By Mary Holper

Prolonged mandatory immigration detention has become the norm, not the exception. We have arrived at this moment because immigration detention is supposedly exceptional, subject to different constitutional norms than other civil detention. When the Supreme Court first examined a facial due process challenge to mandatory immigration detention in its 2003 decision in Demore v. Kim, immigration detention exceptionalism caused the Court to uphold mandatory detention. Absent from the Court's analysis was an entire body of due process jurisprudence, most of which developed in the 1970s, which questioned the government's purposes behind civil detention and required significant procedural protections in order for the government to deprive a person of liberty. In the wake of Demore, courts considering as-applied challenges to prolonged mandatory detention formulated multi-factor tests as a method of interpreting the statute to avoid unconstitutional detention. These tests provided an important counterweight to immigration detention exceptionalism and predictability for litigants, but most of the factors are irrelevant to a federal district court in deciding whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates a detainee's due process rights. Courts have been taking out the scales to engage in due process balancing, but putting the wrong weights on the scales.

Courts are beginning to discard these multi-factor tests and instead applying the Supreme Court's 1976 Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process test to decide whether prolonged mandatory immigration detention is unconstitutional. The Mathews balancing test, which considers the private interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government's interests, has been welcomed in immigration law because it encourages courts to first focus on an individual noncitizen's liberty interest. Mathews thus counteracts immigration detention exceptionalism, which focuses exclusively on the government's interest and finds that removable detainees have no liberty interest whatsoever. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is the first circuit court to shift its test, transitioning to Mathews balancing in 2024 to decide whether mandatory detention was unreasonably prolonged. As a cautionary note, an attempt at transitioning the balancing test led the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2024, to reject all forms of balancing, embrace immigration detention exceptionalism, and hold that any length of mandatory detention is acceptable during removal proceedings. This Article argues that courts can make prolonged mandatory immigration detention exceptional by continuing the work of the Second Circuit in applying the Mathews procedural due process balancing test instead of the existing multi-factor tests.

 Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 662

By Julian Adler,  Jethro Antoine, Laith Al-Saadoon

There was but one passing reference to “core values” over the course of a recent U.S. Senate Judiciary hearing on artificial intelligence [AI] in criminal investigations and prosecutions.[1] This is typical. Even in spaces like the criminal legal system, where the specters of racial injustice and inhumanity loom so large, the technological sublimity of AI can be awfully distracting. People have long looked to technology to duck the hard problem of values. “[W]e have tended to believe that if we just had more information, we could make better policy,” observes University of Nevada’s Lynda Walsh in Scientists as Prophets. “But no matter how much data we could lay hands to—even if it were LaPlace’s Demon itself—values would still stand in the way.”[2] If anything is clear about advanced AI, it is that there is much we don’t know and even more that we can’t begin to predict. Consider that the “generative AI” we have witnessed over the past 18 months—AI which produces autonomous human-impersonating content—was largely unforeseen. It’s now being attributed to AI’s “emergent abilities.”

Nwq York: Center for Justice Innovation, 2024. 8p.

By Miriam Driessen 

Political and legal immunity are justified by the principle that certain social aims outweigh the value of imposing liability. To be exempt from the rules, however, is a privilege granted to or demanded by the powerful. The structural disparities that underpin immunity can turn it into an unjust prerogative, one that is inscribed by global inequalities.  Set against the backdrop of an extraordinary wave of litigation against Chinese corporations in Ethiopia, Immunity on Trial probes the question of immunity in everyday encounters steeped in highly asymmetrical power relations. Drawing on observations from the courthouse, interviews with litigants, judges, and court support staff, and analyses of case files, Miriam Driessen demonstrates how immunity is debated and delegitimized—or affirmed—by those who fight, exact, grant, or weigh it. From the construction site to the police station, from the registrar’s office into the courtroom, she documents tussles over immunity, unraveling the politics of dignity on which they are founded.

Oakland: : University of California Press, 2026. 

By David Abrams and Priyanka Goonetilleke

Like most locally governed activities, police stops are evaluated, if at all, using data from a single municipality. This paper aggregates data on over 8 million pedestrian and vehicle police stops from 16 U.S. cities between 2019 and 2023 to better understand how the widely used police tactic varies by place, time, and race. We find immense variation in the implementation of these policies across cities, something that has not been previously highlighted in the literature. Stop rates vary across cities by almost two orders of magnitude, well in excess of inputs like funding and size of police force vary far less, or outcomes like different measures of crime. Contraband discovery rates (hit rates) for pedestrian stops are consistently low, with gun hit rates never exceeding 10% of frisks in any city. Consistent with optimizing models of policing, hit rates rise over time as frisk rates fall substantially. However, this result is concentrated in gun contraband, and for other types - mostly drugs - hit rates do not vary much even with vast declines in frisks, suggesting police are not optimizing for other types of contraband. This supports the notion that frisks are consistent with the law, which requires they be based on suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. Consistent with prior work, there are substantial racial disparities in all examined cities, with Blacks frisked as much as 10 times more frequently than Whites in some locations. Taken together, these facts point to a standard practice that seemingly has no standards, given the massive variation across the country. This suggests there are potentially large gains in efficiency and fairness from sharing best practices and nationwide data collection on police stops.

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 26-01,

By Kate Weisburd

Scholars and advocates have long argued that a person's consent to a warrantless police search is often so inherently coerced, uninformed, and shaped by race, class, gender, citizenship status, and disability that to call it a "choice" is fiction. This critique is not limited to police searches based on consent. Waiving rights and consenting to otherwise unconstitutional state action permeates criminal procedure. The definition of a seizure, the third-party doctrine, custodial confessions, plea bargains, and agreements to alternatives to incarceration (such as GPS ankle monitoring) all hinge on the idea of voluntary choices-choices that are often just as coerced and uninformed as the choice to consent to a search.Given these concerns, this Article asks: What would happen if consent were eliminated from criminal procedure doctrines? This question is not merely academic. In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have substantially limited or eliminated traditional police searches based on consent. These reform efforts allow us to consider if there is something uniquely coercive or inequitable about consent searches that makes them especially amenable to reform or if we should consider eliminating consent in other criminal procedure doctrines as well.This Article takes on these questions. Drawing on both an original national survey of recent consent-search reforms and a transsubstantive analysis of consent and waiver in a range of criminal procedure doctrines, this Article analyzes the potential ramifications of eliminating (or limiting) consent. In doing so, this Article reveals the extent to which consent plays a pivotal role in upholding—and justifying—the entire operation of the criminal justice system.

.California Law Review (2025), UC Law San Francisco Research Paper Forthcoming,

By Bernard Harcourt

Fifty years after its publication, Discipline and Punish (1975) remains as controversial as ever. Anyone writing about the prison today, in no matter what discipline, feels obliged to position themselves vis-à-vis Michel Foucault’s book. As a result, new studies and books regularly criticize Discipline and Punish, most often for misleading the reader about the history of the prison. As Adam Gopnik recently writes in the New Yorker, scholars are “turning decisively against Foucault,” contending “that incarceration may be a facet of every hierarchical, complex society. In other words, it’s always been with us.”However, Discipline and Punish was never intended to be a history of the prison. It was instead a genealogy of a particular mode of governing in modern times—what Foucault called “disciplinary power” or “panopticism.” And rather than trace the history of the prison, the book proposed a contemporary way to understand how power circulates in society and it paved the way for the study of contemporary modes of governing.  Drawing on a wealth of new Foucault archives, public lectures, manuscripts, and historical documents that have surfaced over the past 50 years, it is possible now to identify the true import of Foucault’s book. Just as the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes captured the turn in modern political philosophy to theories of sovereignty and representation, Discipline and Punish marked the end of modern political theory and launched a new approach to analyze relations of power in society. In this essay, I redefine the central contribution of Discipline and Punish and explore how to use Foucault’s book today—and also, how to go beyond it.

 Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 6044574,

By James Lewis, Sarah Marsden, James Hewitt, Chloe Squires, Anna Stefaniak

Reliability and Validity of Risk Assessment Tools for Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review

By Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Ghayda Hassan, Wynnpaul Varela, Emmanuel Danis, Sarah Ousman, Pablo Madriaza, Inga Lisa Pauls, Deniz Kilinc, David Pickup, Robert Pelzer, Eugene Borokhovski, the CPN-PREV team

Assessment of the risk of engaging in a violent radicalization/extremism trajectory has evolved quickly in the last 10 years. Guided by what has been achieved in psychology and criminology, scholars from the field of preventing violent extremism (PVE) have tried to import key lessons from violence risk assessment and management, while bearing in mind the idiosyncrasies of their particular field. However, risk tools that have been developed in the PVE space are relatively recent, and questions remain as to their level of psychometric validation. Namely, do these tools consistently and accurately assess risk of violent extremist acting out? To answer this question, we systematically reviewed evidence on the reliability and validity of violent extremism risk tools. The main objective of this review was to gather, critically appraise, and synthesize evidence regarding the appropriateness and utility of such tools, as validated with specific populations and contexts. Searches covered studies published up to December 31, 2021. They were performed in English and German across 17 databases, 45 repositories, Google, other literature reviews on violent extremism risk assessment, and references of included studies. Studies in all languages were eligible for inclusion in the review. We included studies with primary data resulting from the quantitative examination of the reliability and validity of tools used to assess the risk of violent extremism. Only tools usable by practitioners and intended to assess an individual's risk were eligible. We did not impose any restrictions on study design, type, method, or population. We followed standard methodological procedures outlined by the Campbell Collaboration for data extraction and analysis. Risk of bias was assessed using a modified version of the COSMIN checklist, and data were synthesized through meta-analysis when possible. Otherwise, narrative synthesis was used to aggregate the results. Among the 10,859 records found, 19 manuscripts comprising 20 eligible studies were included in the review. These studies focused on the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), the Extremism Risk Guidance Factors (ERG22+), the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG-V2), the Identifying Vulnerable People guidance (IVP guidance), and the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)—all structured professional judgment tools—as well as Der Screener—Islamismus, an actuarial scale. Studies mostly involved adult male participants susceptible to violent extremism (N = 1106; M = 58.21; SD = 55.14). The types of extremist ideologies endorsed by participants varied, and the same was true for ethnicity and country/continent of provenance. Encouraging results were found concerning the inter-rater agreement of scales in research contexts (kappas between 0.76 and 0.93), but one of the two studies that examined it in a field setting obtained disappointing results (kappas ranging between of 0.47 and 0.80). Content validity studies indicated that PVE risk tools adequately cover the risk factors and offending processes of individuals who go on to commit extremist violence. Construct validity analyses were few and far between, with results indicating that empirical divisions of scales did not match their conceptual divisions. The internal consistency of subscales was lackluster (Cronbach's alphas between 0.19 and 0.85), whereas full scales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency when assessed (0.80 for the ERG22+ and 0.64 for the IVP guidance). Only one study examined convergent validity, and it revealed a lack of convergence, primarily due to particularities of the scale under study (the MLG-V2). Discriminant validity analyses were exploratory in nature, but suggested that PVE risk tools might not be ideology-specific and may apply to both group and lone actors. Finally, although the TRAP-18 showed a relatively strong postdictive effect size (pooled r = 0.62 [0.35–0.77], p = 0.000), the results were highly heterogeneous (I2 = 86%), and all studies used retrospective designs, meaning the outcome was already known at the time of assessment. As such, no included study evaluated true predictive validity (i.e., the ability to forecast future violent extremist outcomes based on prospective risk assessment). This represents a significant evidence gap. Threats to validity were substantial: (a) Many studies were case studies or had very small samples, (b) nearly all samples were constituted through the triangulation of publicly available data, and (c) convenience outcome measures were often used. Although having imperfect data is better than having no data, the current state of empirical validation precludes the recommendation of one tool over another for specific populations and contexts, and calls for higher-quality validation studies for PVE risk assessment tools. Nevertheless, these tools constitute useful checklists of relevant risk and protective factors that could be taken into account by evaluators who wish to assess the risk of violent extremism and identify intervention targets.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume21, Issue4

December 2025, 2025.

By Michelle Kondo , Michelle Degli Esposti , Jonathan Jay etc.

Neighbourhood environments are a known social determinant of health. Vacant and abandoned buildings and lots and poor or hazardous housing conditions, combined with crime and violence, can affect residents’ health and wellbeing. Nationwide Children’s Hospital and its partners launched the Healthy Homes initiative in 2008, which sought to improve nearby residents’ health and wellbeing by rejuvenating vacant and abandoned properties and increasing homeownership in the South Side neighbourhood of Columbus, Ohio. Between 2008 and mid-2019 the initiative funded 273 repairs or renovations in this neighbourhood. We conducted a ZIP-code-level comparative case study of the Healthy Homes housing interventions using synthetic control methodology to evaluate changes in crime rate in the intervention area compared with those in a synthetic control area. While findings were mixed, we found some evidence of reduced thefts in the Healthy Homes area, relative to its synthetic control. This initiative to repair, rebuild and increase ownership of housing has the potential to reduce crime rates for neighbours of the Nationwide Children’s Hospital.  

By David Spencer

London is in the grip of a crime wave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusLondon is in the grip of a crimewave of robbery, knife crime and theft. Police chiefs have prioritised other issues while allowing the streets to be surrendered to criminals and thugs. Political leaders have sacrificed effective policing to ideological preferences. Bodies such as the Independent Office for Police Conduct have shown themselves only too willing to criticise and pursue police officers doing their best to enforce the law. Given this confluence it should be no surprise that knife crime, robbery and “theft person” offences have rocketed in recent years. This report examines what has gone wrong – and importantly, what the police and government must do now to stem the tide. Chapter 1 examines the rates of knife crime, robbery and theft person offences both nationally and in London. We show that knife crime in England and Wales has risen sharply over the past decade, increasing by 78% since 2013/14, with 50,510 offences recorded in 2023/24. Even accounting for population growth, this represents a 68.3% rise over the last decade. London accounts for a disproportionate share of knife crime offences, representing 32.1% of all knife crime and 45.9% of knife-point robberies in England, compared to only 15.5% of the population. Within the capital, knife crime is highly concentrated: 4% of neighbourhoods accounted for nearly a quarter of offences and 15% accounted for half of offences in 2024. One small geographic area – consisting of around 20 streets around Oxford Circus and Regent Street in the City of Westminster – recorded more knife crime offences than the 716 (or 14.35%) least-affected of London’s 4,988 LSOAs combined. Most knife crime in London involves robbery, with mobile phones the most common target. In 2024, 61.6% of knife crime offences were robberies. Combined robbery and theft person offences led to over 81,000 mobile phone thefts in the capital last year. There are clear insights which can guide the law enforcement and policy response. Within London: knife crime offending is highly geographically concentrated, a significant majority of knife crime offences are robberies, and mobile phones are one of the items most commonly targeted by robbers and thieves. Chapter 2 examines how effective, or otherwise, the Metropolitan Police is at catching robbers, knife crime offenders and thieves alongside the criminal courts approach to sentencing for those who are prosecuted and convicted. The proportion of criminals caught by the Metropolitan Police is pitiful – with only 1 in 20 robberies and 1 in 170 theft person offences solved in 2024. Even for those few who are caught the proportion of offenders being sentenced to immediate cusfalling – dropping from 66.1% in 2014 to 55.4% in 2024. For violencerelated offences, imprisonment rates have also decreased, with just 36.5% of offenders sentenced to custody in 2024. Despite laws mandating prison for repeat knife offenders, around a third evade immediate incarceration. It appears likely that these rates of incarceration will fall even further in the coming years given the Government’s apparent intention to send fewer offenders to prison following the Independent Sentencing Review led by Rt Hon David Gauke1 and the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts led by Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson.2 The failure to adequately deal with the most prolific offenders presented before the courts is perhaps the gravest sign of the permissiveness with which the criminal justice system treats those most dedicated to committing crime. In the year to December 2024, of the 8,207 “hyperprolific” offenders who already had 46 or more previous criminal convictions or cautions, only 44.5% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 4,555 hyper-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. Of the 16,386 “super-prolific” offenders with between 26 and 45 previous convictions or cautions, only 42.1% were sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment on conviction for a further indictable or “eitherway” criminal offence – 9,483 super-prolific offenders were released on conviction without receiving an immediate term of imprisonment. It is difficult to conceive of a collection of statistics which better demonstrates the contempt with which the criminal justice system is treating the lawabiding majority. Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of high-visibility policing in crime “hotspots” – citing evidence which demonstrates that the tactic is highly effectively at reduces crime. However, the use of a key element of proactive police patrolling – stop and search – has fallen significantly over the last decade, partly because of the policies of the Conservative-led coalition government (supported by the now Home Secretary Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP). The reduction in stop and search coincided with substantial increases knife crime, suggesting the reforms introduced in all likelihood significantly undermined the fight against crime. We cite research by the criminologists Piquero and Sherman (2025) which demonstrates that increased stop and search correlates with reduced knife crime. Stop and search in London has been widely criticised for racial disproportionality, often framed as evidence of “racist” policing. Critics argue that black Londoners are unfairly targeted – claims we robustly challenge. Data shows that black people are “over-represented” among victims of the most serious knife crime – within London black people are 3.38 times more likely to be killed in a knife-enabled non-domestic homicide than white people. Similarly black people are 5.0 times more likely than white people in London to be charged with murder. While only 13.5% of London’s population are black, 48.6% of robbery suspects are described as black by victims when reporting the crime to the police. Incontrast to allegations of police “racism”, outcomes of stop and search in London reveal that black suspects are 64% more likely than white suspects to receive ‘community resolutions’ when a prohibited item is found when searching for a weapon (rather than be charged or summonsed and sent to court). This suggests there may well be a leniency being shown towards black suspects compared to white suspects. It is not the role of policing to correct for all of society’s ills – to quote the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police Sir Stephen Watson QPM: “It’s really important in policing that you play the ball that is bowled – you describe the problem, you faithfully attack the various ingredients of the problem and you do so without fear or favour in the public interest”.3 We agree and strongly reject the political ideology and timidity of police leaders which has led to the precipitous reductions in stop and search. As part of better serving the law-abiding majority there should be a surge in stop and search within those parts of London where knife crime, robbery and theft is most prevalent. Chapter 4 examines how offenders can be targeted – specifically through innovative Live Facial Recognition technology and innovations in court orders which limit the activities of known offenders. The Metropolitan Police’s deployment of Live Facial Recognition as a tool to identify wanted individuals, particularly within crime hotspots, has been remarkably successful. In 2023 the force undertook 24 deployments in the capital – in 2024 there were 179 deployments and by mid-June 2025 there had been 94 deployments. An Independent evaluation by the National Physical Laboratory confirmed that the technology can be deployed with a high degree of accuracy and – notably, an absence of significant demographic bias when properly configured. Despite demonstrable results – including 1,045 arrests since 2023 – several London councils have passed motions opposing its use. This includes Islington Council which at the time was led by Kaya Comer-Schwartz – who was subsequently appointed by the Mayor of London Sir Sadiq Khan as the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime. The chapter also reviews a series of legal tools, including Knife Crime Prevention Orders and Serious Violence Reduction Orders, which can be utilised to restrict repeat offenders’ behaviours but have seen limited or inconsistent application. We recommend that their application is made mandatory for certain violent and knife-carrying offenders. Londoners and visitors to the capital face a street crime epidemic – one which includes a very real risk of becoming a victim of seriousviolence, robbery or theft. The steps taken by the Metropolitan Police, Mayor of London and Government have so far been unequal to the task. The Metropolitan Police must take an unequivocal “Crime Fighting First” approach – in those locations where rates of knife crime, robbery and theft are highest that should mean a “Zero Tolerance” approach to crime and criminals. The Government and Mayor of London must demonstrate the necessary political leadership to explicitly reject the policies and ideologies which have led us to this point.The law-abiding majority of people do not accept the status quo, and neither do we at Policy Exchange – this report should act as a call to action for political leaders and police chiefs alike.

By Cristina Bellés-Obrero, Giulia La Mattina, Han Ye

The prevalence and determinants of intimate partner violence (IPV) among older women are understudied.  This paper documents that the incidence of IPV remains high at old ages and provides the first evidence of the impact of access to income on IPV for older women. We leverage a Mexican reform that lowered the eligibility age for a non-contributory pension and a difference-in-differences approach.  Women’s eligibility for the pension increases their probability of being subjected to economic, psychological, and physical/sexual IPV. In con- trast, we show that IPV does not increase when men become eligible.  Looking at potential mechanisms, we find suggestive evidence that men use violence as a tool to control women’s resources. Additionally, women reduce paid employment after becoming eligible for the pen- sion, which may indicate that they spend more time at home, leading to greater exposure to potentially violent partners. 

By Carina Bruwer 

The Atlantic Ocean is a vital conduit for vessels transporting and sourcing licit and illicit commodities. Much of the focus on maritime crime has been on the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea, with fragmented attention paid to illicit activities further south in the Atlantic bordering Angola, Namibia and South Africa. This paper maps transnational organised crimes facilitated by vessels, with the aim of identifying challenges and opportunities in safeguarding southwestern Africa’s coast. Key points • Various vessels transport and source illicit commodities in Africa’s South Atlantic. • The Red Sea conflict has increased vessel traffic around Southern Africa’s coast, bringing both opportunities and risks to trade. • Cocaine remains the primary drug entering Africa via the South Atlantic, but synthetic drug and precursor trafficking is increasing. • Flags of convenience facilitate illegal fishing on the Angola/Namibian border. • Limited resources constrain counter-efforts. • Mapping Africa’s South Atlantic illicit markets provides an evidence base for stakeholders working to counter them.

By: Nasreen Solomons and Harsha Gihwala

Summary - The victim–offender spectrum of human trafficking is characterised by blurred lines and complex circumstances. Recognising varying degrees of voluntariness in individual cases of women along this spectrum would allow legislators and the justice system to understand the complicated contexts in which women intersect with trafficking, where culpability is not always clear-cut. States have a responsibility to develop legislation, policy and strategies that reflect this nuance and enable more effective interventions for those who fall anywhere on this spectrum.

By Cole Jurecka; Joella Adams; Pranav Padmanabhan; Jason Glanz; Paul Christine; Xiaoyu Guan; Danielle Kline; Ingrid Binswanger; Joshua Barocas

In 2022, Colorado passed legislation making possession of small amounts of fentanyl, a high-potency synthetic opioid, a felony. Whether the Colorado law affected opioid overdose fatalities and whether those effects differed by racial and ethnic subgroups is unknown. OBJECTIVE To estimate the association between the change in criminal penalties for fentanyl possession with opioid-related overdose deaths (OODs) in Colorado. DESIGN, SETTING, AND POPULATION Serial cross-sectional study comparing OODs among adults (18 years) who died of an overdose and population estimates before and after Colorado House Bill (HB) 22-1326 was enacted in July 2022 (January 2018-November 2023) using autoregressive integrated moving averages (ARIMA) model time series forecasting. Monthly OOD rates per 100 000 residents were calculated using state population estimates from the American Community Survey 5-Year Data and the Colorado Department of Local Affairs State Demography Office. Overdose death rates were calculated separately by racial and ethnic group (Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, and non-Hispanic White). Data were analyzed from January 2018 to 2023. EXPOSURE Enactment of HB 22-1326 changed the legal penalty for possession of any drug weighing 1 g to 4 g that contained any amount of fentanyl from a misdemeanor to a level-4 drug felony punishable by up to 180 days in jail and up to 2 years of probation. MAIN OUTCOME The difference between expected and observed OOD rates following the enactment of increased criminal penalties. RESULTS A total of 7099 OODs were analyzed (1798 Hispanic [25.3%], 451 Non-Hispanic Black [6.4%], and 4170 Non-Hispanic White [58.7%], 680 other [9.5%] and not included in the race and ethnicity categories). OODs increased across the study period in Colorado from 20.46 per 100 000 adults in January 2018 to 37.78 per 100 000 adults in November 2023. Among different racial and ethnic groups, the non-Hispanic Black population had the highest increase in OODs (9.3 per 100 000 in 2018 to 56.9 per 100 000 in 2023) followed by the Hispanic population. There was no difference between the observed and expect overdose deaths for the overall population following the enactment of HB 22-1326. However, there were significant increases in 4 of 13 months after policy implementation among the non-Hispanic Black population CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The results of this serial cross-sectional study suggest that increased criminal penalties for fentanyl possession did not change preexisting trends of OODs in Colorado and may have been associated with an increase in opioid overdoses in the Black population.

By : Lienke Hutten, Lars Merkus, Joeri Vig

To effectively counter organised crime and high-risk criminal networks, criminal law alone often
falls short. Across the European Union, the administrative approach is increasingly recognised as
a crucial strategy to disrupt the infiltration of criminal networks in the legal economy. This study
maps both the legislative framework and practical initiatives that support the administrative approach
on organised crime drawing on contributions from six member states: Sweden, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Spain, Bulgaria, and Italy. This study maps both the legislative framework and
practical initiatives that support administrative interventions. A structured template was used to
collect country-specific information on relevant laws, the policy framework, and national and local
initiatives. In addition, EU-level strategies and directives were reviewed to assess the broader
policy context and identify shared priorities.

Findings reveal considerable diversity in the design of the legislative frameworks and initiatives.
Countries such as Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands have developed robust and proactive
frameworks, blending preventive and repressive instruments with administrative possibilities
on the local level. Others, like Sweden, demonstrate how general administrative laws can be
creatively adapted to serve crime prevention goals. Spain and Bulgaria show more centrally arranged
administrative bodies and sector-driven efforts. These differences make it apparent that
there is no one-size-fits-all model for the administrative approach. Gaining insight into the diverse
legal and institutional frameworks across countries enables mutual learning and the identification
of promising initiatives for all member states.

Legislation and initiatives at the European level such as AML directives, procurement rules and
asset recovery reforms can serve as important enablers, though their impact heavily depends
on coordinated implementation. Overall, the administrative approach is gaining attention as an
essential component of internal security, offering flexible and preventive tools with local possibilities
to reduce the infiltration and influence of high-risk criminal networks.

By United States Government Accountability Office

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has policies and procedures on employee misconduct but has not fully communicated them. In June 2024, BOP updated its Standards of Employee Conduct and provides ongoing training on these standards. However, BOP is not sharing and using feedback from employees on the training, which is inconsistent with leading practices. Doing so would better position BOP to improve the training’s design, delivery, and overall effectiveness in preventing employee misconduct. Additionally, BOP uses orientation handbooks and signs posted in facilities to inform incarcerated individuals how to report certain employee misconduct. However, the handbooks and signs discuss sexual misconduct rather than a broader range of allegations, such as contraband and physical abuse. Developing a communication strategy to fully inform incarcerated individuals about employee misconduct offenses that affect their health and safety could increase awareness about the standards BOP is trying to uphold and help ensure facility safety and employee accountability. Further, BOP has not fully incorporated data analysis and planning into how it manages employee misconduct. For example, BOP collects employee misconduct data but does not assess these data to identify trends in misconduct across more than 2 years. By developing and implementing an approach to routinely and fully assess employee misconduct data over more than 2 years, BOP could better focus its efforts to prevent and address misconduct. BOP increased staff and took other steps to reduce its employee misconduct caseload, but about 37 percent of the 12,153 cases open as of February 2025 had been unresolved for 3 years or longer. BOP’s approach to investigating and disciplining employee misconduct does not include establishing milestones or designating responsibilities to key officials. Implementing a comprehensive plan with these elements would help BOP allocate the resources necessary for investigating and disciplining employee misconduct cases, achieve desired results, and enhance safety and efficiency.

By: Christian Ambrosius Juliana Quigua Andrea Velásquez

By 2020, one in four Salvadorans lived abroad, with 88 percent residing in the United States. The remittances to GDP ratio was about 25 percent, highlighting the country’s dependence on migration. This paper examines the effects of a major U.S. immigration enforcement program—Secure Communities—on migration and labor market outcomes in El Salvador. Using a shift-share identification strategy, we find that larger exposure to the program decreases the likelihood that a household includes a migrant, consistent with increased forced returns. These effects lead to lower income among male workers, particularly low-educated, informal workers, and those in agriculture. We also document a decline in the probability of receiving remittances. The findings suggest that a closure of migration opportunities can increase labor market competition and strain local economies. Effects are most pronounced in municipalities with limited absorptive capacity, underscoring the unintended consequence s that U.S. immigration enforcement generates abroad.

By Li Sian Goh, Michael Rempel, and Joanna Weill

This report examines the alignment of New York City judges’ pretrial release decisions with the recommendations of the Pretrial Release Assessment, a validated tool that calculates the likelihood people will return to court if they are released before trial. Drawing on 251,917 New York City arraignments subject to pretrial release decisions in 2021, 2022, and 2023, we looked at what the assessment recommended, how often judges followed these recommendations, and cross-borough differences over time.

Key Findings:

Most People are Recommended for Release on Recognizance (ROR): From 2021 to 2023, the Release Assessment recommended releasing people on their own recognizance (ROR) for 88% of cases, including 79% of violent felonies, 77% of nonviolent felonies, and 92% of misdemeanors. Yet judges granted ROR in only 25% of violent felonies, 42% of nonviolent felonies, and 78% of misdemeanors.The Assessment Was Consistent Across Each Race/Ethnicity: The assessment recommended 87% of Black, 88% of Hispanic, and 85% of white people for ROR. For people charged with a violent felony, the assessment recommended a statistically identical 78% of Black and Hispanic and 77% of white people for ROR.Alignment with the Release Assessment’s Recommendations: From 2021 to 2023, judges infrequently followed ROR recommendations for violent felony cases (30%), only followed such recommendations about half the time (51%) in nonviolent felony cases, while adhering at a high rate for misdemeanors (83%). Conversely, in violent felony cases that are virtually all legally eligible for bail under the State’s bail reform law, judges set bail or remand in 41% of the cases where the Release Assessment had recommended ROR.Judges Aligned with the Assessment at Racially Disparate Rates: When the assessment recommended ROR in a violent felony case, judges set it least often for Black people (26%), somewhat more for Hispanic people (32%), and most often for white people (43%). In these same cases, judges were more likely to impose bail or remand on Black (44%) than Hispanic (39%) or white people (29%). Further analysis linked these racial differences to a tendency of judges to overrate certain risk factors correlated with race/ethnicity.Overrating Certain Risk Factors: Although criminal history and living situation are already factored into the assessment’s recommendations, judges were more likely to adhere to a ROR recommendation when people had no prior warrants, no prior misdemeanor or felony convictions, and a stable abode than when one of these risk factors was present.Alignment Varied Across the City: Bronx and Brooklyn judges followed a ROR recommendation at the highest and Staten Island judges at the lowest rate. Nonviolent felonies saw especially wide borough variability. (For example, people facing a nonviolent felony charge and recommended for ROR were 1.8 times more likely to receive it in the Bronx than in Manhattan or Staten Island.)

By David Foster

This briefing provides a brief overview of international parental child abduction, including relevant provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984 and the 1980 Hague Convention. Somebody seeking guidance on a specific case should seek specialist legal advice based on all the facts of their case. They may also seek assistance from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the charity Reunite International. The briefing covers England and Wales unless stated otherwise – for example, the 1980 Hague Convention applies across the UK. 

By Amnesty International
This report presents Amnesty International’s findings from a research trip to southern Florida in September 2025, to document the human rights impacts of federal and state migration and asylum policies on mass detention and deportation, access to due process, and detention conditions since President Trump took office on 20 January 2025. In particular, it focuses on detention conditions at the Krome North Service Processing Center (Krome) and the Everglades Detention Facility, also known as “Alligator Alcatraz”.

By José Gustavo Arocha

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: 

1 Tren de Aragua (TdA) has morphed from a prison gang into a paramilitary instrument of the Maduro regime, now active in at least eleven Latin American countries [1] and twenty-three U.S. states, [2] according to the U.S. House Oversight Committee (2025).

2 Strategic Alignment. TdA’s deliberate expansion complements Venezuela’s Guerra de Todo el Pueblo asymmetric-warfare doctrine, [3] erasing boundaries between statecraft and organized crime.

3 Elastic Network. The gang’s “insurgent archipelago” [4] of semiautonomous cells, linked through encrypted channels, makes it exceptionally resilient; when joint Peruvian-U.S. raids freed more than eighty trafficking victims in January 2025, [5] replacement cells reemerged within days. [6]

4 Weaponized Migration. By monetizing migrant flows, selling “all risk” travel packages that often devolve into debt bondage, [7] TdA offloads costs onto regional adversaries; more than 520,000 migrants transited through the Darién Gap in 2023. [8]

5 Persistent Threat. Despite terrorism designations by the United States, Argentina, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago—and nearly 3,500 U.S. arrests as of August 2025, [9] TdA’s franchise model is regenerating faster than law enforcement can dismantle it.