By Miriam Driessen 

Political and legal immunity are justified by the principle that certain social aims outweigh the value of imposing liability. To be exempt from the rules, however, is a privilege granted to or demanded by the powerful. The structural disparities that underpin immunity can turn it into an unjust prerogative, one that is inscribed by global inequalities.  Set against the backdrop of an extraordinary wave of litigation against Chinese corporations in Ethiopia, Immunity on Trial probes the question of immunity in everyday encounters steeped in highly asymmetrical power relations. Drawing on observations from the courthouse, interviews with litigants, judges, and court support staff, and analyses of case files, Miriam Driessen demonstrates how immunity is debated and delegitimized—or affirmed—by those who fight, exact, grant, or weigh it. From the construction site to the police station, from the registrar’s office into the courtroom, she documents tussles over immunity, unraveling the politics of dignity on which they are founded.

Oakland: : University of California Press, 2026. 

By David Abrams and Priyanka Goonetilleke

Like most locally governed activities, police stops are evaluated, if at all, using data from a single municipality. This paper aggregates data on over 8 million pedestrian and vehicle police stops from 16 U.S. cities between 2019 and 2023 to better understand how the widely used police tactic varies by place, time, and race. We find immense variation in the implementation of these policies across cities, something that has not been previously highlighted in the literature. Stop rates vary across cities by almost two orders of magnitude, well in excess of inputs like funding and size of police force vary far less, or outcomes like different measures of crime. Contraband discovery rates (hit rates) for pedestrian stops are consistently low, with gun hit rates never exceeding 10% of frisks in any city. Consistent with optimizing models of policing, hit rates rise over time as frisk rates fall substantially. However, this result is concentrated in gun contraband, and for other types - mostly drugs - hit rates do not vary much even with vast declines in frisks, suggesting police are not optimizing for other types of contraband. This supports the notion that frisks are consistent with the law, which requires they be based on suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. Consistent with prior work, there are substantial racial disparities in all examined cities, with Blacks frisked as much as 10 times more frequently than Whites in some locations. Taken together, these facts point to a standard practice that seemingly has no standards, given the massive variation across the country. This suggests there are potentially large gains in efficiency and fairness from sharing best practices and nationwide data collection on police stops.

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 26-01,

By Kate Weisburd

Scholars and advocates have long argued that a person's consent to a warrantless police search is often so inherently coerced, uninformed, and shaped by race, class, gender, citizenship status, and disability that to call it a "choice" is fiction. This critique is not limited to police searches based on consent. Waiving rights and consenting to otherwise unconstitutional state action permeates criminal procedure. The definition of a seizure, the third-party doctrine, custodial confessions, plea bargains, and agreements to alternatives to incarceration (such as GPS ankle monitoring) all hinge on the idea of voluntary choices-choices that are often just as coerced and uninformed as the choice to consent to a search.Given these concerns, this Article asks: What would happen if consent were eliminated from criminal procedure doctrines? This question is not merely academic. In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have substantially limited or eliminated traditional police searches based on consent. These reform efforts allow us to consider if there is something uniquely coercive or inequitable about consent searches that makes them especially amenable to reform or if we should consider eliminating consent in other criminal procedure doctrines as well.This Article takes on these questions. Drawing on both an original national survey of recent consent-search reforms and a transsubstantive analysis of consent and waiver in a range of criminal procedure doctrines, this Article analyzes the potential ramifications of eliminating (or limiting) consent. In doing so, this Article reveals the extent to which consent plays a pivotal role in upholding—and justifying—the entire operation of the criminal justice system.

.California Law Review (2025), UC Law San Francisco Research Paper Forthcoming,

By Bernard Harcourt

Fifty years after its publication, Discipline and Punish (1975) remains as controversial as ever. Anyone writing about the prison today, in no matter what discipline, feels obliged to position themselves vis-à-vis Michel Foucault’s book. As a result, new studies and books regularly criticize Discipline and Punish, most often for misleading the reader about the history of the prison. As Adam Gopnik recently writes in the New Yorker, scholars are “turning decisively against Foucault,” contending “that incarceration may be a facet of every hierarchical, complex society. In other words, it’s always been with us.”However, Discipline and Punish was never intended to be a history of the prison. It was instead a genealogy of a particular mode of governing in modern times—what Foucault called “disciplinary power” or “panopticism.” And rather than trace the history of the prison, the book proposed a contemporary way to understand how power circulates in society and it paved the way for the study of contemporary modes of governing.  Drawing on a wealth of new Foucault archives, public lectures, manuscripts, and historical documents that have surfaced over the past 50 years, it is possible now to identify the true import of Foucault’s book. Just as the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes captured the turn in modern political philosophy to theories of sovereignty and representation, Discipline and Punish marked the end of modern political theory and launched a new approach to analyze relations of power in society. In this essay, I redefine the central contribution of Discipline and Punish and explore how to use Foucault’s book today—and also, how to go beyond it.

 Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 6044574,

By Fritz Brugger, Joschka J. Proksik & Felicitas Fischer

Most research on illicit financial flows (IFFs) has focused on illicit outflows from low-income countries and the role of non-state actors in generating IFFs. Less attention has been paid to processes through which IFFs enter formal value chains – in effect being legalised before leaving the country – or the crucial role of state institutions as gatekeepers. We develop a novel explanatory approach to account for the enabling role of state institutions in the legalisation of IFFs. Building on political settlement theory, we explain the performance of institutions in regulating IFFs as a function to maintain political power. Taking the case of Bolivia, we examine how legalising illicit value flows works in practice and analyse the motives and underlying conditions that lead state institutions to permit the formal export of gold shipments that have been illicitly sourced or transferred. We find that the legalisation of IFFs accommodates the interests of powerful cooperatives dominating the gold-mining sector, which are critical to maintaining the political settlement on which the incumbent government’s power is based. By maintaining a status quo of non-enforcement, legal ambiguity, and informality, gold-mining cooperatives reap higher benefits from resource extraction at the expense of domestic revenue mobilisation.

New Political Economy, Volume 29, 2024 - Issue 4

By Sarah A. El Sayeda, Carley R. Sheltonb, and Michael F. TenEyck

Although much is known about recidivism risk, less is known about factors predicting early release. The current study analyses a sample of 2,070 adult felony probation clients to see if offense characteristics, domains from the Texas Risk Assessment System (TRAS), and demographic variables impact both revocation and successful early release. Results revealed that predictors of early release mirrored those of revocation with one exception—race. Specifically, Black clients were 27% less likely to be granted early release. The findings highlight the TRAS is an effective tool to help mitigate bias for revocation of probation but not for granting early release.

By The Alliance for Youth Justice

The briefing, funded by the Barrow Cadbury Trust, examines what happens as exploited children turn 18, exploring how responses across safeguarding and criminal justice fail to keep pace with ongoing risk and harm. It sets out principles and practical steps to ensure protection continues into young adulthood and to prevent the unjust criminalisation of victims.

While awareness of CCE has grown, responses for children remain inconsistent and are too often led by punishment. At 18, those weaknesses are magnified. Support frequently falls away, thresholds for help rise, and young adults are more likely to be treated as perpetrators than recognised as victims. As parliament considers the Crime and Policing Bill’s new offence of child criminal exploitation (CCE), there is a critical opportunity to improve the response for victims – but a growing risk that exploited young adults will be prosecuted as perpetrators.

The briefing is informed by an evidence review and consultation with professionals, legal practitioners, academics, civil servants, and sector experts and identifies several urgent issues:

By John R. Lott, et al.

After peaking in 2022, the number of Concealed Carry Permit holders across the United States has declined for the third year in a row. The total now sits at 20.88 million, representing a 2.7% drop from last year. A major factor behind this ongoing decrease is the widespread adoption of Constitutional Carry laws. Following Louisiana’s implementation of permitless carry on July 4, 2024, 29 states now allow residents to carry without a permit. As a result, 46.8% of Americans (157.6 million) now live in Constitutional Carry States, with 67.7% of the land in the country (2.57 million square miles). Although no additional states enacted such laws this year, the broader trend remains unchanged. Unlike gun ownership surveys that may be affected by people’s unwillingness to answer personal questions, concealed handgun permit data is the only really “hard data” that we have, but it becomes a less accurate measure as more states become Constitutional Carry states.

Salt Lake City UK: Crime Prevention Research Center, 2025

By David Spencer

Summary of Recommendations 1. Given the very poor performance of the Metropolitan Police across a wide range of areas for an extended period – including prior to the present Commissioner’s term of office and particularly in relation to the fight against crime – the Home Secretary should become the “policing body” for the Metropolitan Police. This would remove the Mayor of London’s role in relation to oversight of policing in the capital. Shifting direct political oversight to the Home Secretary, as the minister principally responsible to Parliament for policing and crime, will enable both Government and Parliament to exercise far greater scrutiny and influence over the force’s performance in a way which has the potential to deliver the significant improvements which are required. 2. To enable the Metropolitan Police to shift the force’s principal focus to local crime fighting, the Government should transfer responsibility for the national leadership of the police counterterrorism network from the Metropolitan Police to a national Counter-Terrorism Policing body led by a Chief Constable. 3. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary should return the Metropolitan Police to the “Engage” process – more commonly known as “Special Measures”. The force was, based on performance across several areas, erroneously removed from the “Engage” process inmore commonly known as “Special Measures”. The force was, based on performance across several areas, erroneously removed from the “Engage” process in January 2025. There should be a presumption that all materials relating to the “Engage” process should be made publicly available. The current lack of transparency provides the public with little confidence that the necessary steps are being taken to deliver substantial improvements in the force’s performance. 4. The Home Secretary should order an inspection of the Metropolitan Police’s approach to protest policing using section 54 (2B) Police Act 1996. This should include consideration of both the strategic approach and operational tactics used, including what new strategies and tactics are required to more effectively deal with large-scale and widespread protests. This should consider the strategies and approaches used in other jurisdictions to determine what might be learned and adopted by the force – in particular the willingness of police chiefs to use non-human based means of “creating distance” between officers and protestors. 5. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police should review the performance of his most senior leaders and where individuals have been found to have failed to perform to the necessary standard, in some cases over very long periods, they should be replaced at the earliest opportunity. There should also be a substantial change in the approach to performance management for middle and senior leaders in the organisation – including being prepared to more willingly remove officers and staff who fail to deliver the necessary levels of performance, particularly in relation to fighting crime. Data should be published on every senior officer’s performance on crime-fighting throughout their leadership career. There should be a substantial increase in the transparency of the force’s Frontline Policing performance meetings, where local police commanders are questioned on their performance. This should include the publication of performance data, the publication of the meeting’s minutes and the option for members of the public to attend these meetings through online hosting. 

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 52p.

By Justice

1. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is rapidly reshaping public services, and policing is no exception. The pace of innovation, the scale of private sector investment, and the UK Government’s explicit ambition to “mainline AI into the veins of the nation” mean that AI deployment in policing is not a distant prospect but an accelerating reality. This brings significant opportunities: enhanced investigative capability, faster processing of digital evidence, improved risk assessment, and the potential to intervene earlier to prevent harm. Yet it also carries profound risks for human rights, the rule of law, and public trust. The police occupy a uniquely powerful position in our democratic society; integrating AI into that environment without the right safeguards risks entrenching discrimination, undermining lawful decision making, and eroding communities’ confidence in policing2. This report asks a central question: what must be in place for AI in policing to be trustworthy, value for money, effective in achieving policing goals, and compliant with human rights and the fair administration of justice? To answer this, JUSTICE carried out international research, examined domestic developments, and convened stakeholders across policing, government, civil society, regulators, academia, and industry. Across this work, five lessons emerged, each of which signals not only what must be done, but the urgency of acting now while the UK remains at a crossroads.

London: Justice, 2025. 62p.

By Mia Savicevic and Ethan Miner

This report is a focused look at the growing use of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) by law enforcement agencies across Iowa—a surveillance tool that poses serious risks to Iowans’ privacy and civil liberties. ALPRs are not speed cameras. They are not “red light” cameras. Instead, they are cameras used along roadways throughout Iowa that quickly take thousands of snapshots of license plates as vehicles drive by. That information can then be fed into a network of nationally shared databases that has too few privacy protections and is subject to abuse. More details about ALPRs generally can be found on the ACLU of Iowa website. Unlike other traffic cameras, ALPRs aren’t activated because you violated a law. They record you and every other person who drives by, simply to build a database of vehicle information. ALPRs can take hundreds of photos in a matter of minutes. And unlike ordinary surveillance cameras, where data is either not shared or shared in a more limited manner, the main purpose of ALPRs is to feed this information into a database. To investigate how this technology is being used, the ACLU of Iowa engaged the Technology Law Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law to conduct independent research on the use of ALPRs in Iowa. We sent open records requests to a broad cross-section of 48 law enforcement agencies across the state, to larger towns, to smaller communities, and to Iowa’s college towns. The study was not comprehensive of all ALPRs in Iowa. Of the 48 agencies that were selected, 5 did not respond to our records request before publication: the Des Moines Police Department, the Clinton Police Department, the Fayette Police Department, the Fremont Police Department, and the Mills Police Department.While researching this project, the clinic also identified agencies (see Appendix D) that have accessed other Iowa cities’ or counties’ ALPR databases, whether they have their own ALPRs or not.

Technology Law Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law and ACLU of Iowa, 2025. 63p.

By Camilla De Camargo, Fred Cram

The advent of the COVID-19 pandemic required police officers in England and Wales to enforce new public health restrictions (e.g., stay-at-home directives, social distancing requirements and mask mandates), as well as navigate the risk that COVID-19 posed to their own health and safety during interactions with the public. From a practical standpoint, these factors changed the nature of the policing task significantly, with previously routine police decision-making (e.g., whether or not to carry out stops, searches, arrests and/or detentions) necessarily responding not only to traditional concerns around suspicion and evidence but also directly to these novel legal and organisational challenges. Findings from interviews carried out in 2020 and 2022 with 18 police officers from 11 different forces in England and Wales suggest that well-established predictors of arrest decisions (e.g., offence severity, evidence and/or the pursuit of culturally orientated objectives) were disrupted due to broader considerations, uniquely related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This article uses Keith Hawkins’ (2002) conceptual framework of criminal justice decision-making—surround, field and frame—as an explanatory device to help us understand arrest and non-arrest decisions of street-level police officers during this period, despite the existence of sufficient evidence to support such action.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice Volume 64, Issue 3 Sep 2025 Pages 277-417