dubious, legal status. Conclusions: Though they may promote harm reduction for some users, PIED influencers also promote the public acceptance of PIED use beyond the bodybuilding community and enhance access to PIEDs for millions of people. Multifaceted policy interventions are required, aiming at preventing influencers from becoming a major source of information on, and route of access to, PIEDs.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 104246

By Coleman Bazelon, Alberto Vargas, Rohan Janakiraman, Mary Olson

The harm caused by transatlantic chattel slavery was vast, and its repercussions resonate in the lives of descendants of the enslaved to this day. Each enslaved person experienced overwhelming harm, beginning with the loss of their liberty and often ending with a premature death after a life marked by personal injury and other forms of violence, if they survived the Middle Passage. By our estimates, these harms were inflicted on 19 million people over the span of four centuries. These 19 million include those Africans kidnapped and transported to the Americas and Caribbean and those born into slavery. Given the depth, breadth, and duration of the harm, quantifying the associated reparations is a daunting task. Yet, many scholars in multiple disciplines across different countries have documented and studied these harms for decades. In this paper, we bring economic analysis to build on this vast body of work and quantify in a novel—but far from definitive—manner elements of reparations for transatlantic chattel slavery.24 To meet this challenge, we begin by separating the harm into two broad temporal categories. First for harm during the period when chattel slavery was carried out and, second, for continuing harm thereafter. During each of these periods, harm was multidimensional, and it is important to recognize each of the distinct forms of harm experienced by the enslaved and their descendants. We quantify only a subset of these harms, since the economic tools available are not appropriate to measure some categories of harm or because of data limitations.

For the period of enslavement, including any post-emancipation period of ‘apprenticeship’ where the formerly enslaved were ‘earning’ their freedom, we estimate US$77 trillion to US$108 trillion in reparations. This range provides a lower-bound estimate reflecting conservative assumptions, such as the interest rate to compensate for the time value of money when we bring the value of stolen labor forward to today. If, as other scholars have done, we used interest rates closer to the market rates over the relevant centuries, our estimates would be considerably higher. The lower bound estimate of US$77 trillion in reparation for the period of enslavement uses an alternative approach to bring the value of stolen labor forward to today using an interest rate that is based on the appreciation in the value of labor, instead of an interest rate based on the appreciation of the value of money. Prior work presenting similar calculations has noted that the resulting magnitudes are close to or exceed the current GDP of the enslaving countries. While striking, that is not surprising. These calculations measure a harm inflicted on millions of persons, and sometimes entire nations, for hundreds of years, and therefore one year’s GDP, which measures the annual economic output of a country, is perhaps not the best yardstick to put the results in context. Instead, we compare the magnitude of our estimates with national wealth and the cumulative GDP over the past several decades.   

Boston: Brattle Group, 2023. 115p.

By Roger Bate

With the stated aim of increasing revenue and discouraging smoking, Pakistan raised tobacco duties over the past five years. The result empowered illicit actors, with a flourishing of illicit production and smuggling of cigarettes. Revenue rose initially, only to fall back as untaxed products proliferated. While organized crime and local production interests were the big winners, smoking rates have remained largely unchanged. Pakistan’s authorities have tried to resolve the problem through better enforcement and lowering of duties for certain products, but overall the lesson learned is that rapid duty increases have significant negative effects that are difficult to reverse when illegal supply cannot be controlled.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2018. 10p.

By Anine Kriegler

Cannabis legalization has the potential to weaken organized crime, but it can just as easily strengthen it unless a balance is found between restriction and liberalization, coordinated across both the supply and demand sides of the market. South Africa’s current cannabis policy lacks coherence, with reforms driven more by legal challenges than by strategic policymaking, posing challenges in effectively countering organized crime.

This paper summarizes the history and status of cannabis decriminalization in South Africa and draws on a review of literature to identify a key set of variables that determine the impact of legalization on organized crime: the type and degree of restrictiveness of the new regulations; various cultural, socio-economic, and political factors; features of the criminal justice system; and the structure and nature of criminal organization in the illegal cannabis market.

Reflections are provided on what these suggest about the likely impact of South African cannabis legalization on organized crime, and potential lessons and recommendations are proposed for effective policy reform in South Africa, as well as guidance for similar decision-making in other contexts.

Effective reform requires integrating marginalized communities and black-market participants into the legal market, along with considerations for managing legal supply, strategic enforcement against criminal gangs, and public health education to ensure a comprehensive approach to reducing organized crime. A phased implementation of regulatory frameworks, ongoing monitoring, and investment in data collection are essential to assess and optimize the impact of legalization on organized crime. Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 29p.

By Pascal Tanguay

Elections in 2023 have brought a new government to power, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who declared in late September that his government intends to achieve in the next six months a partial reversal of the reforms, recriminalizing recreational use and leaving the medical market as the sole legal arena.

Through a methodical data collection process involving key informant interviews and literature reviews, this report sheds light on the substantial impacts of such policy changes, especially on the illicit markets and organized crime networks. Informed by these insights, the GI-TOC has formulated preliminary policy recommendations to secure a resilient Thai cannabis market that is as balanced as it is sustainable.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC),  2024. 34p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• Corruption is an urgent challenge in Mexico that undermines political stability, economic development, the rule of law, efforts to combat organized crime, and the effectiveness of public services.

• Corruption in Mexico’s security forces is a key contributor to the sharp rise of organized criminal violence and severely handicaps US-Mexico security cooperation against drug cartels.

• President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s emphasis on combating money laundering and his empowerment of Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit are positive developments for the government’s anti-corruption efforts. However, an increasingly hostile stance to US-Mexico security cooperation, the politicization of investigations, neglect of independent institutions, and inattention to cartel corruption are all concerning.

• The US should use a combination of diplomatic engagement, expanded cooperation against money laundering, and unilateral enforcement actions to restore trust and the effectiveness of bilateral security and anti-corruption cooperation while pushing Mexico to address its anti-corruption blind spots.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2021. 32p.

By Andres Martinez-Fernandez

Key Points

• National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas remain a potent challenge for regional security and development. The ELN is growing in Colombia and Venezuela, thanks to its involvement in illegal mining, now the most important revenue source for the guerrilla group.

• The ELN’s illegal mining remains virtually unrestricted in Venezuela, thanks to the Nicolás Maduro regime’s complicity. At the same time, despite the Colombian government’s recent efforts, illegal mining continues to take place throughout Colombia, benefiting armed groups like the ELN.

• To cut off the ELN from this vital revenue source, the United States and Colombia must work to expand the presence of the state in areas affected by illegal mining, formalize artisanal miners, strengthen the state’s enforcement and investigatory capacities, and isolate Venezuela from global gold markets.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019. 12p.