By María Victoria Llorente and Jeremy McDermott,  Raúl Benítez Manaut , Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón , John Bailey

Since the mid-2000s, violence related to drug trafficking and other transnational crime has increased exponentially in Mexico. By the end of the decade the public began to seriously doubt the government’s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The nature and intensity of violence in Mexico brought forth memories of the 1980s and ’90s in Colombia, when the country was besieged by the Medellín and Cali drug cartels. Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia’s security situation has improved dramatically; it has become an “exporter” of security expertise and has trained thousands of military and police personnel in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean as well as around the world. What aspects of Colombia’s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia’s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter-example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? In One Goal, Two Struggles: Confronting Crime and Violence in Mexico and Colombia, international experts address the utility of comparing Colombia and Mexico’s experiences and strategy for combatting organized crime and violence more generally.

By The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime

Levels of organized crime have remained stable across Europe while increasing in most other regions, according to the 2025 Global Organized Crime Index. Europe remains the second-lowest continent for criminality after Oceania. However, this overall stability masks a dynamic situation across criminal markets and criminal actors.

Europe’s overall criminality score stands at 4.74, while its resilience score reaches 6.28 —the highest globally. Although Europe continues to outperform other continents across all 12 resilience indicators, criminality continues to expand and adapt, highlighting the need to update resilience strategies to keep pace with emerging threats.

Financial crime remains the most pervasive criminal market in Europe for the second consecutive edition of the Index. These crimes include increasingly complex and sophisticated fraud schemes, largely occurring online, such as investment fraud, business email compromise and romance scams, as well as embezzlement and tax evasion. Financial crimes are inherently transregional and are particularly facilitated by corruption.

Europe continues to be a global hotspot for cyber-dependent crimes, ranking second continentally. These crimes range from ransomware attacks to malware distribution and cryptocurrency fraud, often targeting government institutions, major corporations and critical infrastructure. Hybrid and traditional cybercrime actors are increasingly intertwined, with state-sponsored groups often disguising themselves as cybercriminals.

Drug markets remain salient. Cocaine and synthetic drugs have recorded the sharpest increases since 2023. Cocaine is a primary source of revenue for numerous organized crime groups in Europe, and the continent functions as a destination, transit hub and consumer market. Synthetic drug production is becoming increasingly dispersed across Europe, with Central and Eastern Europe registering the sharpest increase since 2021. Heroin, by contrast, is showing signs of decline, while cannabis remains the most widely consumed illicit drug.

Human trafficking and human smuggling remain far-reaching and widespread. Smuggling networks are entrenched along the Western Balkans route, and many European countries serve as final destinations where smuggled people may face forced labour or sexual exploitation.

The presence of criminal actors has grown steadily since 2021. Foreign actors remain the most concerning actor type, recording the largest overall increase since 2021. These groups are increasingly heterogeneous, multi-ethnic and interconnected. Private-sector actors also play a pivotal role in laundering illicit funds, while state-embedded actors, though less pervasive than elsewhere, are implicated in facilitating criminal activity in some contexts.

Europe’s resilience strengths lie in international cooperation, national policies and laws, and territorial integrity. However, government transparency and accountability consistently rank lowest among resilience indicators. Anti-money laundering and economic regulatory capacity also remain areas of concern.

While Europe demonstrates relatively strong resilience overall, certain criminal markets and actors are expanding. The findings underscore the need for more effective and tailored response mechanisms as organized crime continues to adapt across the continent.

By Barbara Kelemen | Ján Slobodník

Summary ▪ Mexico’s macroeconomic stability and abundant natural resources have made the country into an attractive destination for Chinese businesses. ▪ The country still suffers from a lack of internal security, most of it stemming from the Mexican Drug War, an ongoing multilateral lowintensity conflict between the Mexican government and a large number of criminal organizations. ▪ In some of Mexico’s states, pervasive violence and instability have resulted in a power vacuum. With the government being unable to guarantee security, non-state actors such as criminal organizations and/or civilian militias seize the opportunity to establish their own rule. ▪ When foreign companies operate in such troubled areas, they inevitably run into problems caused by Mexico’s security issues. ▪ Within this trend of foreign companies operating in Mexico, some level of tacit cooperation has been observed between Chinese businesses and non-state actors. This cooperation is often an outcome of localized security vacuums that are exploited by alternative security providers, such as criminal organizations, that can fill them and provide operational safety for local businesses. ▪ A growing body of research has identified the existence of Chinese illicit networks and their involvement in the trafficking of people, narcotics, and contraband goods, as well as money laundering and illegal arms trade in Mexico. ▪ Concealed under the guise of legal commercial activity, networks of Mexican criminal organizations and their Chinese business partners exploit the dire security situation in some areas of Mexico. ▪ Despite attempts by the Chinese and the Mexican governments to regulate certain sectors that contribute to the existence of the illicit networks in Mexico, there are still substantial opportunities that are ripe for exploitation by the criminal group-legitimate business partnerships.

By Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan

Criminal cartels and gangs dominate the illicit economy in Mexico. These organized crime groups challenge the solvency (specifically capacity and legitimacy) of the state in Mexico. Organized crime in Mexico is involved in a range of activities including extortion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and petroleum theft. Criminal cartels, often called drug trafficking organizations, have diversified into other illicit activities specifically petroleum theft. This paper provides an overview of the rise of a specialized organized criminal entity: huachicoleros. Huachicoleros specialize in fuel theft and like their narco counterparts use corruption and violence to protect their illicit market. The rise of Cártel de Santa Rosa Lima (CSRL) is discussed as a salient case study. The volatile mix of corruption, violence, and economic instability will be assessed, and government and national oil company (PEMEX) response is discussed

By Diorella Islas

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe. While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe. To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis. The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of theregion where the illicit business are taking place. The third finding was that the transatlantic cocaine trafficking routes are not controlled by an specific actor, but they are horizontal structures that are highly adaptative. The final key finding refers to a methodological observation which I describe as the “paradox of referencing”; when many sources reference something that was true in the past –like the links between Mexican DTOs and Italian mafia discovered in 2008– they help to perpetuate the present perception of a past phenomenon.

By U.S. Congressional Research Service

For over a decade, the synthetic opioid fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances have been key drivers of the U.S. opioid crisis. Countering the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and the precursor chemicals ("precursors") used to make it has been a U.S. priority. In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) first identified the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) as the main source of U.S.-bound fentanyl and fentanyl precursors. Since the PRC imposed domestic controls on fentanyl-related substances in 2019, which curtailed almost all direct shipments of fentanyl from China to the United States, many U.S. policymakers have shifted focus. Their chief concern today is the role of China—the global leader in chemical sales—as the primary source of precursors used by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to synthesize fentanyl and its analogues in third countries (chiefly Mexico). Congress has sought to address China's shifting role in the illicit drug trade, including through provisions in the BUST Fentanyl Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2026.

By the U.K. Ministry of Justice and Department of Health & Social Care

1 In April 2025, approximately 40,000 people in prisons in England and Wales (50%) had an identified drug problem. Misuse of illicit drugs by people in prison creates or exacerbates risks to their health, well-being and personal safety. Between December 2022 and December 2024, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated 833 deaths, of which 136 (16%) were drug-related. Conveyance, supply and use of illicit drugs also increase risks to the safety and stability of the prison regime. Availability of drugs inside prisons creates an illicit economy that can fuel debt, which can lead to assault, extortion or self-harm. Prisoners who are using illicit drugs often reoffend after leaving prison. 2 Effective interventions require HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and health service providers, commissioned for prisons in England by NHS England (NHSE), to work closely together. • HMPPS is primarily responsible for action to detect illicit drugs and prevent their conveyance into prisons, and it also seeks to reduce demand for drugs through initiatives to encourage positive behaviour changes. • Health service providers deliver drug treatment and recovery services inside prisons. • The overall prison environment can support prisoners by providing a rehabilitative culture; education and other purposeful activities; building relationships; delivering a safe regime; and facilitating access to health interventions, including addressing mental health needs. Focus of our report 3 This report focuses on how the prison and health services are using public funds to tackle drug harms in prisons. It examines: • how well the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), HMPPS, Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), NHSE and wider government understand the scale and nature of drug harms in prisons (Part One); • the funding available for HMPPS and NHSE to tackle drug harms in prisons, and how resources are prioritised (Part Two); and • how effectively resources have been used and how well the prison and health services work together (Part Three).4 The report focuses only on illicit drug harms in prisons. We do not cover national and international work by the police and others to counter criminal activity supplying drugs to prisons, nor do we review interventions for people on community orders or the continuity of drug treatment services for prison leavers. ‘Substance misuse’ is a broader term often used in healthcare, which includes misuse of alcohol and diversion of prescription medicines, as well as illicit drugs. We touch on these broader issues where relevant, but they are not the focus of our report. While HMPPS is responsible for prisons in England and Wales, healthcare in Wales is a devolved function provided by NHS Wales, and therefore falls outside the scope of this report

By Carina Bruwer 

The Atlantic Ocean is a vital conduit for vessels transporting and sourcing licit and illicit commodities. Much of the focus on maritime crime has been on the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea, with fragmented attention paid to illicit activities further south in the Atlantic bordering Angola, Namibia and South Africa. This paper maps transnational organised crimes facilitated by vessels, with the aim of identifying challenges and opportunities in safeguarding southwestern Africa’s coast. Key points • Various vessels transport and source illicit commodities in Africa’s South Atlantic. • The Red Sea conflict has increased vessel traffic around Southern Africa’s coast, bringing both opportunities and risks to trade. • Cocaine remains the primary drug entering Africa via the South Atlantic, but synthetic drug and precursor trafficking is increasing. • Flags of convenience facilitate illegal fishing on the Angola/Namibian border. • Limited resources constrain counter-efforts. • Mapping Africa’s South Atlantic illicit markets provides an evidence base for stakeholders working to counter them.

By Cole Jurecka; Joella Adams; Pranav Padmanabhan; Jason Glanz; Paul Christine; Xiaoyu Guan; Danielle Kline; Ingrid Binswanger; Joshua Barocas

In 2022, Colorado passed legislation making possession of small amounts of fentanyl, a high-potency synthetic opioid, a felony. Whether the Colorado law affected opioid overdose fatalities and whether those effects differed by racial and ethnic subgroups is unknown. OBJECTIVE To estimate the association between the change in criminal penalties for fentanyl possession with opioid-related overdose deaths (OODs) in Colorado. DESIGN, SETTING, AND POPULATION Serial cross-sectional study comparing OODs among adults (18 years) who died of an overdose and population estimates before and after Colorado House Bill (HB) 22-1326 was enacted in July 2022 (January 2018-November 2023) using autoregressive integrated moving averages (ARIMA) model time series forecasting. Monthly OOD rates per 100 000 residents were calculated using state population estimates from the American Community Survey 5-Year Data and the Colorado Department of Local Affairs State Demography Office. Overdose death rates were calculated separately by racial and ethnic group (Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, and non-Hispanic White). Data were analyzed from January 2018 to 2023. EXPOSURE Enactment of HB 22-1326 changed the legal penalty for possession of any drug weighing 1 g to 4 g that contained any amount of fentanyl from a misdemeanor to a level-4 drug felony punishable by up to 180 days in jail and up to 2 years of probation. MAIN OUTCOME The difference between expected and observed OOD rates following the enactment of increased criminal penalties. RESULTS A total of 7099 OODs were analyzed (1798 Hispanic [25.3%], 451 Non-Hispanic Black [6.4%], and 4170 Non-Hispanic White [58.7%], 680 other [9.5%] and not included in the race and ethnicity categories). OODs increased across the study period in Colorado from 20.46 per 100 000 adults in January 2018 to 37.78 per 100 000 adults in November 2023. Among different racial and ethnic groups, the non-Hispanic Black population had the highest increase in OODs (9.3 per 100 000 in 2018 to 56.9 per 100 000 in 2023) followed by the Hispanic population. There was no difference between the observed and expect overdose deaths for the overall population following the enactment of HB 22-1326. However, there were significant increases in 4 of 13 months after policy implementation among the non-Hispanic Black population CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The results of this serial cross-sectional study suggest that increased criminal penalties for fentanyl possession did not change preexisting trends of OODs in Colorado and may have been associated with an increase in opioid overdoses in the Black population.

By Lisa N. Sacco, Joanna R. Lampe, Hassan Z. Sheikh

Marijuana is a psychoactive drug that generally consists of leaves and flowers of the cannabis sativa plant. It is a Schedule I controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA; 21 U.S.C. §§801 et seq.), and thus is strictly regulated by federal authorities. In contrast, over the last several decades, most states and territories have deviated from a comprehensive prohibition of marijuana and have laws and policies allowing for some cultivation, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana.

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. According to data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), in 2024 an estimated 64.2 million individuals aged 12 or older used marijuana in the past year, and 44.3 million reported using it in the past month. The percentage of individuals 12 or older who reported past-month marijuana use gradually increased from 6.1% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024—a time frame during which a majority of states repealed state criminal prohibitions on marijuana and allowed for its recreational and/or medical use. The rate of past-month marijuana use among youth (ages 12-17) was 6.0% in 2024 and since 2008 has fluctuated from a low of 6.0% (in 2023 and 2024) to a high of 7.9% (in 2011), while adult (ages 18+) use steadily increased—from 6.3% in 2008 to 16.3% in 2024.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service; March 10, 2026.

By Matthew F. Garnett, Jodi A. Cisewski, Farida B. Ahmad

Objective:

This report identifies the specific drugs most frequently involved in drug overdose deaths in the United States from 2017 through 2023.

Methods:

Data from the 2017–2023 National Vital Statistics System mortality files were linked to literal text data from death certificates. Drug overdose deaths were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision underlying cause-of-death codes X40–X44, X60–X64, X85, and Y10–Y14. Specific drugs were identified by searching three literal text fields of the death certificate: the causes of death from Part I, significant conditions contributing to death from Part II, and the description of how the injury occurred. Contextual information was used to determine drug involvement in the death. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the most frequently mentioned drugs involved in drug overdose deaths. Deaths involving multiple drugs were counted in all relevant drug categories.

Results:

Among drug overdose deaths with mention of at least one specific drug, the most frequently mentioned drugs during 2017–2023 included: fentanyl, heroin, oxycodone, morphine, methadone, hydrocodone, alprazolam, diphenhydramine, cocaine, methamphetamine, amphetamine, gabapentin, and xylazine. Fentanyl ranked first across all years and was the most common concomitant drug found with other top drugs, ranging from 99.0% of xylazine-involved drug overdose deaths to 48.3% of oxycodone-involved drug overdose deaths. Cocaine and methamphetamine were also frequent concomitant drugs. Trends in age-adjusted rates across the 2017 to 2023 period varied by drug, but notably the rate for heroin-involved deaths sharply declined, while the rate for fentanyl-involved deaths increased and then stabilized between 2022 and 2023. In 2023, the most frequently mentioned drugs in unintentional drug overdose deaths were fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, while the most frequently mentioned drugs for suicide-related drug overdoses were diphenhydramine, oxycodone, and bupropion.

Conclusions:

This report identifies patterns in the specific drugs most frequently involved in drug overdose deaths from 2017 through 2023.National Vital Statistics Reports; CDC National Center for Health Statistics; 2026.

By lBenedikt Fischer,  Didier Jutras-Aswad, Bernard Le Foll, Daniel T. Myra

Highlights

•

The province of British Columbia (Canada) temporarily implemented a decriminalization initiative for personal drug possession/use (2023–2024) in contexts of a toxic drug death crisis.

1. •

   The decriminalization initiative was a priori promoted as a “tool to end the overdose crisis” and widely expected to reduce adverse health outcomes from toxic drug use.

2. •

   Emerging evaluation data indicate that the drug decriminalization initiative was not associated with population-level changes in drug use-related mortality (e.g., overdose deaths) or morbidity (e.g., hospitalizations).

3. •

   Drug use decriminalization remains an essential step to align prohibition-based drug policy frameworks with public health and human rights principles, but must be approached realistically and designed sensibly.

4. •

   To tangibly address toxic drug use-related harms, expanded measures are required that are effectively capable of preventing and reducing PWUDs’ exposure to and use of toxic drugs
   International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 150, April 2026, 105181

By Pamela Ruiz

The Mara Salvatrucha 13 (mara) and Barrio 18 (pandilla) gangs have become a major concern for the governments of the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) and the United States. In recent years, government officials have attributed violence and the exodus of Central Americans to the developing capacities of gangs. The Mara Salvatrucha 13(MS-13) and Barrio 18 have been identified to strategically implement violence and extortion rackets which have led to transformations in their organizational structures and increased participation in drug trafficking. Furthermore, officials insinuate that gangs have developed capacities to confront security forces that enter gang territory with an increase in confrontations. This has resulted with Northern Triangle governments reclassifying gangs as organized crime and/or terrorist organizations; but, do these gangs meet the requirements to be classified as such? The overall purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of MS-13 and Barrio 18 in the Northern Triangle of Central America using mixed methods. Crime pattern theory provided the framework to understand the crime opportunity structures to explain the concentration of violence (homicides, extortion, and confrontations). Organized crime and gang concepts were used to evaluate gangs’ evolution with regards to their use of violence, extortion rackets,transformations in organizational structures, and roles in drug trafficking with a focus on their alliances with Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel (Mexican DTOs). Phase I of this study used official quantitative data to map the spatial concentration of homicides, extortions, and confrontations (gang-related crimes) at the municipality level for each country from 2007-2017. Phase II gathered qualitative data through purposive, semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts (academics, law enforcement, and NGO personnel) to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the concentration of violence and whether gangs had evolved to organized crime organizations. Triangulation of the study data provided a more concise display of where these crimes concentrate and contributing factors to the gangs’ evolution. This study concludes illicit political economic networks between corrupt officials, narcotrafficking groups, and gangs contribute to violence and impunity in the Northern Triangle of Central America. The concentration of homicides in border municipalities was often associated with drug trafficking, homicides in urban areas were often associated with gangs, and homicides in rural areas were attributed to vengeance murders. Extortion concentrated in urban centers and was described as a crime of opportunity with various “imitators” involved. Confrontations between law enforcement personnel and gangs have led to formal accusations of extrajudicial executions. Moreover, the politicization of gangs has limited attention to address criminal activities and violence that are not associated with gangs. Therefore, this study’s findings indicate violence in the Northern Triangle of Central America can be attributed tointer-and-intra gang violence, 2) inter-and-intra narcotrafficking violence, 3) state violence and 4) non-gang related violence. Lastly, it is unquestionable MS-13 and Barrio 18 have evolved, while it is premature to classify these gangs as an organized crime group; this study puts forth categorizing gangs as “organized delinquency” to best describe their capacities.

New York: City University of New York, 2019. 193p.

By Laurie Caron, Frank Crispino and Cyril Muehlethaler

Tobacco smuggling remains a widespread illegal activity in Canada, associated with important social and economic impacts, and often linked to organized crime. This study explores the application of forensic profiling as an intelligence tool to support the analysis of contraband cigarette production and distribution. Physical and chemical manufacturing characteristics of seized contraband cigarette packs, provided by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), were observed and coded using macroscopic, microscopic, and spectroscopic techniques. Multivariate statistical analyses were then conducted to compare manufacturing characteristics between packs and identify potential links. The analyses highlighted links between cigarette packs and seizures based on shared manufacturing characteristics. The results and the identified groups were also compared with seizure data provided by the CBSA. The results demonstrate the relevance of forensic profiling to formulate hypotheses regarding shared production processes or supply networks. These hypotheses provide information that contributes to understanding tobacco smuggling and aim to examine how forensic intelligence can support law enforcement and measures to prevent and disrupt this criminal activity. A preliminary optimal procedure for applying forensic profiling in operational contexts targeting contraband tobacco was finally proposed. Despite limitations in the dataset creation that were beyond our control, this study represents a starting point for applying this scientific approach to tobacco smuggling

By CECILIA FARFÁN-MÉNDEZ | JASON ELIGH 

More than 1.1 million people in the United States have died from opioid overdoses since 2000. In Canada, over 50,000 lives have been lost to opioid-related overdoses since 2016. Meanwhile, in Mexico, homicide—mostly committed with illegally trafficked firearms—is the leading cause of death among men aged 15 to 44. These overlapping crises reveal that the harms associated with synthetic opioids are not confined to one country but span all of North America.

This policy brief sheds light on how illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF) is produced and distributed within and across Mexico, the US, and Canada. The report reveals a complex and highly integrated system of production, tablet pressing, trafficking, and consumption. Far from being a product trafficked into North America, IMF is increasingly produced on its soil.nized Crime trilateral perspective

By Christopher Hernandez-Roy and Rubi Bledsoe 

Drug trafficking, especially cocaine trafficking, from source countries in South America to Europe has produced alarming and lasting effects on both sides of the Atlantic. While various trafficking routes to Europe exist, transshipment through the Caribbean, including through the European territories in the region, is of growing concern. In Europe, the expanding cocaine market has brought a rise in homicides, kidnappings, and intimidation. In the city of Antwerp, for example, there were around 200 drug-related violent incidents in the past five years as competing gangs fought over control of territory. In the Caribbean, drug trafficking by organized crime has been associated with record homicide levels, corruption, democratic backsliding, and money laundering, among other pernicious effects. It has also prompted wars between gangs over the control of criminal economies, expanded illegal firearms trafficking, and exacerbated human trafficking both within the region and beyond. Shedding light on the complexity of the issue—while providing policy recommendations for increased cooperation between the United States, Europe, and Caribbean countries—is necessary as both continents seek regional and extra-regional security.

Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023. 11p.

By Antonio L. Mazzitelli

The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel‘s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt. 

Miami:  Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center. 2011. 22p.