By the U.K.Ministry of Justice, and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities

Executive Summary This report presents follow-up analysis building on Pathways between probation and addiction treatment in England: report - GOV.UK focusing on people sentenced to community orders (COs) and suspended sentence orders (SSOs) with an Alcohol Treatment Requirement (ATR) or Drug Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR). It examines engagement with alcohol and drug treatment, how engagement relates to reconvictions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0955395926000332 outcomes, and their characteristics. The analysis covers all ATRs and DRRs issued between August 2018 and March 2023. The study linked probation case management records with the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System (NDTMS) using probabilistic data linkage. This was supplemented by Natural Language Processing (NLP) analysis of probation contact notes. This approach aimed to assess whether the absence of ATRs and DRRs in structured treatment data reflected a true lack of treatment or gaps in data linkage. A total of 45,943 ATR and DRR requirements were issued during the period. Of these, 22,636 were linked to structured treatment through data linkage. The NLP approach derived an engagement rate from the unlinked sample. This was then applied to all unlinked records, resulting in an estimated 18,712 requirements with evidence of treatment engagement. Key Findings 1. Up to 90%1 of ATRs and DRRs were estimated to involve some form of treatment engagement. This is based on 49% linked to structured treatment through probabilistic data linking and an additional 41% of unlinked records showing treatment engagement in probation contact notes. Engagement was estimated to be higher for ATRs (93%) than for DRRs (88%). 2. Reconviction was less common following ATRs and DRRs linked to structured treatment. Within 12 months of sentencing, 36% of those linked to structured treatment were reconvicted, compared with 44% of those not linked to structured treatment. 

3. Characteristics associated with being more likely to be linked to structured treatment included being: • aged over 50 • female • in settled accommodation, (least likely when associated with rough sleeping) • engaged by treatment services within: 

▪ 3 weeks of an ATR, ▪ 3–6 weeks of a DRR 4. Reconviction outcomes varied by treatment outcome: • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were lowest when they remained in structured treatment at the end of the observation period (13% for ATR; 26% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs were highest when they dropped out of structured treatment (41% for ATR; 60% for DRR). • Reconvictions associated with ATRs and DRRs that were not identified in structured treatment were higher than completed or remained in structured treatment but lower than those that dropped out of structured treatment (37% for ATR; 51% for DRR). Conclusion The analysis shows clear associations between treatment engagement and both individual characteristics and justice system factors. Individuals with ATRs and DRRs who completed or remained in structured treatment had better reconviction outcomes than those who dropped out of or had no identified structured treatment. This highlights the value of sustained engagement. The report also demonstrates the value of AI based NLP methods to strengthen insight by identifying treatment activity not captured through data linkage alone.

London: U.K. Ministry of Justice and the Office of Health Improvement and Disparities, 2026. 47p.

By Steven Dudley, et al.

Although traditional synthetic opioid strongholds like the United States and Canada appear to be experiencing a stabilization of their illicit fentanyl market—evidenced by a historic reduction in overdose deaths 1—synthetic opioids continue to expand across the globe, creating widespread health and security concerns. Existing explanations for the rise and stabilization of these markets focus on economic incentives, supply-chain disruption, precursor controls, consumption patterns, and public-health interventions. But the role of organized crime in structuring retail distribution has been largely overlooked. The experience of Mexico’s northern border illustrates that local criminal governance can be a decisive factor in determining where and how new drug markets take root. Fentanyl, for example, has quietly reshaped drug markets in Mexico and upended some widely held assumptions of how larger criminal groups interact with these markets. As local criminal organizations became major producers and exporters of the synthetic opioid to the United States, domestic consumption also emerged in key trafficking corridors. In Tijuana and Mexicali in Baja California, Hermosillo and Nogales in Sonora, and Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua, the transnational fentanyl economy has taken root locally, generating unprecedented public health and security pressures. This expansion, however, has been uneven, and the criminal actors who control local drug economies are far from monolithic. Across northern Mexico, fragmented local factions—sometimes linked to larger organizations, sometimes operating with considerable autonomy—determine what reaches consumers and under what conditions. Retail fentanyl markets have therefore expanded not simply in response to demand or price signals, but according to thestrategic decisions of local criminal groups. In Baja California, these groups actively promoted fentanyl sales, enabling the market to consolidate. In Sonoran cities and Ciudad Juárez, they restricted distribution, confining consumption to specific user niches.Overall, the impact on the ground has been substantial. The introduction of fentanyl triggered waves of overdose deaths and serious health effects among users. Although there are signs that the crisis may have stabilized in some areas, the risks persist, and the problem remains underestimated in official statistics, limiting the effectiveness of institutional responses that are already ill-equipped to address it. This report aims to provide a deeper understanding of this issue. It examines fentanyl consumption dynamics in the cities mentioned, traces the evolution of the market, and outlines the distribution networks that sustain it. Additionally, it analyzes the models of criminal control over local drug markets and assesses the state’s response to date. A central question running through the analysis is why fentanyl did not spread uniformly across these cities and what role local criminal structures played in that divergence.

Washington DC: Insight Crime, 2026. 66p.

By OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NEBRASKA CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM; Doug Koebernick, Inspector General Zach Pluhacek, Assistant Inspector General

This report by the Office of Inspector General of the Nebraska Correctional System (OIG) explores five areas of interest and/or concern related to mental health services within Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS) facilities. The findings and recommendations in this report resulted from more than a year of examination of the NDCS mental health system. This work began in early 2024, after NDCS moved to consolidate almost all of its inpatient mental health beds for men from across the system into the Reception and Treatment Center (RTC) in Lincoln. The change – which was directed by NDCS administration, not mental health officials – prompted complaints from patients and their advocates about the living conditions and how this disruption had impacted their mental health. Through interactions with more patients and providers, additional matters came to the OIG’s attention. Although not an exhaustive list, the five topics addressed in this report were selected based on 1) how frequently they were mentioned by people in the system, including patients and staff; 2) the significance of their impact on the system; and 3) their relevance to the Legislature, based on existing statutes and past legislative engagements in this area. These five topics are as follows: 1. Staffing. NDCS mental health services are in a longstanding staffing crisis, which appear more significant than the staffing challenges facing the overall behavioral health industry, including other state-run institutions. However, NDCS appears to be making some progress in this area. 2. Living conditions. The OIG fielded a variety of complaints about the living conditions in NDCS mental health units, including the use of custody restraints, limited out-of-cell time, and quality of facilities. Some of these conditions may be improving with new facilities, management changes and better custody/security staffing, but concerns remain. 3. Restrictive housing for seriously mentally ill individuals. State statute prohibits placing seriously mentally ill people in longer-term restrictive housing. However, NDCS’ interpretation and implementation of statute results in many people with serious mental illnesses being placed in these settings, anyway. 4. Discharge review. State statute also requires NDCS to have “evidence-based criteria” for screening people nearing release who are mentally ill and dangerous and may require civil commitment. However, it is unclear whether an evidence-based tool even exists for such a purpose. 5. Programming for high-risk individuals. There is a general lack of structured, clinical treatment programming available for individuals in high-security settings. NDCS terminated its version of the Violence Reduction Program (VRP), intended for those at high risk for violence, in early 2024 and has yet to identify a replacement. More specific findings are included in each section of this report. The report concludes with a summary of these findings, as well as recommendations for NDCS and the Legislature to consider. The OIG appreciates the efforts of NDCS mental health providers, administrators, and others involved in this area of the correctional system. Although this report provides a broad (and, hopefully, instructive) look at NDCS mental health services, it is not intended to serve as a comprehensive review. It is hoped that these findings and recommendations will help further the Department’s own efforts at improving this system as well as the Legislature’s role in assisting and guiding that process through policy.

By Michael Rempel, Krystal Rodriguez, and Kellyann Bock

As New York City works toward its mandate to close Rikers Island, addressing the mental health needs of people detained in the jail system remains a central challenge—and a defining opportunity for reform. Developed by the Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College and the Katal Center for Equity, Health, & Justice, this report brings together the latest mental health data for people held at Rikers, lived-experience insights from directly impacted people, and a 15-point plan to create a more effective and humane path forward.

Grounded in evidence, the report aims to:

1. Present updated data on the nature and scale of mental health needs among people held in the NYC jails.

2. Give a voice to the people behind the numbers through select first-person accounts that highlight systemic gaps and unmet needs.

3. Identify a continuum of safe and effective jail diversion strategies that can reduce the jail population while strengthening care, stability, and long-term public safety.

Taken together, this report offers a roadmap to reduce the number of people with serious mental health needs detained at Rikers and to strengthen NYC’s continuum of care.

By Human Rights Watch

The 81-page report, “‘You Have Arrived in Hell’: Torture and Other Abuses Against Venezuelans in El Salvador’s Mega Prison,” provides a comprehensive account of the treatment of these people in El Salvador. In March and April 2025, the US government sent 252 Venezuelans, including dozens of asylum seekers, to the Center for Terrorism Confinement (Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo, CECOT) mega prison in El Salvador, despite credible reports of serious human rights abuses in El Salvador’s prisons. The Venezuelans were subject to refoulement—being sent to where they would face torture or persecution—arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, inhumane detention conditions and, in some cases, sexual violence.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh and Sabrina Pearce

The U.S. criminal legal system stands at a crossroads. The United States remains a world leader in incarceration, locking up its citizens at a far higher rate than any other industrialized nation.

Between 1972 and 2009, the number of people imprisoned grew nearly 700%, while crime rates declined dramatically after peaking in 1991. Imprisonment levels slowly scaled back, achieving a 25% decline between 2009 and 2021. Then, the prison population has resumed its growth, according to the most recently available data. The prison population grew in 2022 and in 2023, 39 states increased their prison populations.

The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a seismic increase in the most serious crime, homicide, which has fortunately declined to pre-pandemic levels. By 2024, homicide rates were 49% lower than their peak level in 1991. Violent and property crime rates overall have reached historic lows: 2024’s violent crime rate was 53% lower than its peak-1991 level and the property crime rate was 66% lower.

While crime rates are at historic lows, Americans deserve greater levels of community safety. A growing number of elected officials at the local, state, and federal levels have moved to overturn successful criminal justice reforms and revert to the failed playbook of mass incarceration, while the federal government has cut funding for important crime-prevention programs. Instead, policymakers should respond to crime upticks with evidence-based responses, while correcting the counterproductive, costly, and cruel responses of the past.

Excessive reliance on imprisonment in the United States is ineffective at addressing crime, diverts resources from effective public safety investments, upends family stability, contributes to trauma, and disproportionately harms communities of color. A vast body of research has established that we can advance community safety while reducing prison admissions as well as scaling back sentences for both those entering prisons and those already there

By Chris Whitty,

he aim of this report is to explore the health and healthcare of people in prison and on probation in England and make recommendations to improve these. It combines insights from, and individual chapters authored by: front line professionals working in prisons and the secure estate and in probation; public health professionals; commissioners and policy makers in health and justice; third sector organisations; academics and lived experience experts. These insights were gathered by extensive evidence gathering and stakeholder engagement, albeit by a small team within a defined time frame from September 2024 to July 2025. Regional health and justice teams across prison and probation were invited to share their written experiences and attend roundtables. Additional roundtables and workshops were conducted to explore specific themes such as the health needs and healthcare challenges of people on probation, health workforce and long-term conditions. We are very grateful for the time, enthusiasm and knowledgeable response from prison, probation, NHS and public health staff. Building on previous CMO visits looking at health to the secure estate (including secure mental health hospitals) we visited a further: 15 male and female prisons; 1 young offenders’ institution, 1 secure school and 1 secure children’s home; 1 secure NHS hospital and 4 probation delivery units. These covered all regions of England. During visits we discussed with frontline clinical and operational staff as well as people in prison, prison and probation officers, governors and healthcare leaders and we are very grateful for their time and expertise. In addition to lived experience identified by chapter authors and from group discussions during visits, we worked with the NHS Health and Justice Lived Experience Network and Empowering People: Inspiring Change (EP:IC) lived experience consultancy to bring together themes from existing lived experience engagement relevant to the chapters of this report, including engagement held for the 10 Year Health Plan. This was supplemented with additional lived experience focus groups held with pregnant women currently in prison, with people on probation and recently in prison on topics including the health and care needs of older adults in prison and health improvement in prison. One person with lived experience of the criminal justice system was a member of our steering group and contributed and reviewed all chapters. Lived experience contributions are incorporated throughout chapters in blue panels, practice examples (orange) and case studies (lilac) gathered from engagement are also included to illustrate findings.The development of the report was guided by 2 groups: ■ a stakeholder steering group with representation from UK Health Security Agency, Department of Health and Social Care, HM Prison and Probation Service, Ministry of Justice, NHS England and EP:IC lived experience consultancy ■ a clinical task and finish group chaired by the Royal College of General Practitioners: Secure Environments Group. Attended by front line clinicians and clinical leaders (GPs, nurses, pharmacists, psychologists, psychiatrists, midwives, obstetricians and peer support workers) working in, or with recent experience of, prisons, probation and the secure estateThe ‘children and young people’ chapter was guided by its own steering group with representation from NHS England, Youth Justice Board, Youth Custody Service and clinical advisers. The important challenges of substance misuse in prisons have been extensively explored in the recent independent review by Dame Carol Black published in 2024. For this reason we have not concentrated on this issue in this report and would point people to Dame Carol’s recommendations . Sentencing policy is obviously outside the remit of this report on health, although the implications of long and short sentences on health and healthcare is considered. Any response to the Sentencing Review by the Rt Hon David Gauke 2025 is likely to have an effect on prison and probation health and healthcare2 . While important to this population, it was outside the scope of this review to do an in depth review of social care in prisons. The ongoing independent commission into adult social care should consider the justice population.

By Stephen Koppel & René Ropac

The current study isolates the effect of what is arguably the most consequential bail reform provision: eliminating the option to set bail or detain people for most misdemeanor and nonviolent felony charges. The study uses what is known as a “difference-in-differences” causal design—comparing the change in re-arrest rates from before to after initial bail reform implementation among charges seeing the elimination of bail versus charges remaining legally eligible for bail.

What Did We Find?

• Pretrial Recidivism: During the brief pretrial period (capped at 6 months for all cases), eliminating bail had no overall effect on recidivism. However, recidivism increased among a small high-risk group with a pending case.

• Two-Year Recidivism: Over a longer two-year follow-up—including the period both before and after a case disposition—results grew more favorable to bail reform. Charges seeing the elimination of bail had significantly lower felony re-arrest rates than charges still exposed to bail and detention. In addition, there was no longer evidence of a recidivism increase for the “high-risk” subgroup (or any other subgroup).

What's the Upshot?

Our latest study adds to a growing body of research analyzing the effects of New York’s bail reform on public safety. Short-term recidivism increases appear limited to a small high-risk subgroup, with the current study indicating that such increases were no longer present when extending the follow-up period to two years. 

Meanwhile, considering all five of DCJ’s recidivism studies, a pattern emerges that, overall, expanding pretrial release under bail reform reduced recidivism in New York City—especially over a long-term 50-month tracking period—while having no clear effect in suburban and upstate regions. Each prior DCJ study (two in New York City, one outside the City, and a statewide study released last month) reported these overall effects, while adding more nuanced results for key subgroups of interest.

By Falcon Correctional & Community Services, Inc

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WIDOC) Division of Adult Institutions (DAI) has long served the Wisconsin community with its three stated goals: • WIDOC works to protect the public through the constructive management of those placed in its charge. • WIDOC offers education, programming, and treatment to persons in WIDOC’s care that enables them to be successful upon returning to the community. • WIDOC’s mission is to achieve excellence in correctional practices while fostering safety for victims and communities. The WIDOC Executive Leadership Team sought outside assistance to conduct a comprehensive system-wide assessment of correctional, mental health, and physical health operations and practices, with a particular focus on restrictive housing and organizational culture. The project, initiated through discussions with Secretary Jared Hoy and his executive team, was designed to build upon recent reform efforts and respond to persistent staffing and operational challenges. The study used a multi-method approach that included data requests and analyses, staff interviews, workshops with DAI staff and other key stakeholders, site visits, interviews with incarcerated individuals, and policy reviews. The central objectives of the study were to (1) identify areas of strength that could be expanded upon throughout the department, (2) identify areas requiring improvements, and (3) provide actionable, evidence-based, and sustainable recommendations to achieve both short-term and long-term success. This independent assessment was conducted by an interdisciplinary team of Falcon Correctional and Community Services, Inc. (“Falcon, Inc.” or “Falcon”) experts with expertise in the administration of state prison operations, correctional medical and behavioral health practices, the assessment of criminogenic risk, large-scale system studies, and restrictive housing reform. The purpose of this independent evaluation was to serve as a tool to collectively understand, navigate, and prioritize recommendations for system improvements. Falcon would like to thank everyone at WIDOC for their assistance throughout this study. The time commitment was significant, from responding to data requests, organizing and facilitating site visits, and participating in workshops to providing the information necessary to complete this important project. We also thank you for the important work you do for the individuals in your care, your staff, and the Wisconsin community.Inc. 

By Alabama Appleseed

One of Five Incarcerated Alabamians is Serving a Life Sentence

When the Alabama Department of Corrections begins filling up the most expensive prison ever built in the United States, a sprawling $1.2 billion complex in Elmore County, the prison will not come close to housing only the prisoners serving life sentences. This mega prison will have a capacity of 4,000. Yet, more than 6,520 individuals are serving sentences of life with parole, life without parole, or virtual life. Lifers alone could fill the new prison to overflowing, and approximately 15,500 people would remain housed in the violent, dilapidated, understaffed prisons that have the state spending tens of millions in legal fees fighting multiple federal lawsuits while six years of unconstitutional brutality persists.

Alabama relies on long sentences at a higher rate than most of the United States with nearly one in five prisoners serving life sentences. Nationwide, the average is one in seven. A growing body of research shows that incarcerating people for these kinds of extreme sentences is generally unnecessary for public safety because it ignores the irrefutable truth that most people age out of criminality.

Incarcerating older people, many of whom are too feeble to do harm, drains resources that could be devoted to crime prevention or solving crimes, yet laws and parole practices in Alabama have failed to adjust accordingly, as this report will show. 

By Oluwole Ojewale and Raoul Sumo Tayo

Informal money transfer systems in the LCB facilitate trade but lack regulation, enabling terrorist financing and illicit flows despite emerging digital integration opportunities. Power for sale: the organised crime infiltration of elections in Africa.

By Nicolas Sarullo .Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Tatyana Deryugina,James Hodson ,Ilona Sologoub, Anastassia Fedyk

Using household survey data on expenditures and incomes, we construct an objective measure of corruption in the public sector for a broad spectrum of countries. Specifically, we focus on the consumption-income gap for public sector workers relative to private sector workers to gauge the extent of hidden income (bribes) in the government. After validating our data and documenting properties of the consumption-income gap, we compare our measure with popular corruption perception indices. We find that i) the relationship between our measure and the alternatives is nonlinear; ii) available indices appear to be only weakly (and sometimes “wrongly”) correlated with the consumption income gap at high frequencies; iii) the available indices appear to have a low weight on the relative consumption-income gap in the public sector.

By Carolina Martinelli

Brazil may join a small but growing number of countries that have already criminalised sexual corruption through specific legal provisions. This legislative effort shows how naming, strategic framing, and cross-sector collaboration can bring invisible gendered abuses into legislative concern. It offers critical lessons on the importance of political sponsorship, data collection, and media visibility for addressing complex, underreported crimes.

By Daniel Schaeffer

Often viewed through a myopic lens as an environmental issue or one relegated to fisheries authorities, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing affects all coastal nations in the Western Hemisphere and has national security implications on the United States. A regional problem requires a regional solution and greater cooperation across agencies, private industry, and governments. Actions to address IUU fishing in Latin America have the potential to achieve greater aims of maritime security in the region. The report will frame the problem of IUU fishing by first highlighting its overall impacts globally and regionally. Food security, employment, national revenue, and other illicit activities are discussed. The report concludes with recommendations for interagency and regional coordination.

By Lucia Dammert

Extortion is a phenomenon that can be understood from various disciplines, such as economics, criminology, the political sciences, and sociology. Each of these fields of knowledge emphasizes either the system or economic models under which extortionists and victims operate, the short- or long-term relationship sought by establishing simple or complex extortion mechanisms, the political relationship between extortionists and victims, or citizens’ perceptions of the institutional framework, which can serve as a gateway for criminal groups to create ties of protection through extortion. The complexity of extortion, given the different forms it can take and the ease with which it can be confused or linked with other crimes, such as kidnapping or corruption, calls for an open discussion and the establishment of research agendas. This report sheds light on the importance of extortive practices in Latin America. It is based on qualitative research since 2019 that includes 36 interviews of academics, public officials, police, professionals, and victims of extortion in 10 countries,5 along with a review of all official public information and newspapers in five countries during 2019.6 The research also focuses on working groups and reviews official and civil society documents related to extortion as a criminal phenomenon throughout Latin America. The report is part of a long-term research project that focuses on the importance of this criminal activity, its possible links to organized crime organizations, and the policies designed to tackle its impact on businesses and citizens alike.

The report shows that extortive practices are a regionwide trend, albeit with national, specific characteristics. Although it is primarily a non-violent crime, an increasing tendency— specifically linked to practices against women—should make it a priority for the public security agenda. Furthermore, extortion could be depicted as the “perfect crime” since it is hardly reported, let alone investigated. High levels of impunity have allowed for this practice to move into criminal organizations, prisons, and street gangs; also, state officials and even business partners use extortive practices to finance their activities. There is a clear impact on democracy since corruption, fear of crime, and a general sense of freedom from punishment corroborate the idea that there is no rule of law. Efforts toward understanding extortion remain limited and need to take a central role in most national and regional public security policies. 

By Kathryn Westmore and Georgia Jones

To answer this question, the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI convened a virtual roundtable in September 2025 to discuss how football clubs, players and agents are vulnerable to money laundering and the benefit of any potential regulatory response. Participants were drawn from the public sector, the private sector, academia and civil society and included those with first-hand experience of issues relating to money laundering, financial crime and compliance within professional sports.

By Pilar Lizana , Maria Nizzero and Carlos Solar

This paper highlights the critical need for Chile to strengthen its asset-recovery frameworks to combat the growing threat of organised crime and money laundering. It provides an in-depth analysis of the structural challenges hindering Chile's ability to trace, seize and recover illicit assets, and situates these findings within the broader Latin American and global security context. The authors identify key obstacles, including limited risk understanding, weak state governance, gaps in cooperation and information sharing and deficiencies in asset recovery systems. The paper offers actionable recommendations to enhance Chile's institutional resilience and contribute to regional and international security efforts.

Key Recommendations

• Establish a centralised asset-management office to ensure effective administration and preservation of confiscated assets.

• Invest in training and capacity building to improve risk understanding and investigative capabilities across public and private sectors.

• Strengthen public–private cooperation to enhance information sharing and risk mitigation strategies.

• Increase human, financial and technological resources for agencies combating organised crime and recovering assets.

• Update legislation to include extended confiscation and non-conviction-based confiscation mechanisms, aligning with international standards.

This paper underscores the importance of sustained reforms and international cooperation to disrupt transnational criminal networks and safeguard democratic governance in Chile and beyond.

By Valerie Wirtschafter

Over the past three decades, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has transformed from a prison gang founded in São Paulo into a transnational criminal “leviathan,” with a presence throughout South America, Africa, and Europe. In response to this growing threat, in 2021 the U.S. government cited the PCC as “the most powerful organized crime group in Brazil and among the most powerful in the world.” What can we expect from the PCC moving forward? And how might policymakers stall this international expansion?In the coming year, the PCC will likely continue to vie for dominance in strategic areas of contested control throughout Brazil and look for opportunities to consolidate gains abroad. Confrontation with rival groups, including the Comando Vermelho (CV), born in the Rio de Janeiro prisons, and its allies in areas such as the Amazon, is also likely to continue. This is particularly the case due to the region’s importance for drug smuggling

By Katrina Geddes

The “substantial similarity” between a copyrighted work and an unauthorized derivative has formed the bedrock of copyright infringement jurisprudence since the mid-nineteenth century. Recent technological developments, however, are destabilizing these conceptual foundations. In May, the Copyright Office suggested that the use of copyrighted works to train AI models may constitute infringement even if model outputs are not “substantially similar” to model inputs if they nevertheless “dilute the market” for similar works. One month later, Judge Chhabria of the Northern District of California argued that AI outputs do not have to be “substantially similar” to copyrighted training data in order to be infringing. The plaintiff’s incentives are sufficiently harmed, Judge Chhabria argued, when the market is flooded with “similar enough” AI-generated works.

These developments should be read as early warning signs of a disturbing doctrinal shift from “substantial similarity” to a new and dubious threshold for actionable infringement: “substitutive similarity”, where the substitutability of the defendant’s work, rather than the similarity of protected expression, provides the cause of action. This novel theory of harm, if widely adopted, would impose dangerous restrictions on downstream creativity. Any new work that was “similar enough” to existing works would be treated as potentially infringing, despite the absence of substantially similar expression. This would corrupt what is essentially a question of fact – whether the defendant copied “enough” of the plaintiff’s work to constitute unlawful appropriation – with deontic considerations of the wrongfulness of free-riding.

At the same time, artists are understandably rattled by the speed and scale of AI generation. AI models can produce “new” works in the style of established artists in a matter of seconds, dramatically undercutting the market for their work. AI style mimicry makes it difficult for artists to control their personal brands and for consumers to locate authentic works by their favorite artists. Copyright is responsible for protecting artists’ creative incentives, but its legal tests were not designed to handle the scale of imitation enabled by AI.

This Article offers a way out of this jurisprudential morass. Instead of lowering the burden of proof for infringement, Congress should strengthen the attribution rights of existing creators. Low-protectionists have long advocated for attribution rights as a way of protecting authors’ interests without expanding the scope of their economic entitlements. Proper attribution allows creators to capture the full reputational benefits of their labor without stifling downstream creativity. For example, Congress could enact an AI-specific attribution right that requires the disclosure of copyrighted training data in output metadata. This would mitigate the labor-displacing effects of generative AI by directing consumers to the original creators of a popular style or aesthetic.

Generative AI places copyright jurisprudence at a critical crossroads. Indulging Judge Chhabria’s novel theory of harm would effectively inaugurate a new standard for infringement – “substitutive similarity” – that would stifle not just AI innovation but human creativity more broadly. The stakes for protecting free expression through careful guardianship of longstanding doctrine could not be higher. This Article guides readers through this critical inflection point with new terminology for the jurisprudential lexicon as well as practical proposals for reform.

By The International Crisis Group

Born of Port-au-Prince’s most powerful gangs, Viv Ansanm has raised the criminal threat overhanging Haiti’s state and civilians to alarming heights. The gang coalition announced itself to the world by besieging the Haitian capital in early 2024, triggering former Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation. After consolidating its hold on much of the city, Viv Ansanm has expanded into neighbouring departments, tightened its grip on the main roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country and mounted attacks on the airport, essentially cutting Haiti off. Gangs’ violent offensives have killed over 16,000 people since 2022. But a rising death toll and diversifying criminal portfolio, now including extortion, piracy and drug trafficking, have not stopped gangs from claiming to represent the country’s downtrodden, especially on social media. UN approval of a new foreign force to combat the gangs could shift the balance of power. But it is vital that plans are in place not just to overpower the gangs but also to persuade them to demobilise. Haitian business and political elites have relied on paramilitary forces to protect their interests since the 1950s dictatorship of Francois Duvalier, or “Papa Doc”. But in the wake of the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs have mutated, evolving from tools in the hands of the most powerful to overlords of Haiti. Two main gang groupings – the G-9, whose most public figure was Jimmy Chérizier, alias Barbecue, and the Gpèp, under Gabriel Jean Pierre, known as “Ti Gabriel” – fought for supremacy after Moïse’s murder. Even as the two faced off, gang leaders discussed whether to strike agreements to scale down the death toll among their members and spare resources. Mediators managed to craft several pacts among local groups to divvy up coveted turf. Late in 2023, reports emerged that the country’s two main gang coalitions had merged into one platform; their first joint offensive began months later. Alongside its violent expansion, Viv Ansanm has sought to transform its public profile from that of a predatory criminal force into that of an ideological crusader. Crime bosses say their mission is to protect the poorest Haitians from rapacious elites and colonial powers that historically have oppressed this black Caribbean nation. Chérizier and other gang leaders have even announced the creation of a new political party, albeit without taking the steps needed to register it formally.While continuing to enrich themselves at the expense of Haitians rich and poor, their message has nevertheless become more overtly political: they appear intent on guaranteeing that their allies are part of the next administration, which should be formed by 7 February 2026 to replace the current transitional government. The concrete result they aspire to is a general amnesty for leaders and members. Haiti and its foreign partners are looking to beef up their ability to respond to the gangs with force. The UN Security Council has approved a new security operation, dubbed the Gang Suppression Force, to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, which started up in 2024 but has never had the personnel or resources needed to check the gangs. The new force aims to incorporate 5,500 military personnel and expects to draw on reliable funding. Its mandate appears to give it more operational independence and the leeway to adopt more aggressive tactics. But until the force’s deployment, which is expected to commence around April 2026, Haiti’s authorities will have to turn to other methods. A task force, led by Haiti’s prime minister and powered by U.S. private military companies, has already used drones to hit gang members in their urban strongholds, killing over 200 people. Foreign partners are also providing training to the newly reconstituted army. Meanwhile, citizens exhausted by the threat to their neighbourhoods have established self-defence groups, provoking a brutal riposte from the gangs. A well-resourced, properly informed and expertly commanded Gang Suppression Force could help change the balance of force on the ground and push the gangs onto the back foot. Port-au-Prince and its foreign counterparts, however, must take care to mitigate the dangers of civilian casualties and violations of human rights, ensuring that robust accountability systems are in place. Once the force is up and running, the Haitian government should also overcome the coordination failures4 that have plagued previous security campaigns. In particular, the government should appoint members to the National Security Council and ask them to design a strategy that lays out each institution’s role in fighting the gangs. Even so, it remains unlikely that force alone will entirely extricate gangs from the communities they control or sever the nexus with politics that has bedevilled Haiti for over half a century. Though informal negotiations with gangs take place on a regular basis – to gain access to people in need of humanitarian aid or to keep businesses open – many Haitians oppose the idea of formal dialogue with the perpetrators of crimes they consider unforgivable. Government officials have correctly said the Haitian state cannot engage in talks from a position of weakness. But if the new multinational force and revamped Haitian security forces allow the authorities to gain the upper hand and broadcast their armed superiority, state officials should look to use dialogue as a means of convincing the gangs to cut their losses, reduce violence against civilians and, eventually, demobilise.  

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2025. 69p.