By Nathan P. Jones and John P. Sullivan

Criminal cartels and gangs dominate the illicit economy in Mexico. These organized crime groups challenge the solvency (specifically capacity and legitimacy) of the state in Mexico. Organized crime in Mexico is involved in a range of activities including extortion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and petroleum theft. Criminal cartels, often called drug trafficking organizations, have diversified into other illicit activities specifically petroleum theft. This paper provides an overview of the rise of a specialized organized criminal entity: huachicoleros. Huachicoleros specialize in fuel theft and like their narco counterparts use corruption and violence to protect their illicit market. The rise of Cártel de Santa Rosa Lima (CSRL) is discussed as a salient case study. The volatile mix of corruption, violence, and economic instability will be assessed, and government and national oil company (PEMEX) response is discussed

By Evan Ellis

The U.S. government threats of tariffs on the Mexican government if it did not do more to control illicit fentanyl ows into the United States have cast new attention on the growing problem of transnational organized crime that has wrought violence and corruption at all levels in Mexico. This work, based on the authors research in interviews with senior Mexican security ofcials in Mexico City in March 2025, examines the evolution of transnational organized crime in the country, and the Mexican government’s response, with the support of the United States and other partners.The principal drivers of transnational organized crime dynamics in Mexico are ows of cocaine through the country, largely destined for European and Asian markets, as well as the production of fentanyl there from Chinese and other precursors, mostly oriented toward export to the United States. In addition, other illicit activities including petroleum theft (huachicol), smuggling and exploitation of migrants transiting the country, extortion and kidnapping, illegal mining and money laundering, have also fueled Mexico’s evolving illicit economy. With respect to murders and other violence in Mexico, arms, including long arms imported from the United States, arms obtained on the black market from Central American and other global wars, drones and other military products principally from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as a large, welldeveloped illicit domestic industry for military vehicles and supplies all contribute to the lethality of multiple ongoing conict within the country.The organized crime dynamics in Mexico, the domestic and international groups involved, in the pattern of violence has evolved signicantly in the almost two decades since 2006 when Mexican president Felipe Calderon declared war on the drug cartels for their escalating violence and deployed federal troops into Michoacan to respond. This work analyzes of those dynamics, their evolution, and the response of the Mexican government, in conjunction with the US and other partners.

By Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith

High crime—especially intentional homicide—has posed a clear and present danger for the Caribbean for some time. However, soaring homicide rates across the region and the fact that many are committed using weapons from the United States have caused the matter to attract more attention in recent months, with a recent symposium in Trinidad and Tobago on the subject shining the most recent spotlight. CARICOM leaders are concerned about the growing homicide rates and the number of arms entering the region—issues raised both at the February 2023 CARICOM Summit in the Bahamas as well as at a recent special meeting on April 18 and 19 on the subject convened by Prime Minister Keith Rowley of Trinidad and Tobago, who holds the portfolio for security within the CARICOM quasi cabinet. The conference framed crime and violence as a public health crisis. Unlike at the Bahamas meeting—which featured government leaders—experts from within and outside the Caribbean were invited to the symposium to discuss options to address the issue. The Caribbean leaders declared a “war on guns to combat the illegal trade which provides the weapons that contribute significantly to crime and violence in our region causing death, disabilities and compromising the safety of our citizens” and implored the United States to support their efforts to halt illegal arms trafficking. They also lamented the disproportionate shares of their national budgets they are obligated to allocate to national security, especially to combat crime and violence while also grappling with mental and other health-related challenges spurned by the arms trafficking business.1 This report offers an analysis of the contemporary Caribbean crime landscape. Particular attention is paid to intentional homicides and murders. This is not because domestic violence, burglary, rape, larceny, money laundering, and other crimes are unimportant or have not increased in some places. Indeed, there have been troubling surges in domestic violence in Guyana, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and elsewhere. Murder, however, commands attention here because it constitutes the “ultimate crime”—taking a life as well as having powerful economic, public security, and other consequences. Yet, the region’s crime scene is troubling not just because of the volume of murders, but also because of the heinous nature of some of the criminal acts. Thus, we first provide a portrait of the murder scene and then offer examples of some of the horrible ways in which crimes have been prosecuted. Next, we discuss the significant use of weapons, the source of the weapons, and the actionsand the actions being pursued by Caribbean and other leaders to stem the flow of arms into the region. In this respect, we focus on the crime symposium held this past April in Trinidad and Tobago. This report has taken into account a few policy considerations that might be considered as the region’s policymakers and practitioners address the perennial challenge of crime, violence, and arms trafficking.

By Patricia Faraldo Cabana

In recent years the interrelation of the trafficking of cultural property with other forms of organised crime has gained prominence in EU policies on the protection of cultural heritage. This article analyses how the EU has conceptualized and operationalized this overlap in terms of describing the phenomenon and designing countermeasures. Through a content analysis, we evaluate the articulation and use of this connection in EU policy documents published from 1993 to 2023 that include both organised crime and trafficking of cultural property or similar terms (n = 58). The analysis demonstrates conceptual and organizational deficits and a correspondingly weak foundation for EU policy. Misunderstandings related to the organised nature of trafficking of cultural property and its overlaps with other forms of organised crime, particularly the financing of terrorism, may result in misguided policies with the potential to undermine law enforcement efforts. Conversely, the addition to the list of obliged entities and persons in the anti-money laundering framework of persons trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art opens new opportunities to disrupt the illicit financial flow in the art and antiquities market.

By Omar García-Ponce 

Organized criminal groups (OCGs), ranging from local gangs to powerful drug cartels that operate across national boundaries, represent the single most important security threat in Mexico and Central America. A growing body of research in political science and other disciplines has examined the political and socioeconomic roots of these organizations, as well as the mechanisms underlying the production of organized criminal violence. The unprecedented wave of organized criminal violence that has been affecting the region in recent years can be traced back to political transformations and policy changes that disrupted the social and political order at the local level, redefining the organization of illicit markets, and undermining the rule of law. On these issues there is a particularly rich literature that focuses on understanding the outbreak of violence and criminal rivalry in Mexico. Several studies have emphasized the role of state-criminal group relationships as a key factor to understand the challenges that organized crime poses in terms of peacebuilding and democratic rule. Within this framework, the existing literature has identified various forms of criminal governance prevalent in Mexico and Central America, and shed light on how communities respond to crime and violence in contexts of low state capacity. Some of these responses include social mobilization, vigilantism, and support for extralegal violence. The use of violence by OCGs in electoral contexts has also received particular attention in the literature, since they often target candidates or intimidate voters, affecting political preferences and patterns of political participation. Finally, a series of studies has rigorously investigated the impact of organized criminal violence on a number of outcomes, including political attitudes and behavior, trust in institutions, and health and education, among others.

By Omar García-Ponce

The study of criminal violence has received increasing attention in political science over the past 15 years, as organized criminal groups have grown and diversified worldwide, unleashing unprecedented waves of violence. This article presents a critical assessment of the current state of political science scholarship on criminal violence. It discusses the sources and dynamics of organized criminal violence, emphasizing the reconceptualization of state–criminal group relationships in the literature, shifts in illegal markets, and the political incentives fueling criminal wars. It also examines how states and societies respond to criminal violence. State responses include punitive approaches, institutional reform, and community-based interventions, while societal responses can be examined through the lenses of exit (e.g., migration, disengagement), voice (e.g., political participation, collective resistance), and loyalty (i.e., compliance with state authorities or criminal groups). The article also addresses conceptual and methodological challenges, policy implications, and ethical considerations inherent in this field of study and identifies promising pathways for future research.

By Jan Slobodník

This study examines the militarised approach of the Mexican government in its struggle against organised crime between 2001 and 2016, focusing on the deployment of the armed forces and the implementation of the so-called kingpin strategy. It argues that the removal of cartel leaders, rather than weakening criminal networks, produced fragmentation, diversification, and militarisation within Mexico’s underworld—a process defined here as zetafication. The thesis uses the rise and evolution of Los Zetas as a case study to analyse how a criminal organisation born from army deserters introduced military tactics, hierarchical discipline, and extreme violence into organised crime, transforming the conflict’s character and the state’s response. Drawing on government reports, interviews with Mexican military officers and civilians, and contemporary scholarship, the study situates this phenomenon within Mexico’s political, legal, and socio-economic context, including the influence of U.S. security policy. It concludes that the use of the military as a policing tool produces short-term tactical gains but undermines long-term state stability, erodes public trust, and perpetuates cycles of violence.

By Willis Okumu, Carina Bruwer, Valtino Omolo and Mugah Michael Sitawa

Africa’s Great Lakes are vital for biodiversity-related income generation, water for consumption and agriculture, transporting goods and delivering services, and cultural identity. But they are at risk from unsustainable human activities, including climate change and pollution, and because of their cash-generating potential. These threats are intensified when lake borders are shared by multiple countries with unequal access to transboundary resources. Contestation around lake resources can lead to insecurity along their shores.

By Daniel Brombacher, Ruggero Scaturro and Sarah Fares

 Africa-linked organised crime is a growing threat for Europe. The phenomenon embraces a broad array of organised crime groups, criminal networks and criminal markets. Debate on the topic is highly polarised and marked by knowledge gaps. This paper seeks to shed light on the challenge, drawing on field research and case studies from Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Key points • Africa-linked organised crime is deeply intertwined with the social and economic marginalisation of African immigrant communities within Europe. • Africa-based organised crime groups in Europe show high levels of adaptability to local conditions, resulting in different criminal patterns across countries. • Nigerian organised crime groups maintain hierarchical, financial and operational links to Nigeria, often using legal covers in Europe. • African diaspora networks in Europe maintain few ties to North Africa, are heavily involved in retail and wholesale drug markets and maintain operational flexibility. • Effective countermeasures require improved evidence gathering, intelligence sharing and targeted disruption of financial flows.

By Financial Crime News

Background & Context: TD is the 2nd largest Bank in Canada, the 6th largest in North America and 10th largest in the USA, with globally 28 million customers, and total assets of US$1.52 trillion. TD employs around 90,000 people and is present in many financial centres around the world with retail businesses in Canada and the USA. RBC is the 5th largest in North America, with Scotiabank 9th and Bank of Montreal 10th. The TD Group had been led by CEO, Bharat Masrani who was appointed to the role in November 2014. Masrani spent all his professional life at TD in front facing leadership roles, in Canada and overseas. In 2003 he became Chief Risk Officer of TD Bank Group. Once TD entered the US market he became CEO of it’s US operations. In 2013 Masrani was appointed COO and CEO designate following the then CEO’s announced retirement. This followed the fine by the OCC against TD bank USA (for more see below). In 2018, Masrani was the highest-paid Big 5 Canada CEO with C$15.3 million in total compensation. In 2023, he took a pay cut due to U.S. regulatory issues and the bank's termination of its First Horizon acquisition, which saw his compensation drop to C$13.4 million ($9.93 million) in 2023. Masrani had championed TD Groups ambitious U.S. expansion strategy as it looks for growth opportunities outside of Canada. The C$13.4 billion (US$10 billion) First Horizon deal, which was announced in February 2022, if completed, would have given TD access to 12 states across the U.S. Southeast. It was called off in May 2023 when it’s US AML issues meant US would not be approving the transaction. Whilst Masrani has announced his early retirement he is still in post until a planned succession by insider Raymond Chun, a 30 year TD veteran and Head of Canadian Personal Banking can be finalised at next years AGM on 10 April, 2025 TD Bank USA, uses the moniker, “America's Most Convenient Bank”, and provides 10 million customers with a full range of retail, small business and commercial banking products and services at more than 1,100 convenient locations throughout the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Metro D.C., the Carolinas and Florida. In addition, TD Auto Finance, a division of TD Bank, N.A., offers vehicle financing and dealer commercial services. TD Bank and its subsidiaries also offer customised private banking and wealth management services through TD Wealth. TD Bank USA is headquartered in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Total revenues in 2023 of C$51,8 billion (US$37.6 billion), up from C$46.1 billion (US$33.5 billion) in 2022, with costs of C$27.4 bullion (US$20 billion), up from C$24.3 billion (US$17.6 billion) in 2022 (non interest expenses) and net income or profit of C$15.1 billion (US$11 billion) down from C$15.4 billion (US$11.2 billion) in 2022. Increased costs in 2023 in terms of non intere

By Ben Senator, Michelle Priest, Beau Kilmer

Nearly one in four U.S. adults think psilocybin “magic” mushrooms should be legal, according to a new RAND study. This level of support mirrors attitudes toward cannabis in the mid‑1990s—just before states began allowing medical use.

The study, which draws on data from the 2025 RAND Psychedelics Survey, finds that public attitudes vary greatly depending on the substance: While 23 percent of respondents support legal use of psilocybin mushrooms, only about 10 percent said the same about LSD and MDMA.

Among those who support making psilocybin use legal, 56 percent favor its use for treating mental or physical health conditions, but just 42 percent believe adults should be free to use it for any reason. And among those opposed to legalizing psilocybin, 62 percent believe it should be illegal for any reason.

The survey also asked about how legal psilocybin should be obtained: 49 percent of respondents favor supervised use in a medical facility, 28 percent support dispensary sales, and 23 percent endorse allowing adults to grow or forage for personal use.

These findings highlight the complexity of Americans' views on psychedelics, particularly psilocybin. And although it remains to be seen whether public opinion—and public policy—on psilocybin will follow a similar path as cannabis, such insights can help inform policy discussions.

By Diorella Islas

This thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of the transnational behaviour of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) by documenting the role that Mexican DTOs had in the cocaine trafficking to Europe after 2008. This was the year when the Italian authorities announced their discoveries that there were business interaction between the Mexican DTOs and the Italian mafia groups. At the same time the Italian authorities were announcing their findings, my literature review showed a lack of analysis and documentation regarding the transnationalization of Mexican DTOs to Europe. While most of the literature focuses on the explanation of the cartels inside Mexico, my research question focused on clarifying whether or not the Mexican DTOs are expanding their cocaine trafficking activities to Europe. At this point I considered the reports of the Italian authorities that affirm that the Mexican DTOs are relevant drug trafficking intermediaries in the cocaine trafficking routes to Europe. To answer my research question, and to systematically describe the evolution of DTOs, a qualitative methods approach was deployed (Mohajan, 2018) with a case study design adapted from Yin (2003). My analysis was carried out through the use of multiple triangulation techniques that helped me to collect and study different types of data to understand the subject. I collected empirical information through 28 interviews with security personnel with experience in countering Mexican DTOs or in the cocaine routes to Europe. The information gathered from the security personnel, complemented by official reports and open source information, was useful to answer my research question and test my hypothesis. The analysis showed that despite Italian authorities’ claims and perceptions, the power of the Mexican cartels is very limited when talking about their presence and links in Europe, and resulted in four key findings. Firstly, that the perception of the Mexican DTOs as having trans-Atlantic powers is erroneous, because the evidence showed that there is no transatlantic expansion. Secondly, the analysis uncovered the internal, national and international variables that were observed to alter the evolution and behaviour of the Mexican DTOs. At the internal level, the variables included the loss of leadership and the grievances between groups. At the national level the identified variables were the democratic transitions, corruption and impunity networks. And at the international level the variables were the international drug demand, the changes in the international illicit world, the situation of governance and corruption in foreign countries and the geography of theregion where the illicit business are taking place. The third finding was that the transatlantic cocaine trafficking routes are not controlled by an specific actor, but they are horizontal structures that are highly adaptative. The final key finding refers to a methodological observation which I describe as the “paradox of referencing”; when many sources reference something that was true in the past –like the links between Mexican DTOs and Italian mafia discovered in 2008– they help to perpetuate the present perception of a past phenomenon.

By Roland Neil, Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar, Beau Kilmer, Michael W. Robbins, Kristin Warren

Objectives

Racial disparities in arrests are a major concern, particularly when it comes to drug enforcement. In 2021, Oregon decriminalized the possession of controlled substances as part of Measure 110 (M-110), an unprecedented policy change in the United States. We estimate how M-110 affected five types of arrests, overall and by race.

Methods

National Incident-Based Reporting System data covering 3,642 police agencies from 43 states for 2018-2023 are combined with 2020 Census data. We extend a synthetic control methodology developed for micro-level data to test whether policy effects differ across groups and whether policies affect disparities, using permutation inference to quantify uncertainty.

Results

M-110 reduced drug possession arrest rates in Oregon for the overall population (67.8%) and for the three racial groups we focus on: Black (75.6%), Hispanic (77.5%); and White (66.2%), with the reduction being statistically significantly larger for Hispanic and Black than White individuals. M-110 reduced disorder arrest rates by 30.9% for Black individuals, which is statistically significantly different from zero and the White estimate. Black-White rate differences in drug possession arrests fell by 79.5% and in disorder arrests by 41.7%. In general, M-110 did not affect arrest rates for violent, property, or drug trafficking offenses.

Conclusions

M-110 reduced drug possession arrests while reducing Black-White rate differences. M-110 led to a decrease in disorder arrests for Black individuals, suggesting police did not substitute one arrest type for another for this population. Our method offers a new approach for examining heterogeneous policy effects and how policies affect disparities.

By Kees Koonings, Dirk Kruijt

Show moreSince the turn of the century more people in Latin America have been killed or otherwise afflicted by violence and insecurity than during the times of dictatorship, repressive regimes, guerrilla uprisings, and armed conflict (1960s–1990s). Latin America has turned into what is on average the most lethal region in the world in terms of homicide rates. The 2013 Regional Human Development Report (UNDP 2013, v) mentions that “in the last decade, more than one million people have died in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of criminal violence”. In 2012, Latin America’s citizens represented only 8 percent of the world’s population; however, they produced around 37 percent of the world’s homicides in that year (Chioda, 2017, 1). Since then, regional statistics have not really improved.1 Formally at peace and formally democratic, one of the most salient aspects of this violence is that it is not explicitly directed at acquiring or defending state power. Rather, it is labelled ‘criminal’ or ‘social’ and includes not only everyday forms of direct violence and coercion but also institutional and symbolic forms of violence. These dimensions, in turn, rest upon a long history of social inequality, exclusion, and elite privileges that are often enveloped as structural violence. Except for drug-related violence corridors in Colombia, Central America and Mexico, Latin American violence is largely urban (Koonings & Kruijt, 2015). According to the Mexican NGO Seguridad, Justicia y Paz (2020), of the 10 most lethal cities of 300,000 inhabitants or more in the world in 2020, seven are Mexican. Of the 50 most lethal cities, 40 are Latin American or Caribbean: 17 are Mexican, 11 Brazilian, six Venezuelan, two Honduran, two Colombian, one Jamaican, and one Puerto Rican. Of the remaining cities, five are American and five SouthAfrican.2 What is behind these dismal statistics? After the disappearance of the dictatorships and the re-democratisation process in the course of the 1980s new and violent non-state actors emerged, not aiming at revolutionary political transformations like the former guerrilla groups but aspiring to become a ‘regular’ element with prestige and negotiating power in the economy and society. They operate in criminal, violent, clandestine or at least extra-legal ambiences. But they are not hidden or invisible. They vigorously put forth their claims to local, municipal, regional, and national involvement. They control larger or smaller territories or commercial corridors for smuggling, levy taxes on ‘their’ people, provide ‘protection’ by eliminating ‘adversaries’ (legal or illegal competitors) and try to establish an economy of uninterrupted profits and a society of continued legal impunity, replacing official rule of law by criminal justice and extra-legal order making. So, despite the apparent non-political nature of this system of violence, it does have farreaching repercussions for social life as well as for politics, governance, the law, and the state. In this contribution we seek to examine the implications of contemporary violence in Latin America for order making and governance. The article is developed as follows. As a starting point we combine two concepts, namely protracted hybrid conflict and criminal governance, to frame the paradox of violence in Latin America. This paradox rests on the proposition that chronic violence coincides with formally democratic states that are, in a conventional sense, not at war. We will then look briefly at the historical context of violence, state and hybrid order making in Latin America. Subsequently we will explore three specific and intersecting mechanisms of criminal governance in Latin America: state capture, layered micro-sovereignty, and statetransgression.

By U.S. Congressional Research Service

For over a decade, the synthetic opioid fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances have been key drivers of the U.S. opioid crisis. Countering the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and the precursor chemicals ("precursors") used to make it has been a U.S. priority. In 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) first identified the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) as the main source of U.S.-bound fentanyl and fentanyl precursors. Since the PRC imposed domestic controls on fentanyl-related substances in 2019, which curtailed almost all direct shipments of fentanyl from China to the United States, many U.S. policymakers have shifted focus. Their chief concern today is the role of China—the global leader in chemical sales—as the primary source of precursors used by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to synthesize fentanyl and its analogues in third countries (chiefly Mexico). Congress has sought to address China's shifting role in the illicit drug trade, including through provisions in the BUST Fentanyl Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2026.

By: Tyson Singh Kelsall, Caitlin Shane, Kelsey A. Speed, et al.

People and communities in Vancouver, British Columbia (BC) have been profoundly impacted by the toxic drug crisis, which has driven a province-wide public health emergency since 2016. In 2023, BC implemented a “Decriminalization Pilot,” which temporarily removed criminal sanctions for the possession of small amounts of certain substances. In May 2024, the Decriminalization Pilot was amended to exclude its application in almost any urban outdoor space; a reform colloquially referred to as “Recriminalization.” This study sought to address gaps in understanding how law enforcement practices towards people who use criminalized drugs may have changed during the Decriminalization Pilot and subsequent Recriminalization periods.

Methods

We undertook a community-based, qualitative study. We conducted 21 interviews with people who use criminalized drugs and who interacted with law enforcement in Vancouver between January and May 2025. We employed combined reflexive thematic and interpretative phenomenological analyses.

Results

We derived five main themes: 1) confusion over the Decriminalization Pilot; 2) selective enforcement and pervasiveness of policing; 3) police interference with overdose response and other public health interventions; 4) seizures of belongings, including government-supplied resources; and 5) displacement from public space.

Conclusion

Our findings illustrate how harmful law enforcement practices that target people who use criminalized drugs, particularly those relying on public spaces for survival, persisted during the evolving drug policy periods. Together, these law enforcement practices along with the lack of understanding regarding the shifting Decriminalization Pilot, may have undermined the potential success of a policy dedicated to decriminalizing drug possession in BC

By the U.K. Ministry of Justice and Department of Health & Social Care

1 In April 2025, approximately 40,000 people in prisons in England and Wales (50%) had an identified drug problem. Misuse of illicit drugs by people in prison creates or exacerbates risks to their health, well-being and personal safety. Between December 2022 and December 2024, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated 833 deaths, of which 136 (16%) were drug-related. Conveyance, supply and use of illicit drugs also increase risks to the safety and stability of the prison regime. Availability of drugs inside prisons creates an illicit economy that can fuel debt, which can lead to assault, extortion or self-harm. Prisoners who are using illicit drugs often reoffend after leaving prison. 2 Effective interventions require HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and health service providers, commissioned for prisons in England by NHS England (NHSE), to work closely together. • HMPPS is primarily responsible for action to detect illicit drugs and prevent their conveyance into prisons, and it also seeks to reduce demand for drugs through initiatives to encourage positive behaviour changes. • Health service providers deliver drug treatment and recovery services inside prisons. • The overall prison environment can support prisoners by providing a rehabilitative culture; education and other purposeful activities; building relationships; delivering a safe regime; and facilitating access to health interventions, including addressing mental health needs. Focus of our report 3 This report focuses on how the prison and health services are using public funds to tackle drug harms in prisons. It examines: • how well the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), HMPPS, Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), NHSE and wider government understand the scale and nature of drug harms in prisons (Part One); • the funding available for HMPPS and NHSE to tackle drug harms in prisons, and how resources are prioritised (Part Two); and • how effectively resources have been used and how well the prison and health services work together (Part Three).4 The report focuses only on illicit drug harms in prisons. We do not cover national and international work by the police and others to counter criminal activity supplying drugs to prisons, nor do we review interventions for people on community orders or the continuity of drug treatment services for prison leavers. ‘Substance misuse’ is a broader term often used in healthcare, which includes misuse of alcohol and diversion of prescription medicines, as well as illicit drugs. We touch on these broader issues where relevant, but they are not the focus of our report. While HMPPS is responsible for prisons in England and Wales, healthcare in Wales is a devolved function provided by NHS Wales, and therefore falls outside the scope of this report

By The United States Government Accountability Office

Agencies at the federal, state, and local levels have facilities capable of analyzing emerging street drugs—psychoactive substances newly circulating in the drug market. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have forensic laboratories that can analyze seized drugs and identify emerging substances. Current laboratory-based technologies can detect and identify emerging street drugs when appropriate methods (protocols) and reference standards are available. Portable technologies can detect drugs at the point of seizure but face accuracy challenges due, in part, to user error. Technology manufacturers told GAO they are developing more lay-friendly user interfaces and operational methods.

From fiscal year 2019 through 2024, the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services awarded a combined total of about $12.5 million in grants for the development of new methods and technologies for analyzing emerging street drugs. New methods and technologies may make laboratory processes more consistent, among other enhancements. Method development can be done on faster timelines than technology development.

While new methods and technologies could enhance some capabilities, forensic scientists face key challenges with analyzing emerging street drugs, including:

• Lack of resources. Laboratories GAO spoke to consistently referenced insufficient staffing and time.

• Unstandardized reporting. According to stakeholders, varying reporting requirements at thestate and local levels can lead to gaps in data.

• Limited information sharing. Law enforcement may not always share up-to-date information about emerging drugs with medical examiners and hospitals.

If these challenges could be addressed, laboratories could be in a better position to meet the nation’s needs for emerging drug analysis. However, GAO is not making recommendations to address these challenges because they are primarily faced by state and local laboratories.

By: Nathan P. Jones1 & W. Layne Dittmann2 & Jun Wu3 & Tyler Reese2

This study is a mixed methods case study of the Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO) better known as the Tijuana Cartel in the 2008–2010 period, aimed at better understanding internal structures and the roles of individuals in crossborder polydrug networks under pressures from rivals and state leadership targeting. In addition to historical archival data to build a qualitative case study, it uses arrest warrant data (an emergency wiretap application and a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act or RICO indictment) from the FSO drug network investigation in order to visualize the structure of the cross border network and to explore research questions regarding the relationship between actor centrality/network topography metrics and variables of interest including organizational role, age, gender, number of prior arrests, location of criminal activity, and location of residence using social network analysis (SNA). Findings included: narcotics distributors, drug couriers, and enforcers for the network all had higher centrality in the network, age was only slightly negatively correlated with eigenvector centrality, gender had no bearing on centrality, the number of prior arrests also had no bearing on degree or betweenness centrality, but did positively correlate with eigenvector centrality. Findings also demonstrated faction subgroup analysis had considerable overlap with both law-enforcement-reported-address and location of criminal activity (coded as actor attributes). This finding suggests it may be possible to predict the location of criminal activity and residence through faction analysis in other binational trafficking networks.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium

The 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs was a watershed moment in global drug policy. It created a rare opportunity to reconsider the prevailing international paradigm on drugs and to chart a new direction.

The UNGASS process was notable for the unprecedented involvement of civil society, affected communities, UN entities and human rights experts. It helped place public health, human rights and communities closer to the centre of drug policy-making, and paved the way for better alignment between the UN drug control regime and the wider UN system. The process also generated valuable momentum for new debates and advocacy at the national level.

However, the UNGASS ultimately fell short of introducing genuine reform of the norms and institutions underpinning the international drug control system.

This report examines progress made since the 2016 UNGASS to assess the role of the global drug control regime in shaping change. It draws on UN data and reporting, academic research, contributions from civil society and community organisations, and a dedicated civil society survey conducted among IDPC members and partners.

Key conclusions

The report concludes with four forward-looking findings:

• Civil society and community organisations play a critical role in drug policy, yet continue to be sidelined, underfunded, and increasingly exposed to threats and attacks.

• The UN drug control treaties require urgent modernisation in order to respond to new realities and remain fit for purpose.

• A drug control system oriented towards human rights, health and development requires a thorough reconfiguration of the existing architecture, including strong and systematic inter-agency cooperation across the UN system.

• Regular discussion of drug policy at the UN is essential, but the agenda and working methods of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) must change to enable meaningful progress.