By Ohioans To Stop Executions

Ohio’s cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment sys­tem has come into sharp focus with the release of two reports that exam­ine four decades of the state’s death penal­ty record and draw stark­ly dif­fer­ent con­clu­sions about the future of Ohio’s death penal­ty. On March 30, Ohioans to Stop Executions (OTSE) pub­lished Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Confronting the Wrongful Conviction Crisis in the State of Ohio, doc­u­ment­ing the record of mis­takes and errors that result­ed in 12 exon­er­a­tions. “The death penal­ty in Ohio is a sys­tem defined more by its capac­i­ty for error than its pur­suit of jus­tice,” the report states, con­clud­ing, “It’s time for Ohio to end its death penal­ty.” Two days lat­er, out­go­ing Attorney General Dave Yost released his eighth and final Capital Crimes Report, call­ing the state’s years-long pause on exe­cu­tions “a mock­ery of the jus­tice sys­tem” and com­plain­ing that Ohio has pro­vid­ed death-sen­tenced pris­on­ers with “more than their fair share of due process.” AG Yost urges law­mak­ers to pass leg­is­la­tion that would allow exe­cu­tions to resume.

Beyond Reasonable Doubt cen­ters on data OTSE argues Ohioans can no longer ignore: since the state rein­stat­ed cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment in 1981, it has exe­cut­ed 56 peo­ple and exon­er­at­ed 12 oth­ers from death row — mark­ing one exon­er­a­tion for every five exe­cu­tions car­ried out. Collectively, OTSE notes that these 12 men lost 245 years of their lives to wrong­ful impris­on­ment. “It turns out that Ohio has a mas­sive wrong­ful con­vic­tion prob­lem, far worse than any­one imag­ined,” said Kevin Werner, Executive Director of OTSE. Mr. Werner added that “[a]ttempts to restart exe­cu­tions will result in the exe­cu­tions of inno­cent peo­ple, and no one wants that.”

In addi­tion to the 12 indi­vid­u­als who have been wrong­ful­ly sen­tenced to death, Beyond Reasonable Doubt iden­ti­fies an addi­tion­al 12 “shad­ow exon­er­a­tions,” or cas­es in which indi­vid­u­als faced cap­i­tal indict­ments and were sen­tenced to life in prison rather than death and were lat­er proven inno­cent. The same issues are present in both groups of 12 cas­es: pros­e­cu­to­r­i­al mis­con­duct, coerced tes­ti­mo­ny, false eye­wit­ness iden­ti­fi­ca­tions, and false or mis­lead­ing foren­sic evi­dence. “The records of the 24 men exon­er­at­ed after cap­i­tal indict­ments are no ‘suc­cess sto­ries’ of the legal sys­tem; they are indict­ments of it,” the report states. “They prove that in Ohio, the dif­fer­ence between a free man and a dead man is often noth­ing more than a lucky pub­lic records request or the per­sis­tence of postconviction counsel.”

By James Stone

For incarcerated people litigating pro se, the civil discovery process is vitally important. When imprisoned litigants lack meaningful access to discovery, their cases become swearing contests they are bound to lose, and wrongdoing in prison goes unaddressed. Yet for these same plaintiffs, civil discovery is defunct. The vast majority of incarcerated plaintiffs, including those with promising or meritorious claims, are unable to navigate either to or through litigation’s discovery phase. Part diagnosis and part treatment, this Article is the first to explore in depth how the discovery process—as designed and implemented—fails those pursuing civil-rights claims against their jailers, betraying both a crisis in prison litigation and a failure of our procedural regime.

Relying on both case research and extensive interviews with federal judges, staff attorneys, prison rights lawyers, formerly incarcerated people, and prison officials, the Article chronicles prison discovery’s written and unwritten rules and their failures. It begins with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which map awkwardly or not at all onto prison litigation. It then discusses the much broader amalgam of practical impediments to evidence gathering in prison. These include profound informational asymmetries, resource disparities, and hostility between prison defendants—who create and control much of the evidence relevant to incarcerated people’s claims—and imprisoned plaintiffs.

The Article then scrutinizes the dockets and filings of two hundred recent federal cases arising out of two different prisons in two different districts: Louisiana State Penitentiary in Louisiana and Menard Correctional Center in Illinois. The research reveals startling disparities between the districts’ case-management decisions and cultures, resulting in stark differences in prison litigants’ discovery prospects. Incarcerated litigants’ current chances of evidencing and vindicating claims may be largely contingent on the district in which their prison sits—what some incarcerated people call “justice by jurisdiction.” Arguing that this situation is both untenable and preventable, the Article suggests multiple concrete avenues for reform.

By Michael D. Anestis, Allison E. Bond, Kimberly C. Burke, Sultan Altikriti & Daniel C. Semenza 

Background

Firearm purchasing patterns, intentions, and behaviors change over time in response to specific events. Additionally, the nature of these changes may be evolving over time or differ depending on the nature of the event in question. Given the intensity of the rhetoric surrounding gun violence leading up to the 2024 election, we sought to examine the extent to which firearm purchasing patterns, intentions, and behaviors changed following the 2024 Presidential election and the extent to which any such changes varied by population.

Methods

A nationally representative sample was recruited to complete an online survey October 22-November 3, 2024 (n = 1,530) and assessed again January 7-January 22, 2025 (n = 1,359).

Results

Identifying as Black was associated with increases in urges to carry firearms because of the election results (β = 0.16; 95%CI = 0.07-0.61). Liberal beliefs were associated with greater increases in urges to carry firearms because of the election results (β = 0.11; 95%CI = 0.01-0.13) and greater odds of storing firearms more quickly accessible because of the election results (OR = 2.11; 95%CI = 1.29–3.44).

Conclusions

Individuals threatened by Trump administration policies appear to be experiencing urges to acquire firearms, carry them, and store them readily accessible. These results highlight that the current political environment may be fostering community-level decision making that, while motivated by the drive for protection, increases the risk for harm. Policies and programs that encourage secure storage and discourage firearm carrying may be increasingly important for the prevention of injury and death.

By Jonathan Katz, Renée Rippberger, and Eric Urby

he assassinations of Minnesota State Representative Melissa Hortman and her husband Mark, as well as the attempted murders of Minnesota State Senator John Hoffman and his wife Yvette, are disturbing examples of the rise in political violence in the United States. Political violence includes “[t]he use of physical force, coercion, or intimidation to achieve political goals” ranging “from violent acts against individuals or groups, to state-sponsored violence, and to physical violence and intimidation used by both state and non-state actors.” To protect the health of our democracy and safety of our communities, Americans—especially political leaders—must consistently and loudly denounce such violence and take steps to address this growing threat, while remaining cautious not to restrict civic freedoms.

Politically motivated violence is a major concern for a vast majority of Americans, regardless of political identification. The impacts of political violence on a democratic society are far-reaching. In addition to the devastating effects on victims, their families, and their communities, political violence can also stifle critical forms of public engagement—such as voting, community organizing, and running for office—and chill free expression. Due to its harmful effects, and the troubling uptick following the Jan. 6, 2021 insurrection, we highlighted the urgent need to swiftly and “vigorously oppose” political violence or harassment in all forms in the Brookings Democracy Playbook 2025.

Election officials, judges, and lawmakers from across the political spectrum have faced increasing threats of political violence. There were assassination attempts against President Donald Trump in 2024 and Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro in April 2025. More recently, a bomb threat was made at an Illinois hotel where several Texas lawmakers were staying—quickly followed by a second. This rise in intimidation and violence is dangerous not only for the safety of Americans, but for the health of U.S. democracy. This deeply concerning trend is linked to inflammatory rhetoric and policy by leaders and their supporters, the spread of disinformation online, and other factors. 

There are short- and long-term strategies that federal, state, and local officials—as well as other stakeholders—can implement to mitigate the risk of violence and harassment. These strategies include consistently enforcing relevant laws to address immediate threats, speaking out against agitators regardless of political affiliation, and tackling the root causes of political violence, both physical and psychological.  

Amid the federal government’s recent cuts to programs aimed at reducing violent extremism, it is especially important for subnational and nongovernmental actors to provide funding, tools, and other resources to address the risks and counter the impacts of political violence. This includes the private sector, specifically the technology industry, which can do more to redesign social media features that are exploited by hostile actors, implement high-quality standards for threat assessment, and otherwise guard against political violence. 

While implementing these strategies, it is essential that government, civil society, community leaders, and citizens at every level of society—regardless of political affiliation or ideology—cooperate to swiftly and unequivocally condemn political violence. Government and civil society leaders should champion nonviolent methods of conflict resolution and reaffirm democratic principles such as freedom of speech, assembly, and expression. 

Political leaders’ immediate reactions to the Minnesota assassinations included both appropriate and concerning responses. On the former, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed bipartisan resolutions that condemned political violence and called for reconciliation of differences through civic dialogue and debate. Similar responses emerged from state legislatures and lawmakers across the country, from Georgia to Washington. In contrast, we saw troubling responses from some lawmakers and other actors.

It is extremely important to caution U.S. policymakers in this heated environment to act responsibly and not use the specter of political violence as an excuse to suppress nonviolent movements, curb freedoms of assembly and expression, encourage retaliation, or otherwise close civic spaces. Weaponizing calls for stability and peace in response to political violence is a real threat in democratic and nondemocratic countries globally

By: Rosanna Smart, Andrew R. Morral, James P. Murphy, Rupa Jose, Amanda Charbonneau, Terry L. Schell

In this report, part of RAND's Gun Policy in America initiative, researchers systematically review the scientific literature that has examined the likely effects of various gun laws. In the fifth edition of this report, the authors incorporate more-recent research in their synthesis of the available scientific data regarding the effects of 18 state firearm policies on firearm injuries and deaths, violent crime, suicides, the gun industry, defensive gun use, and other outcomes. By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, the authors hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, they also illuminate areas in which more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.

By Kristof Titeca and Giovanni Salvaggio

This report argues that violence attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be understood through a single lens, such as jihadism, but must instead be analysed as a multilayered phenomenon in which ideological, military, political, and economic logics coexist and overlap. While the ADF’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and subsequent financial and ideological links are real and consequential, an exclusive focus on jihadism obscures the group’s deep embeddedness in local and regional political economies of violence. Drawing on long-term fieldwork in eastern Congo and Uganda, the article shows how ADF violence is intertwined with taxation, trade, resource extraction, and local power struggles, and how the ADF label itself has become a franchise used by a wide range of actors to conceal or legitimise violence. It concludes that monocausal readings - including recent attempts to frame ADF violence primarily as sectarian or anti-Christian - flatten a far more complex reality and hinder a proper understanding of the drivers of violence in eastern Congo. The ADF, in other words, is not an exception to the Congolese conflict dynamics, but an extreme and particularly violent crystallisation of it.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

In Haiti, 5 915 people were killed in 2025 (compared to 5 601 in 2024). The national homicide rate got to 49.8 per 100 000 people, and Port-au-Prince, which is home to about a quarter of the population, reached nearly 140 per 100 000 people, ranking it among the most violent cities in the world.

Gangs continued to expand their influence in Haiti, both through territorial control and by consolidating their role as political brokers. This latter dimension remains largely absent from national and international crisis response strategies.By failing to account for the political economy of violence, particularly the importance of addressing politico-criminal relationships, current policies risk perpetuating rather than loosening the links between armed groups and the political system, especially if the 2026 elections proceed without a more comprehensive response adapted to the complexity of the crisis.Haiti’s gangs are neither insurgents nor revolutionaries; they are embedded within circuits of political and economic power. The crisis is sustained by illicit financial flows, arms and drug trafficking, and patronage networks that protect and instrumentalize armed groups.Arrests and targeted operations may weaken certain groups, but as long as the structures that sustain criminal governance remain intact, the system will reconstitute itself. Without measures to dismantle the networks intertwining political competition and criminal governance, electoral processes risk reinforcing rather than transforming the system they are intended to renew.Haiti requires a strategy to combat organized crime that integrates public security, justice and community reconstruction. Any approach focused exclusively on force will fail if it does not address the political and economic foundations that allow violence to persist.To be effective, the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) must be paired with judicial tools capable of targeting gang support networks, particularly financial ones, and not only armed actors. This includes pursuing criminal leaders as well as their political and financial sponsors. Only by addressing the broader ecosystem of collusion can Haiti move away from a political order that is shaped by entrenched politico-criminal relationships.A long-term crisis resolution strategy must integrate justice, economic policy, security and political reform. The central question is not whether to negotiate with criminal groups, but how to articulate justice, demobilization and reintegration in a way that prevents the reproduction of violence.

By Pierfrancesco Moscuzza

Over the last two decades, Mexico has experienced a substantial increase in violence and insecurity, leading to its classification as one of the world's less secure countries. While the origins of this insecurity can be traced back to Mexico's turbulent history, the current surge in violence is a more recent development, primarily stemming from a lack of regional and national coordination among government entities and their respective security agencies. This chapter seeks to delve into the complexities of the Mexican security problem, offering an exploration of its historical context. Additionally, through a comparative analysis with the Italian case, where organized crime posed a significant threat to national security, this chapter aims to propose a set of comprehensive strategies to mitigate the impact of violence and insecurity on both the population and the country's overall development.

By José Miguel Cruz and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría

 What are the factors behind citizen support for the use of extralegal violence in Latin America? The prevailing argument is that, in countries overwhelmed by skyrocketing levels of criminal violence, people endorse the use of extralegal violence as a way to cope with insecurity. Other scholars believe that support for extralegal violence is the result of state withdrawal and failure. Few empirical studies, however, have tested any of these arguments. In this article, using regional data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we examine different explanations regarding citizen support for the utilization of extralegal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. We developed a multi-item scale that gauges support for different forms of extralegal violence across the Americas, and we hypothesize that support for extralegal violence is higher not only in countries with extreme levels of violence but especially in countries in which people distrust the political system. Results indicate that support for extralegal violence is significantly higher in societies characterized by little support for the existing political system.

By Mikaela Rabinowitz, Vaughn Crandall, and Shantay Jackson. 

Community gun violence in US cities is both rare and highly concentrated. Decades of research and practice show that shootings cluster within a very small number of people, places, and social networks. Effective violence reduction therefore requires identifying and engaging the individuals at very high risk of being involved in gun violence in the immediate future (i.e., very high-risk individuals, or VHRI).

This new brief is designed to support jurisdictions working to implement community violence intervention approaches by improving their ability to identify VHRI. The brief provides 1) a concise synthesis of the research evidence on risk for involvement in community gun violence, and 2) guidance on how to implement structured processes to identify the people driving violence within their communities.

By Alice Baxter

The government has announced that it is establishing a statutory public inquiry into grooming gangs. The inquiry begins work on 13 April 2026. Why have there been calls for an inquiry? By the early 2010s, multiple child sexual abuse scandals had prompted public concern about the state response to organised and systematic child sexual abuse. These included revelations about media personalities such as Jimmy Savile and Rolf Harris as well as about organised child sexual abuse in towns such as Rotherham, Oldham and Rochdale. In 2014 Theresa May, then Home Secretary, established a non-statutory inquiry panel into the issue. The inquiry panel was replaced by a statutory public inquiry (the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, or IICSA) in 2015, after the Home Secretary told the House of Commons that the panel had lost the trust of victims and survivors. IICSA took seven years to complete, making 20 recommendations in its final report in 2022. In July 2024, Oldham Council wrote to the Home Secretary requesting a public inquiry into child sexual exploitation in the local area. In October 2024, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls, Jess Phillips, refused Oldham Council’s request (PDF). The minister wrote that it should be for Oldham Council itself to decide to commission a local inquiry, rather than for the government to intervene. This decision became the focus of considerable parliamentary and press attention in January 2025, in part driven by comments made by the US tech CEO Elon Musk on social media. Also in January 2025, the then Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, told the House of Commons that none of IICSA’s recommendations had been implemented. The government asked Baroness Casey of Blackstock to run a “rapid audit” on gang-based exploitation and report to the government on what further work was needed. Baroness Casey reported in June 2025, recommending that the government establish both a national police operation and a national inquiry

By Devon Ziminski , Julia P Schleimer and  Meron Girma 

Community violence interventions (CVI) encompass a range of strategies aimed at reducing community firearm violence among those most affected. While CVI is an umbrella term, specific CVI approaches across the United States differ markedly in their underlying theoretical frameworks, specific program activities, and populations served. These different CVI approaches have not been well defined or uniformly understood. Given unprecedented financial support for CVI from local, state, and federal sources in recent years, increased research attention to understanding the implementation and impacts of these programs, and growing efforts by policymakers, practitioners, and community leaders to enact CVI programs, it is important to understand how CVI is defined and characterized in applied discourse (eg, among CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars). This grey literature review aimed to synthesize how CVI practitioners, funders, and scholars commonly characterize CVI approaches and how those approaches relate to previously identified CVI theoretical frameworks. Following processes similar to a scoping review, we conducted a grey literature search to locate and synthesize information from webpages (eg, from community groups and academic organizations) and (non-peer reviewed) reports from web sources discussing CVI approaches. We identified nine main CVI approaches commonly mentioned in applied CVI discourse: 1. Violence interruption/street outreach; 2. Group violence interventions (GVI)/focused deterrence/group violence reduction strategy (GVRS); 3. Hospital-based violence intervention programs (HVIP); 4. Built environment/place-based/Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED); 5. Behavioral science interventions/cognitive behavioral interventions; 6. Victim/trauma/survivor programs/resources; 7. Mentoring/fellowship programs; 8. School-based/related youth interventions; and 9. Diversion/deflection programs. These approaches operated at multiple intervention levels and drew on various theoretical frameworks. Findings from this scoping review provide a timely summary of how CVI is characterized in applied discourse, which can support the field in operating from a shared understanding of what constitutes CVI and, in turn, inform CVI research, practice, and policy-making.

Community gun violence in US cities is both rare and highly concentrated. Decades of research and practice show that shootings cluster within a very small number of people, places, and social networks. Effective violence reduction therefore requires identifying and engaging the individuals at very high risk of being involved in gun violence in the immediate future (i.e., very high-risk individuals, or VHRI).

This new brief is designed to support jurisdictions working to implement community violence intervention approaches by improving their ability to identify VHRI. The brief provides 1) a concise synthesis of the research evidence on risk for involvement in community gun violence, and 2) guidance on how to implement structured processes to identify the people driving violence within their communities.

By The Louisville Office of Violence Prevention

The Louisville Metro Gun Violence Dashboard is updated daily, providing users with real-time information regarding criminal homicides and shootings [4]. Offering a broad view of gun violence, the dashboard includes information on year-to-date trends, victim demographics, and mapping visuals that use neighborhood, council districts, ZIP codes, and police districts. Since its launch, the dashboard has received approximately 100,000 views through June 30, 2025.

By: Mike Nellis, Emeritus Professor of Criminal and Community Justice, University of Strathclyde

Abstract

The 2025 Independent Sentencing Review (the Gauke Report) famously placed great emphasis on the use of technology in what has traditionally been called “community supervision”, to provide a way out of the capacity crisis in England and Wales’ prisons. In favours a significant expansion of electronic monitoring (EM) and markedly more punitive forms of remote regulation – dubbed “prison outside prison” in press releases. It further encourages the use of emerging forms of AI to make monitoring and supervision more efficient. In this, the Review was largely elaborating the Ministry of Justice’s own emerging view of the penal future. Its call for EM to be more integrated with the Probation Service, may have gone further, but the Review’s vision of the future Probation Service is of a punitive-surveillant agency with a rather ambiguous commitment to rehabilitation. Whether this imagined future is realised remains to be seen.

By: The JABBS Foundation for Women and Girls – Eliza Ogden Barnsley, Dr Tom McNeil and Lizzie Humphreys

Abstract

The Independent Sentencing Review represents a once in a generation opportunity to make the criminal justice system fairer and more effective. This article suggests how several recommendations for women might be implemented, drawing on pioneering research and evidence of ‘what works’. This includes, first, the important role of gender-responsive tools, in particular the Women’s Risk Needs Assessment (WRNA), recently validated in the UK for the first time by the University of Birmingham. Adopting tools that meet these standards is essential for ensuring pre-sentence reports identify a much wider range of needs and are gender- and trauma-responsive. Through this, practitioners are better able to tailor appropriate support for women to improve wellbeing against numerous metrics, while reducing re-offending (linked to Recommendation 6.3). Secondly, it discusses lessons from the Birmingham women’s Intensive Supervision Court (ISC), with emerging evidence showing great promise through its use of the WRNA and strong partnerships with women’s centres and numerous agencies, to inform the Government’s ISC expansion (Recommendation 6.1). Thirdly, we emphasise the importance of early intervention through women’s centres (linked to Recommendation 6.2) and other integrated and multi- disciplinary support, preventing the need for sentencing altogether. Combined, this article highlights evidence and opportunities for ‘how’ we capitalise on the Independent Sentencing Review’s momentum.

Introduction

The Corston Report (2007) was pivotal in advocating for the radical change that is needed for women in the criminal justice system. At its core, it highlighted the vital need for a holistic, wrap-around approach that aligned with women’s unique needs and pathways into crime. Whilst this sentiment was largely well received and a number a great steps towards progress were made, there were several missed opportunities, both in terms of policy, and ensuring effective long-term stability (Gelsthorpe and Russell, 2018). In the wake of the Independent Sentencing Review (2025), which we believe is ambitious given the current social and political climate, it is critical such opportunities are not again missed. Whilst the review makes a number of recommendations that we believe have the potential to genuinely improve the lives of many women in the criminal justice system (CJS), careful implementation is required, learning from the existing and growing evidence of ‘what works’. This article first highlights some of the most pertinent recommendations for women in the review, outlines the key contemporary evidence before suggesting some opportunities for effective implementation.

By: Dave Nicholson and Helen Codd

The Independent Sentencing Review highlights the potential of AI for supporting behavioural change in criminal justice involved people and identifies SherlockAI as deserving further exploration and evaluation to realise that potential (p.135). SherlockAI was co-founded by criminal justice involved people in partnership with the authors, and in this article, we explain how SherlockAI offers a distinctive and innovative resource. Both the authors are part of the SherlockAI team and this short article offers insights into why the innovative approach of this particular app resonates with the findings of the review at a time when there are ongoing emergent developments in mobile-based technologies to encourage and support desistance (Bartels, 2023; Knight et al., 2024; McGreevy, 2017; Morris and Graham, 2019) and ongoing interest in Hilary Cottam’s work on radical help and radical care (Cottam, 2018; Cottam, 2021).

By: Rob Allen, Independent Researcher, and former Director of the International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College, London

Abstract

The Gauke review was primarily commissioned in response to a crisis in prison capacity. Despite a series of emergency measures to reduce demand for prison places and a planned increase in the supply of those places, the incoming Labour government recognised that future sustainability required a recalibration if not of sentencing, then at least of the way sentences are implemented.

This paper considers the extent to which the review’s core recommendations and the measures proposed in the government’s response are likely to bring about long-term sustainability and efficiency.

It will examine

• the credibility of the impacts on prison numbers made for the four of Gauke’s five

  core recommendations accepted by the government; the reduction of short sentences, extended scope of suspended sentences, earned release provisions and a new model for recall and

• the extent to which the current supply of prison places can be maintained and expanded to the required level.

  It concludes with suggestions about further steps which could be taken to limit the growth of prison numbers and enable investment in more constructive ways of preventing and responding to crime.

  Keywords: Gauke, prison, sentencing; early release, probation.

  Introduction

  In its 2024 election manifesto, under a section entitled A justice system that puts victims first, the Labour Party promised to ‘carry out a review of sentencing to ensure it is brought up to date’ (Labour Party, 2024). But the real driver of the Gauke review was not a desire

for modernisation but the need to address the urgent lack of custodial capacity to meet current and projected demand, something described by incoming Justice Secretary Shabana Mahmood as ‘a prison system in crisis, moments from catastrophic disaster’ (Mahmood, 2024a).

When introducing emergency early release measures to avert that disaster, Mahmood confirmed a commitment to longer-term reform and cutting reoffending, and that a forthcoming review would make sure ‘our sentencing is consistent and coherent, and that our sentences do actually work’ (Ibid).

It was only when the Independent Sentencing Review (ISR) was announced in October 2024 that its primary purpose was revealed – ‘ensuring we never run out of prison places again’ (Mahmood, 2024b). Injecting a rare dose of realism into penal policy, the Justice Secretary told MPs that despite the creation of 14,000 new prison places, ‘we cannot build our way out of this crisis. However fast we build, increasing demand will outstrip supply’.

The total adult prison population - 87,294 on 6 October 2025 - is projected to increase steadily to reach between 97,300 and 112,300 prisoners by November 2032, with a central estimate of 104,100 (MoJ, 2024b). The prison expansion programme aims to produce a usable capacity of about 99,000 by 2032 (MoJ, 2024a). To meet the clear objective of balancing supply of and demand for prison places, the ISR was advised that ‘that aiming to reduce demand by 9,500 prison places would help ensure there were sufficient places for the most serious offenders’ (ISR, 2025a).

The final report of the Gauke review, published in May 2025, proposed five core recommendations designed to reduce prison numbers to meet that requirement (ISR, 2025b). Gauke estimated that the combined effect of these would be to reduce the prison population by 9,800. His report also contained a number of other proposals that might lead to reductions in prison numbers but unlike the core recommendations the effects were not specified. Even for the core recommendations, the review provided no details about how the estimated effects had been calculated and failed to indicate over what timescale the reductions would take effect. This is important given the short period in which the demand for prison places is projected to exceed demand, perhaps as early as 2026 (PAC, 2025).

Four of Gauke’s five core recommendations have in large part been accepted by the Government and are contained in a Sentencing Bill published in July 2025 and whose Second Reading was held on 16 September 2025. The Bill’s Impact Assessment (IA) provides lower estimates for the deflationary effects of the Gauke proposals on prison numbers than did the ISR. This reflects the outright rejection of one recommendation - an ‘earned progression’ model for those serving Extended Determinate Sentences (EDS) - and modifications to others. The best estimate for prison place impacts of the Bill’s measures is 7,500 although this figure includes the impact of measures designed to reduce the use of custodial remand which did not emerge directly from the ISR (MoJ, 2025a).

Before assessing these, it is worth noting that the ISR did not consider all of the ways in which pressures on the prison population might be reduced.

First, although the ISR was intended to be a comprehensive re-evaluation of the sentencing framework, arrangements for young people under 18, wholesale reform of sentences for murder and the management of Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) were excluded from its scope.

Of these perhaps the most significant in terms of impact on the prison population, albeit indirectly, is the murder sentencing framework. In his preliminary report on sentencing trends, the Gauke review identified the principal cause of the increasing prison population ‘is that prison sentences have been lengthened substantially by successive governments’ (ISR, 2025b). In particular, it concluded that the introduction of statutory starting points for minimum terms for offenders convicted of murder ‘had an impact on wider sentencing and the prison population more broadly, subsequently inflating sentence lengths for other serious offences’ (ibid). Gauke’s terms of references did permit him to consider the impact of sentencing for murder on the wider sentencing framework, but other than recommending that the Law Commission should look at the minimum sentence tariffs for murder, the final report did not propose ways of limiting the effects of increasing sentence lengths for murder on other offences in order to put a brake on sentence inflation.

Indeed, more generally, Gauke’s final report and proposals shied away from addressing head on the reduction of the length of sentences imposed by the courts for example by reducing maximum penalties, or recalibrating sentencing guidelines. Nor did the review make recommendations to remove the minimum sentences for certain offences or the requirements on courts to treat previous convictions as aggravating factors, both of which have contributed to making sentences more severe. Gauke suggests that maximum and minimum penalties should be looked at, but his review itself does little to address the rampant sentence inflation which the first part of his review identified as the main cause of the capacity crisis.

Instead, the review concentrates on how prison sentences are implemented, proposing much greater use of suspension of prison terms so that they are served in the community; a structure for most prison sentences which involves shorter periods in custody; and limitations to the use of imprisonment as a response to failures to comply with post release supervision. While these may prove useful ways of reducing the numbers in prison in the short to medium term, they do not necessarily provide the basis for a proportionate, transparent, and sustainable sentencing framework suitable for a modern liberal democratic state.

This article starts by discussing each of the Gauke proposals which are designed to reduce prison numbers before addressing the overall impact they are likely to have on demand for prison. It continues with an assessment of the supply side of the equation- how more prison places are being created - before concluding with some observations about what further action might be needed to restrain the use of prison in an unpromising political climate.

When a new government was elected in July 2024, they were confronted by a prison capacity crisis in England and Wales. In order to identify long term solutions to this, they established the Independent Sentencing Review (ISR), to be chaired by David Gauke, which was tasked in its terms of reference with ’a comprehensive re-evaluation of our sentencing framework ... to ensure we are never again in a position where the country has more prisoners than prison places‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2024a).

Before that was even launched, however, the Secretary of State for Justice had started discussing the idea of earned release, whereby people in prison could secure earlier release

by participating in education, training or other positive activity. This idea quickly became arguably the most prominent element of the government’s plans for prison reform and central to the ISR.

This article will track the evolution of this policy idea, show how the current plans to implement it constitute a missed opportunity, and look at what would be needed to implement a proper policy of earned release based on participation in education and training.

By: Phoebe Lil, Advance Charity

The publication of the Independent Sentencing Review (ISR) in May 2025 provoked a diverse range of reactions from the specialist women’s sector. For some, particularly those delivering services responding to Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG), there was trepidation about the impact of measures designed to ease the prison capacity crisis on victim/survivors. Specialist organisations working with justice-experienced women welcomed the range of measures that would have an overall positive impact on criminalised women.

But what do the women affected by these recommendations think? This article explores several thematic ISR recommendations, subsequently accepted by the Government, in the context of women’s experiences of existing interventions. Drawing on Advance’s experience – a leading women’s charity that supports women in contact with the criminal justice system and those who have experienced, or are at risk of, domestic abuse and other forms of gender-based violence – we will examine how the recommended measures can be implemented to best meet the needs of women who have been victimised, criminalised or – as is often the case – both.

The article will begin by demonstrating how a lack of adequate victim response can result in women committing offences, including examples from Advance’s services for criminalised women. As is well documented, women who offend are much more likely than the general population to have experienced some form of abuse, domestic or other.

Drawing on insights from services and best practice by Advance and partners, we then highlight how ISR recommendations should be implemented to ensure women’s safety. Finally, we consider where gaps in recommendations remain, and where the Government must invest to deliver a truly whole-system reform of a CJS that works for women, enabling

both the successful implementation of the ISR and other government ambitions, including the Women’s Justice Board and halving VAWG in a decade.

By Jeremy McDermott,  Steven Dudley

“Connections between European and Latin American criminal networks have surged in recent years, with drugs, gold, and human trafficking proving particularly lucrative in the European market.

The number of European citizens linked to criminal networks arrested in Latin America has increased significantly, especially in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina. The strengthening alliance between Latin American and European crime groups now poses a global threat.

Today’s Latin America’s major criminal networks, unlike the cartels of the 1980s, operate in a world of subcontracting. Groups, or nodes in the network, often specialize in specific roles or stages of the supply chain. If a node is targeted by law enforcement, the network can quickly adjust and reconfigure itself, ensuring efficiency and the uninterrupted flow of criminal commodities.

These networks pose a serious threat to the rule of law, subverting it by establishing social norms through violence to exercise control with different forms of criminal governance. In Latin America and the Caribbean, they pose the single biggest threat to democracy in the region, using corruption to penetrate the state, and violence where bribery fails. This means it is the primary motor for human rights abuses and homicides. Corruption, like cancer, is spreading through state institutions in many nations of the region. Additionally, these networks harm economic stability development, distorting local economies, deterring foreign investment and affecting international financing.

Studying these networks is crucial to understanding the flow of illicit goods from Latin America to Europe, and essential to crafting effective strategies to combat these structures. After an analysis of different variables such as their criminal economies, geographical distribution or state response, EL PACCTO 2.0 and InSight Crime, with the support of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), particularly within the Operational Action 8.3, of the High Risk Criminal Networks EMPACT, have ranked the 28 most active or relevant high-risk criminal networks in Latin America and the Caribbean, identifying key factors about their operations that reveal potential opportunities for combating organized crime in the region. This work has direct implications for both Latin America and Europe.

The list ranges from criminal networks with thousands of members to small brokers or gangs operating in Latin American countries, Caribbean islands or in Central America. In addition, the current report has sought to identify the connections or influence that high-risk criminal networks may have in different countries. This has led to the creation of a specific file for each criminal network with a specific individual map. Likewise, an aggregate map of all the information on the 28 criminal networks has been designed to provide a global overview.”

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2025. 114p