By Ichiro Iwasaki and Kocenda, Evzen

We examine the corporate criminal records of 18,187 firms operating in 17 European emerging markets and empirically analyze the effects of board composition and national institutions on crime deterrence. Our analysis reveals that 872 firms (about 5% of the sample) committed 1,734 crimes over 2020-2023. We show that firms with larger boards and greater board independence are associated with higher incidences of corporate crime, suggesting that larger or nominally independent boards may not function effectively in emerging market contexts. In contrast, female leadership and board gender diversity do not exhibit significant deterrent effects, implying that gender inclusion alone may not suffice in these environments. In banks with an outside board chairman, the occurrence of corporate crime increases substantially. Importantly, stronger national institutions consistently correlate with lower crime rates, a pattern observed universally across European emerging markets, and boards in countries with stronger institutions appear more effective in deterring crime

CESifo Working Paper No. 12132 54 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2025

By Wang Ngai Yeung, Riccardo Di Clemente & Renaud Lambiotte

Criminal networks such as human trafficking rings are threats to the rule of law, democracy and public safety in our global society. Network science provides invaluable tools to identify key players and design interventions for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), e.g., to dismantle their organisation. However, poor data quality and the robustness of criminal networks make effective intervention extremely challenging. Although there exists a large body of work building and applying network scientific tools to green intervene criminal networks, these work often neglect the problems of data incompleteness and inaccuracy. Moreover, there is thus far no comprehensive understanding of the impacts of data quality on the downstream effectiveness of interventions. This work investigates the relationship between data quality and intervention effectiveness based on classical graph theoretic and machine learning-based targeting approaches. Decentralization emerges as a major factor in network robustness, particularly under conditions of incomplete data, which renders intervention strategies largely ineffective. Moreover, the robustness of centralized networks can be boosted using simple heuristics, making targeted intervention more infeasible. Consequently, we advocate for a more cautious application of network science in disrupting criminal networks, the continuous development of an interoperable intelligence ecosystem, and the creation of novel network inference techniques to address data quality challenges.

 EPJ Data Sci. 14, 37 (2025)

By Kristina Amerhauser | Audrey Thill 

  Cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia rely heavily on information and communications technology, financial fraud, trafficking for forced criminality, corruption and elite capture. This creates what can be described as ‘compound crimes’, reflecting how cyber scam operations are both based in physical compounds and involve multiple criminal markets. While estimates vary, the scale of funds defrauded from scam victims each year is in the tens of billions of US dollars and trending upward. In addition, illicit proceeds are generated from exploitation of trafficked persons, illegal gambling and corruption. The scale of illicit financial flows represents a clear threat to national economies, governance and international security. Cyber scam operations and their enabling networks operate at scale across Southeast Asia and beyond. They have reportedly trapped hundreds of thousands of people inside compounds where they are forced to conduct scams. Some operations retain workers through debt bondage, psychological coercion and financial incentives. Significant diversity in operational models – from high-security compounds to thousands of smaller operations located in apartments and other small premises – creates varied patterns of financial flows across jurisdictions. The money laundering process is part of a sophisticated financial service ecosystem. Most concerning is how networks of actors operate at scale and at the intersection of legitimate and illegitimate economies by using licensed crypto exchanges, registered fintech platforms and traditional banking services. Some are ‘crime as a service’ providers, explicitly providing money laundering services to cyber scam operations and doing so with corporate efficiency. This means that moving and laundering money has evolved into a marketplace-type structure where actors remain anonymous to others within the network. Governments, the private sector and civil society actors have sought innovative responses to disrupt the illicit industry. These include initiatives that ‘follow the money’ and disrupt the money laundering networks used by cyber scam operations. While some work has begun to explore illicit financial flows stemming from scam operations, notably related to cryptocurrencies, important gaps persist. Less is known about the wider set of financial flows, the mechanisms used to transfer proceeds in and out of the region and the networks involved. This policy brief seeks to help fill this gap by mapping wider related payments and providing insights into how money is moved and where it ultimately ends up. It concludes by providing actionable policy recommendations for Southeast Asian governments as well as regional and global financial service providers. Crucially, these recommendations identify entry points for disrupting the operations of the transnational organized crime groups that run cyber scam operations. The key findings include: Actors involved in cyber scams and trafficking for forced criminality often use cryptocurrency to move illicit money. They also use cash, fintech – such as peer-to-peer (P2P) payment apps – gaming or gambling platforms, bank transfers, shell and front companies, credit cards and pre-paid cards. The role of the formal banking sector in these financial flows appears significant, as many scam-related transfers are initiated by the victim from their own bank accounts before being converted into cryptocurrencies at different steps of the laundering process. While most financial institutions likely process these transactions unwittingly, evidence suggests they may be enabled by regulatory loopholes such as weak know-your-customer (KYC) requirements and/or excessively high minimum thresholds for reporting suspicious transactions. After being laundered and converted back into fiat currency4 from cryptocurrency, illicit funds are also likely to be moved again through the formal financial system.

Many of the fintech and cryptocurrency platforms that money laundering networks use to convert cryptocurrencies back into fiat are registered companies and hold financial service licences. Some owners of these platforms have close connections to the political and business elites in the countries of registration, suggesting influence over financial regulation and an interest in maintaining a policy environment amenable to the large-scale laundering of criminal proceeds. Transnational organized crime groups in Southeast Asia generate highly lucrative profits. This creates a vicious cycle: greater profits enable these groups to expand their influence, including over public officials and the financial sector, which in turn reduces scrutiny of cyber scam compounds and related suspicious financial transactions. With their growing wealth, these criminal networks invest further into other types of crime and crime-as-a-service infrastructure, generating additional profits that allow them to strengthen their influence and market position   
Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2025. 44p.

By Jennifer Franks

The Department of Homeland Security's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program gives agencies cybersecurity tools to strengthen the networks and systems they use to meet their missions.While the program has met two of its goals, it lacks sufficient guidance for managing network security and data protection. The program generally supports government-wide cybersecurity initiatives, but DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency hasn't finalized all plans for how CDM can provide support. For example, the agency hasn't fully updated the program's cloud asset management guidance.

We recommended DHS address these issues

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025. 46p.

By Richard Danzig

In this paper, the author warns national security decisionmakers that to accomplish their missions they urgently need to better prepare for the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on cybersecurity. He analyzes the present failings of the U.S. government in this respect, highlights the consequences of these failings, and makes recommendations for correcting them. He offers this effort as a case study and draws from it ten propositions relevant to those who are more broadly concerned with how AI, other technologies, and human decisions are intertwined and co-evolving.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2025.

By Katalin Parti, Thomas Dearden

Purpose: Historically, cybercrime has been seen as a near exclusively male activity. We were interested to learn whether the relationship between strain and crime holds for both males and females.

Methods: We utilized an online survey instrument to collect data from a national sample of individuals (n=2,121) representing the US population by age, gender, race and ethnicity. We asked offending related questions regarding various cybercrimes. In the current study, we use data from 390 individuals who reported a cybercrime activity within the past 12 months.

Results: We find strong support for prior strains correlating with both specific (e.g., illegal uploading) and general cyber-offending. We further examine whether gender interacts with strain. While general strain theory (GST) correlates with cyber-offending for both males and females, we did find a few important differences. Except for lack of trust in others and receiving unsatisfactory evaluation at school or work, there are different variables responsible for online offending for men and women. Parents’ divorcing, anonymity, and online video gaming increase cybercrime offending in women, whereas falling victim to a crime, breaking up with a significant other, and darkweb activity are correlated with cyber-offending for men.

Conclusion: Although GST functions differently by gender when it comes to engaging in cyber-offending, the theory is indeed gender-specific, as different strain variables are responsible for engaging in cyber-offending in women and men. Components of general strain responsible for cyber-offending need to be further studied concerning gender. According to our results, GST is gender-specific, and these variables need to be further studied.

International Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 13, 211–226

By Suleman Lazarus  · Peter Tickner  · Michael R. McGuire1

 We discuss cybercrimes against senior citizens from three standpoints: (a) online fraudsters often target senior citizens because of their age, which results in the propagation of ageism. Thus, we explicitly defne ageism in the context of cybercrime, characterising it as the intentional targeting or prioritisation of senior citizens as potential victims of online fraud. (b) Senior citizens are vulnerable to online fraud schemes for physiological (e.g., cognitive decline), psychological (e.g., elevated fear of cybercrime), familial (e.g., insider fraud), and sociocultural (e.g., isolation) reasons. (c) Cybercrimes against older adults predominantly fall under the socioeconomic category driven by a common fnancial motive. We argue that ageism serves as a weapon used by online offenders to target older adults, whilst the concept of the ideal victim acts as society’s shield in response to these reprehensible actions. This framework invites closer attention to how age-based targeting in cyberspace reproduces broader social, economic, and moral asymmetries.  Future empirical studies are warranted to substantiate these claims beyond the theoretical realm.

Security Journal (2025) 38:42 

By Winnona DeSombre Bernsen

If the United States wants to increasingly use offensive cyber operations internationally, does it have the supply chain and acquisition capabilities to back it up—especially if its adversary is the People’s Republic of China? 

 The Cyber Statecraft Initiative’s new report from CSI nonresident fellow Winnona DeSombre Bernsen, Crash (exploit) and burn: Securing the offensive cyber supply chain to counter China in cyberspace,  is the first to conduct a comparative study within the international offensive cyber supply chain, comparing the United States’ fragmented, risk-averse acquisition model with China’s outsourced and funnel-like approach.

 Strategic competition between the United States and China has long played out in cyberspace, where offensive cyber capabilities, like zero-day vulnerabilities, are a strategic resource. Since 2016, China has been turning the zero-day marketplace in East Asia into a funnel of offensive cyber capabilities for its military and intelligence services, both to ensure it can break into the most secure Western technologies and to deny the United States from obtaining similar capabilities from the region. If the United States wishes to compete in cyberspace, it must compete against China to secure its offensive cyber supply chain.

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025. 44p

By Hal S. Stern and Daniel L. Cork, Editors

Cybercrime poses serious threats and financial costs to individuals and businesses in the United States and worldwide. Reports of data breaches and ransomware attacks on governments and businesses have become common, as have incidents against individuals (e.g., identity theft, online stalking, and harassment). Concern over cybercrime has increased as the internet has become a ubiquitous part of modern life. However, comprehensive, consistent, and reliable data and metrics on cybercrime still do not exist - a consequence of a shortage of vital information resulting from the decentralized nature of relevant data collection at the national level.

Cybercrime Classification and Measurement addresses the absence credible cybercrime data and metrics. This report provides a taxonomy for the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of measuring different types of cybercrime, including both cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes faced by individuals and businesses, and considers the needs for its periodic revision. This report was mandated by the 2022 Better Cybercrime Metrics Act (BCMA).

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press., 2025. 160p.

By Mark Button  · Vasileios Karagiannopoulos  · Julak Lee  · Joon Bae Suh  · Jeyong Jung

Introduction The nature of crime has been changing globally with technological and other societal developments fuelling a growth in fraud and cybercrime (Button and Cross 2017). The diversity and rapid evolution of a broad range of scams has led to millions across the globe becoming victims of fraud (Federal Trade Commission 2019; ONS 2023a, 2023b). A common belief often promoted in policy circles and some research is that older adults are more vulnerable to fraud (James et al. 2014). This is not so clear cut, however, as in terms of victimisation, the middle aged have been most at risk (see Fig. 1 later). This is changing and there is evidence older adults (65+) are fast becoming the one of the most at risk categories and that they also tend to lose much more than other age groups (see Table 1 later). Indeed, there are a variety of trends fuelling a potential explosion in fraud and cybercrime among older adults unless serious action is taken to reduce the risks that we will shortly explore. It is for this reason we conceived this special edition and the research project that underpins it. To set the context for this edition, it is important to examine the factors fuelling the growth in fraud and cybercrime victimisation among older age groups. We will do this using data from the UK and South Korea. The reason for the selection of these countries is simple. The funding for the project stimulating this edition came from ESRC funding aimed at developing relationships with these two countries 

  Security Journal (2025) 38:40

By Lauren R. Shapiro 

This paper evaluated three cyber-enabled imposter scams against older adults using Lifestyle Routine Activity Theory. The frst section examined the motivated ofender’s tools for manipulating older adult targets (social engineering and persuasion) and explained how Artifcial Intelligence could increase exposure and susceptibility of imposter victims. The next section focused on the suitable victim by examining how heuristics and impaired cognitive, physical, and psychosocial abilities contributed to the older adult target’s susceptibility to imposter scam by interfering with the process of rational decision-making. The third section examined ways in which capable guardians, in the form of agencies and laws, protected and helped older adult targets from imposter scams. Recommendations regarding the creation of educational programs that teach older adults how to be safer online (i.e., less suitable victims) through evaluating risks, identifying potential imposter scams, and becoming efcient self-advocators were provided.   

  Security Journal (2025) 38:43

By Mark Button  · David Shepherd  · Chloe Hawkins  · Jacki Tapley

This paper explores older adults who are largely over 75 and their experience of fraud, based upon research with the clients of a UK charity working with this age group. The researchers used a postal questionnaire yielding almost 2000 responses, supplemented with interviews with clients and key staf. The research found higher rates of fraud victimisation than national rates for this age group as well regular attempted frauds, largely through the telephone. The experience of fraud and attempted fraud has a devastating impact on some of the lives of older adults, causing fear, anxiety, and related issues, which afects their quality of life. This is the frst study to illustrate that fear of fraud is a major problem amongst older adults, particularly females living alone.  

Security Journal (2025) 38:44

By Cassandra Cross  · Thomas J. Holt 

Using the premise of a genuine relationship, romance fraud ofenders deceive victims for monetary gain. Research on romance fraud has grown, but limited work explores the demographic correlates of victimisation. An assumption exists that older persons are more susceptible to fraud, though this dynamic is not consistently evident in the literature. This article analyses 2686 romance fraud complaints to Scamwatch, an online Australian fraud reporting portal, to identify correlates between being 65 years and older and their risk of victimisation. The fndings illustrate that seniors were not more likely to sufer monetary losses to romance fraud and were less likely to lose personal information compared to victims in other demographic groups. This study afrms the challenge of using demographics to predict romance fraud victimisation and emphasises the need for additional research in this area 

  Security Journal (2025) 38:46

By Katalin Parti  · Faika Tahir  · Pamela B. Teaster 

Cyber victimization targeting vulnerable populations, particularly older adults, has become increasingly prevalent in the digital age. Grounded in the Bioecological Systems Framework (Bronfenbrenner in The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979), this research explores the factors contributing to victimization, including the ease of exploitation, the situational factors setting up victims for scams, their vulnerabilities, the dynamics within their environments, and the challenges victims face in recognizing scams. Using semi-structured interviews, we asked scam victims (n=19) aged 60 years and above about their personal and structural circumstances as well as their individual assessment of the impact of their being victimized. Despite high levels of education and computer literacy among our sample, their victimization occurred far too frequently, which prompts a call for the revision of existing approaches toward helping older adults overcome scam victimization.  

  Security Journal (2025) 38:49

By Marcelo F. Aebi Stefano Caneppele Lorena Molnar (Eds.)

  Cybercrime has become part of everyday life. We live in hybrid societies, fl uctuating between the material and the virtual world, and we are hence confronted with online, offl ine and hybrid offences. However, the few victimisation surveys conducted in Europe reveal that victims of online crimes seldom report them to the police. Consequently, cybercrimes – which according to the best estimates represent between one third and more than half of all attempted and completed crimes in Europe – seldom appear in national criminal statistics. The State seems powerless to prevent them and private security companies fl ourish. During two days, experts from all over the continent gathered together in the framework of a virtual conference organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union to discuss what we know, what we do not know, and what we could do to improve our knowledge of crime in our contemporary hybrid societies, develop evidence-based criminal policies, provide assistance to crime victims, and implement realistic programs in the fi eld of crime prevention and offender treatment. This book presents their experiences, refl exions, and proposals  

The Hague: Eleven Publishing, 2022. 150p.  

By Yen Zhi Yi
SYNOPSIS
In recent months, heightened media scrutiny has drawn attention to the proliferation of scam centres along Myanmar’s border towns and the subsequent crackdowns on them. Concurrently, Singapore has also witnessed a significant increase in scam-related incidents, with the government urging vigilance and taking precautionary measures to safeguard its citizens. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for ASEAN countries to work collaboratively to tackle this growing cross-border scourge. Doing so calls for stepped-up action at home to enhance awareness and enforcement collaboration abroad among regional partners to check this transnational security challenge.
 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 6p.

Socio-economic status, demographic background and criminal history.

By Lisa Westfelt

This study focuses on aspects that have not yet been examined in Swedish research: the socio-economic status and demographic background of victims and perpetrators at the time homicides are committed, as well as the victims and perpetrators’ criminal histories.

English summary of Brå report 2025:5 Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), 2025. 14p.

By Lisa Westfelt, Sara Jonsson and Ulrika Lindstedt

Brå has been commissioned by the Government to survey crime and fear of crime in rural areas. Brå’s commission has included describing the specific nature of criminality and how fear of crime affects people in rural areas. Brå has also analysed the incidence of crimes committed by animal rights activists. The study is mainly based on police report statistics, the Swedish Crime Survey and interviews both with municipal police officers and crime prevention coordinators in rural municipalities and with experts. Less crime and greater sense of safety As with previous studies in this area, the analysis shows that, overall, there is less crime in rural areas. This applies to both reported offences and self-reported victimisation. People living in rural municipalities report less fear of crime than those in other types of municipalities. Crime trends follow broadly the same patterns as elsewhere in Sweden. According to the Swedish Crime Survey, various types of municipalities show no differences in terms of citizens’ experiences with the police, but the survey shows a marginally lower level of confidence in the justice system in rural municipalities. However, several interviewees argue that confidence in the police, as well as in public authorities in general, is lower in certain very sparsely populated rural areas. Specific challenges for crime prevention There are certain conditions in rural areas that, directly or indirectly, impact crime and create challenges for crime prevention. Financial difficulties and skills shortages Many rural municipalities have declining and ageing populations, which leads to a shrinking tax base and financial difficulties. The low population density and declining populations of rural areas have made it more difficult for businesses providing goods and services in rural areas to operate. As public utilities and infrastructure are gradually dismantled, social trust can be negatively affected, and, with it, confidence in the justice system. Our interviews reveal that municipalities experience difficulty in securing necessary skills as well as in recruiting and retaining municipal police.

English summary of Brå report 2025:1 Stockholm: The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), 2025.2025. 8p.

Scope, trends and characteristics.

By Klara Hradilova-Selin

This study is the fourth in a series of Brå’s research reports on homicide in Sweden, based on material from the criminal justice system. The analyses build on audited data from police preliminary investigations and, in cases that have been cleared, judgments obtained from both district courts and appeal courts. The aim has been to outline trends in and characteristics of homicide cases since 1990, with a particular focus on the most recent period for which data have been collected, 2018–2021. Some analyses also include data from Brå’s statistics on confirmed cases of lethal violence for 2022 and 2023. 

Report 2024:6

By The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention

This report focuses on how circumstances and situations that make fraud possible are targeted by fraud prevention measures. The report also includes recommendations for different crime prevention actors.